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LINGUISTIC CLAIMS AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS

Spanish Labyrinths in the European Context

Andrea C. Bianculli, Jacint Jordana and Mónica Ferrín Pereira

Linguistic Claims and Political Conflicts

This book explores and assesses the multiple levels at which linguistic policies can be challenged, devised and enacted, i.e. sub-national, national and supranational, and the variety of state and non-state actors involved.

Moving beyond descriptive and normative approaches, it provides an empirical comparative assessment of the policy responses and strategies deployed to deal with linguistic diversity and conflicts in Spain, a country where almost one third the population is at least bilingual in their own languages. The Spanish case is then assessed within the European context, both from the perspective of multilevel influence and mutual interaction, and from the learning experiences it may entail for similar or equivalent problems and disputes occurring at the European level or beyond.

This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of Spanish politics, linguistics, identity politics and more broadly of European politics and governance, public policy, education and communication policy and comparative politics.

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Foreword

Language is a subject which is politically way too important to leave its study only in the hands of linguists. As pioneers of contemporary political sociology such as Karl W. Deutsch or Stein Rokkan have cogently shown, the key parameters of linguistic conflicts in modern societies are not connected to issues intrinsic to language: they reflect the complex relationship between language and collective identity. The main arena where this complexity comes to the fore obviously is nationalism. Thus, when we talk about the issues that configure the Spanish labyrinths which are the subject of this book, we refer to phenomena of a cultural politics which cannot be properly grasped by drawing on the concepts currently in vogue in the realm of, say, applied linguistics and contiguous disciplines. Their study rather requires looking into the mobilisation of social groups, power relations and the institutional factors that define the status of different linguistic collectivities.

From this angle, and in contrast with the recurrent stereotypes of language ideologies, it is not some magic feature inherent to Castilian/Spanish what makes for its dominant position vis-à-vis other vernaculars spoken on Spanish territory, such as Basque or Catalan. The dominance rather results from the politics of a state-building centre that embodies a long record of negating diversity, be it on religious or linguistic grounds. Some 50 years ago, the late Juan Linz, who may not only be considered one of 20th-century Europe's leading political sociologists, but also an iconic intellectual of liberal Spanish nationalism, published an article where he focused on the institutional reluctance of accepting multilingualism in a society with a 'dominant world language', this language being Castilian. There is no point in questioning the force of sheer numbers, which make it very difficult for Galician, with about 2.4 million speakers, or Catalan, with about 9 million, to compete on equal terms with Spanish, which counts more than 450

million native speakers worldwide, as the *Instituto Cervantes*, set up by the Spanish state to promote Spanish abroad, proudly claims. We must keep in mind, however, that the 'global linguistic market', where only few languages share the privilege of being part of the transnational communication oligopoly, has not been shaped by spontaneous and politically innocent forces. It rather reflects the impact of imperial legacies, which persist into the present, and which cannot simply be reduced to demographic factors, but have very much to do with the political attribution of unequal status to different groups and their languages.

Minority language activists in Spain sometimes tend to link the imperial legacies of Spanish in Spain with its legacies in postcolonial multilingual contexts, such as the Andean region or in Mexico. The analogism does not really work, as the dominance Spanish/Castilian has had in relation to Basque in the Basque Country or to Catalan in Catalonia for most of the last four centuries has other causes than those that led to the dominance of Spanish/Castilian in relation to Aymara or to Nahuatl. The long period of subalternity of Basque, for instance, cannot be explained by the same factors that entailed the repression of indigenous languages in the Americas, where enforced assimilation might even be regarded as one of the more 'benign' facets of a history characterised by protracted economic exploitation, cultural discrimination and racism. Yet regardless of all critical differences between what happened on the Iberian Peninsula and in the Americas, it is difficult to completely separate the external from the internal repercussions of Spain's imperial past. Notwithstanding the terminal collapse of the Spanish empire in 1898, the collective imagery of Spanish nationalism remained permeated by notions of a cultural greatness that at best was prepared to tolerate diversity, but never came to embrace it, which would have implied to renounce hegemonic claims.

Overcoming hegemony and establishing civic equality in ways that ended the protracted subordination of the 'regional' languages, giving their speakers a collective dignity that had previously been the exclusive privilege of those who identified with Castilian, thereby became one of the key challenges the parliamentary monarchy established in 1978 had to confront. How well has it done in this respect? Which balance can be drawn 50 years after the reestablishment of democracy? In dealing with these questions, the authors of 'Spanish Labyrinths' rightly emphasise that the answers must be considered substantial evidence for assessing the quality of democratic citizenship in Spain today.

As they show with great empirical detail, the assessment leads to mixed and somewhat problematic results. It may be true that Spain does not do significantly worse than many other Western-type democracies when it comes to recognising linguistic diversity. The *Estado de las autonomías* created by the 1978 constitution introduced a model that combined political decentralisation with the recognition of the vernaculars in a number of Autonomous Communities. Spain thus departed from the highly uniformising system of territorial rule it had been implementing for most part of its modern history, a history characterised by the attempt at imitating the state structures of the neighbour to the north without being able to deliver the key elements of political modernisation characteristic of the French republic. The adoption of linguistic autonomy at the regional level has certainly played a determinant role in inverting the trend that characterised the 40 years of Francoist dictatorship. In particular, it has allowed for a substantial recovery of Basque and Catalan. The recovery is basically due to the empowerment of the governments of the respective Autonomous Communities when it comes to devising their language policies, widely accepted by their citizens, who have been ratifying these policies in successive elections. That much can be said on the positive side. In parallel and often convoluted ways, the recovery has also instigated new forms of political conflict, which in most cases relate to the public status of those languages that had formerly been subject to discrimination. Generally speaking, the rationale subjacent to these conflicts is the politics of a recognition which is only given reluctantly and largely remains an *unequal* recognition. In other words, what fuels conflict is an arrangement where the officiality of Galician, Catalan and Basque may be accepted by the centre, but only as long as it remains subordinate to the officiality of Castilian, the only 'official Spanish language of the state', as Article 3 of the Constitution reads.

The Spanish state has remained monolingual, although it qualifies this monolingualism by admitting the co-existence of Castilian with other languages in its peripheries. The linguistic autonomy model thereby establishes a clear asymmetry between Castilian, on the one hand, and Basque, Catalan and Galician, on the other hand. This makes for a basic difference between Spain and linguistic federations such as Belgium or Switzerland, where the languages which are official at the level of regions or cantons are official state languages as well. It is a striking difference, given the sheer quantitative proportions of linguistic diversity in Spain, and – even more important – the political salience of the issue. The asymmetry is exacerbated by an important additional factor: a key player in the conflicts described in

this book are the institutions of the Spanish state – most notoriously, the Spanish government – which regularly take the role of the alleged or actual victims of the policies of linguistic equalisation introduced by an Autonomous Community, in particular by Catalonia. In consequence, the asymmetry inscribed in the Spanish Constitution finds its prolongation in the structure of sociopolitical conflicts turning around the question of language: Spain is a state that sociologically must be considered multinational. This very multinationalism gives linguistic identity issues much of their political virulence. However, Spain has not been willing to pay full institutional tribute to this multinational reality. This takes us back to the past and its imperial legacies, which Spain would have to forgo in radical ways, if it ever wanted to find a forward-looking path out of the labyrinth made of unjust domination hidden behind an obsolete rhetoric of historical mission and greatness.

Spain's inability at making sense of its democratic present by breaking with the remainders of an undemocratic past may be seen as one of the causes that keep fuelling the conflicts of the centre with those parts of the country that do not feel represented by the great Hispanic narrative, most ostensibly Catalonia and the Basque Country. The disaffection culminated in Catalonia's failed bid for independence in 2017. Many factors intervened on the tortuous trajectory that led to the Catalan crisis, whose end is not in sight yet. Most analyses put forward to date fall short of grasping the complexity of the constellation that led to the confrontation of the recent years. Yet it is not exaggerated to hold that one of the major aspects triggering the conflict has been the failure of Spanish authorities to find soft ways of accommodating Catalan aspirations, which have always included demands for real linguistic equality. In this context, it is only fair to add that the failure of Spain ultimately also is a failure of Europe, as the book's last chapters hint at. If democracy in Spain is not in best shape today, neither is democracy in many other parts of Europe. Among the main witnesses of this situation are those groups who claim cultural and linguistic rights without having a state that is supportive of these claims. While the politics of linguistic identity in Spain has features that respond to a particular path of state-building, these features do not have an exotic character; they overlap with general patterns of majority–minority relations that can be detected elsewhere in Europe as well. The asymmetries and hierarchies that become patent in the Spanish case are part of such general patterns, where political power translates into cultural power (and vice versa). Having been minoritised basically entails having less power than those represented by majority institutions when it comes to defining one's own linguistic status.

For many Europeans belonging to minoritised language groups, the European Union (EU), constituted by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, encouraged the hope that the entrenched historical grievances subjacent to the processes of state formation on the continent would find an end, rendering categories such as majority and minority ultimately obsolete. In a way that counterbalanced the technocratic jargon concomitant to the expansion and consolidation of the Common Market, the political discourse of integration in the 1990s very much celebrated diversity. The EU presented itself as a space where equal citizenship rights would not only be fully compatible with the protection of the diversity of languages and cultures, but where diversity would flourish due to the pivotal role it had been assigned for articulating a common project. At any rate, this was what Europe's all but forgotten motto 'united in diversity' – which never became official due to the implosion of the constitutional process in 2004 – seemed to indicate to those who saw the Union as the harbinger of a coming postnational age. From the corresponding angle, diversity could only be conceived of as a diversity in equity, i.e. as a diversity freed from the hierarchies and asymmetries that characterise majority–minority relations in a system of nation-states. Accordingly, the bonds between language, identity and political institutions were in the future to be shaped by a bottom-up dynamic, not by the top-down attribution of cultural status through state authorities. In the most basic sense, this would have implied, for instance, that Catalan (9 million speakers) would not have an inferior position vis-à-vis the EU than Latvian (2 million) or Maltese (0.5 million), which as official languages of a member state automatically become official languages of the EU as well. That this status is denied to Catalan still today shows that being stateless literally means being *statusless*. Diversity in equity would also have meant designing a transnational language regime that does not ignore the existence of immigrant languages, several of which (e.g. Arabic or Turkish) count significant numbers of speakers. Last but not least, it would have meant searching for paths enabling a Europe-wide network of communication between citizens beyond the one-dimensional logic of a language market monopolised by English.

From the perspective of 2020, all this sounds very much like science fiction. While Europeanisation is a reality to be measured not only in economic, but also in sociological and cultural terms, the EU lacks the political will to steer this process in a direction that would give unity in diversity a substantial meaning. Thirty years after Maastricht, to the extent it has any meaning at all, diversity in Europe first and foremost is a diversity owned and controlled by states. EU institutions

such as the Parliament have been hesitantly supportive of the Charter of European Regional and Minority Languages, introduced in the 1990s. But it has to be noted that the Charter was not the product of deliberations by the EU; it was launched from within the Council of Europe, and still has not been ratified by important EU member states (such as France). Regardless of the post-Maastricht diversity hype, the EU has remained passive where claims of being diverse did not make for an easy fit with the 'official' cultural profile of a member state. In contrast with former declarations of intent, in the implementation of Common Market policies linguistic diversity has rather been treated as an impediment than as an asset. The choice not to decide on linguistic issues stabilises a situation in which the use of English, irrespective of Brexit, has by default become the de facto approach to enhancing trans-European communication. As can be seen by the examples taken from the Spanish context of the last two decades, the impact of Europe at the local level has hardly been beneficial in terms of the protection of diversity; those who would like to reduce diversity to an oligopolistic undertaking have in some cases even used the imperatives of 'Europeanization' through dominant languages as an excuse for additionally weakening the position of non-dominant vernaculars.

All this does not make for an all too bright picture. Nevertheless, I would like to finish this foreword in a slightly optimistic mood, which should be based not only on the optimism of will, but also a bit on the optimism of reason, to paraphrase Gramsci's famous sentence. The present volume shows that the role of language – in singular *and* in plural – in the realisation of citizenship rights has become a key topic in contemporary scholarship on politics in diverse societies. This makes for an important link between the social sciences and the humanities, as language is the paramount example of a subject that requires multidisciplinary approaches. If a politics-blind study of languages does not make much sense, the same holds for a study of politics that does not take into consideration language and linguistic diversity. Putting it in technical terms, language is endogenous to democratic processes. This book is an excellent example for how the complex field of language politics can be tackled in productive ways.

Moreover, it offers rich evidence showing that its perspective is not only scholarly relevant, but a matter of concern for really existing citizens. Under democratic conditions, conflict may contribute to sustaining a multilingualism that does not respond to technocratic criteria or grand-national schemes but has a bottom-up and auto-centred character. At any rate, this is the mildly optimistic conclusion the reader may draw after learning about the mobilisations against the plans for a

trilingual 'reform' of education intended by the Spanish-conservative right in the Balearic Islands and Galicia. These cases show that conflict is not only needed for bringing about change in a positive sense; it is also necessary for avoiding a reactionary rollback. Let us take this as one of this book's most timely messages: what could be observed in the Spanish context some ten years ago may well have been an early indication of what we have been witnessing more recently in other areas of Europe too. The early 2000s were marked by an odd coalescence of technocratic neoliberalism and statist populism. But protesting the politics of these great uniformisers is not a pointless venture. The pendulum may swing back again, articulating a Europe from below that rescues the notion of a diverse citizenship from the ashes where it lies buried, but still glowing.

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September 2020

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Our research was part of the work package on ‘Rivalling citizenship claims elsewhere’, where we did extensive research on language, identity and policies. Our contribution to this project was published as a book chapter in the volume edited by Francis Cheneval and Mónica Ferrín (2018), with the title ‘Linguistic policies and citizens’ claims in a multinational state: the case of Spain’, co-authored by Andrea C. Bianculli, Jacint Jordana and Siresa Lopez Berengueres. However, after the project was finalised, we decided to turn our work into this book, expanding the analysis and developing further our arguments. The intricacies of the topic and the aim to explore a multilevel perspective – including the European level – and the linguistic claims and conflict that occurred in Spain during the first decades of the 21st century brought us to continue working and to prepare this book. In all, this would not have been possible without the bEUcitizen project and the EU support for it. We owe our gratitude to those who participated in the project and gave us detailed and helpful advice. They include Francis Cheneval, Clara Velasco and Marc Sanjaume, among others.

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Abbreviations

ACMC	Catalan Association of Municipalities and Counties
AGE	Galician Alternative of the Left
ANC	National Catalan Assembly
APIMA	Association of Students' Fathers and Mothers
BNG	Galician Nationalist Bloc
CCC	Catalan Civic Coexistence
CCMA	Catalan Corporation of Audio-visual Media
CCOO	Workers' Commissions
CFR	Charter of Fundamental Rights
CIG-Ensino	Galician Intersindical Confederation-Teaching
CIU	Convergence and Union
CoE	Council of Europe
COMEX	Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
CpC	Citizens for Change
CRTVG	Galician Radio and Television Corporation
CSO	Civil society organization
EA	Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna)
EB	United Left-Green Party (Ezker Batua-Berdeak)
EBLUL	European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages
EC	European Commission
ECRML	European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
ELA	Solidarity of the Basque Workers (Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna)
ELEN	European Language Equality Network
ERC	Republican Left of Catalonia

EU	European Union
EU	United Left (Esquerra Unida)
EUiA	United Left and Alternative (Esquerra Unida i Alternativa)
FAPA	Federation of Associations of Students' Mothers and Fathers
FaPac	Federation of Associations of Mothers and Parents of Students of Catalonia
FemCAT	Foundation of Catalan businesspersons
FETE	Federation of Workers of Education
FETE-UGT	Federation of Workers of Education-General Union of Workers
ICV	Initiative for Catalonia Greens (Iniciative per Catalunya Verds)
IU	United Left
IV	The Greens Initiative (Iniciativa Verds)
LAB	Comissions of Abertzale Workers (Langile Abertzaleen Batzordeak)
LOMCE	Organic Law on the Improvement of the Quality of Education
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCB	Balearic Cultural Work
PCTV-EHAK	Communist Party of the Basque Homelands-Euskal Herrialdeetako Alberdi Comunist
PNV	Basque Nationalist Party
PP	Popular Party
PPC	Popular Party of Catalonia
PSC-PSOE	Socialists' Party of Catalonia
PSdeG-PSOE	Party of the Socialists of Galicia
PSE-EE	Socialist Party of Euskadi
PSIB-PSOE	Federation of Spanish Socialist Workers' Party in the Balearic Islands
PSM	Socialist Party of Mallorca
PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
PXNL	Normalization Law (Plan Xeral de Normalización da Lingua Galega)
RAG	Royal Galician Academy
RTVM	Radio-Television Mallorca
SCJC	Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia
STEE-EILAS	Union of Teaching Workers of the Basque Country

STEI-I	Union of Workers of Teaching-Intersindical of the Balearic Islands
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TIL	Integral Treatment of Language
TSXG	Superior Court of Justice of Galicia
UGT	General Union of Workers
UPyD	Union, Progress and Democracy

1 Introduction

Since the 2000s, questions about how political communities manage linguistic pluralism and multilingualism have become a major concern across Europe, as globalisation brought new demands and conflicts arose to accommodate old and new linguistic disputes. In this sense, linguistic diversity not only constitutes a salient dimension of the new social and political order that shapes complex cultural diversity or 'super-diversity' (Vertovec 2007), but it also represents a main distinction of present-day European polities. Many countries confront complex linguistic situations that have emerged or have become more salient in recent years, and which have been intensified by the context of growing globalisation and large migratory fluctuations (Kraus 2012). Different types of linguistic conflict emerge from such situations, based on particular configurations and problems in each case, that are not possible to disentangle using a simple interpretative framework (Nelde 1998).

This book aims to contribute to a better understanding of such linguistic conflicts by adopting a perspective that considers language as a key component of citizenship rights. From this perspective, and also by considering the point of view of collective decision-making, we plan to scrutinise how linguistic conflicts emerge in different circumstances, involving not only identity disputes but also concerns about the instrumental use of language across multiple levels and purposes. In doing this, we identify what we will call 'linguistic claims': claims about the social use of particular languages in regulated linguistic environments. In other words, we identify demands made by citizens, individually or collectively, either directly or by their representatives, based on their perceived language rights and, secondarily, based on the legal rights that presumably support their claims, either country-based or European-wide.

This is not a book aimed at developing a normative analysis of linguistic policies, nor is it focused on the discussion about which values inspire linguistic policy-making and the types of confrontation emerging as a result of competing values and principles among the main actors involved in the policy area. To the contrary, here we aim to unravel the conditions involved in the processes that generate and articulate linguistic claims and how they lead to the emergence of linguistic political conflicts of both a different nature and a different intensity. Whether linguistic claims derive from the instrumental communication dimension, or whether they are more a result of expressive needs related to some symbolic and identity sensitivities, is no doubt important, and we take such reasons into account, but this is not the focus of our analysis.

The relevance of the instrumental and expressive dimensions is very important for understanding how linguistic policies are legitimised and how authoritative instruments are implemented, as many interesting contributions have illustrated (e.g. Woolard 2016). However, both dimensions are extremely entrenched in most linguistic conflicts, and to disentangle them is quite arduous, and it does not seem to be a reasonable research strategy for making sense of how linguistic conflicts come about, blow up and get resolved. In this sense, we assume that all languages serve as a medium of social integration and of the expression of collective identities, as well as being instrumental communication vehicles for making interpersonal interactions possible in multiple facets. In this sense, it follows that language acquisition and language use are related to citizens' involvement in our societies and in their political communities. It is not a surprise that claims about language rights would emerge when there is more than a single language within a society, and particularly when they are territorially entrenched. Actually, in a context of overlapping linguistic communities in a territory – each of them including all citizens with functional abilities to communicate in a specific language – both dimensions are expected to be present to some extent.

We also argue that making language policy involves a regulatory endeavour in the sense that it is a key component of citizenship rights, in a double sense. First, linguistic rights largely enable the exercising of other citizenship rights due to the ubiquity of language in all dimensions of collective life. This has policy implications for different areas, which require the establishment and management of language rules, both formal and informal ones, particularly to articulate those cases in which multiple language communities coexist. Second, it is not an irrelevant fact that the regulatory governance of language rights

can strongly contribute to facilitate the configuration of a shared sense of community, overcoming social cohesion problems that may emerge when it is not possible for all community members to speak the same language fluently. Whereas this may appear as a trivial issue in single-language societies, in multilingual ones it becomes a matter of utmost importance. Citizenship rules are required to respect and integrate linguistic rights to facilitate the governance of language usages and practices in any community. Yet citizenship is a multi-layered phenomenon (Kymlicka 1995; Yuval-Davis 1999) which clearly exceeds the physical limits of the nation-state and has relevant developments at the sub-national level, as it is the case of the European multilevel political community.

We emphasise such an analytical approach and thus avoid discussing normative approaches to linguistic arrangements. Also, the book avoids assessing the linguistic qualities of both existing provisions in particular territories and those requested by some of the actors involved in defending their linguistic claims. We concentrate on identifying and characterising linguistic claims, developing a specific method of analysis and discussing how they become key elements of political language conflicts when specific conditions occur. The research presented here, based on several sub-national cases in Spain, applies this methodological perspective. We identified several episodes of political linguistic tensions that occurred in four territories, each one with a different linguistic configuration, during the period 2005–2015, and we carefully documented the linguistic claims present in each episode. Some of these episodes resulted in important political conflicts, but not all of them. In our analysis, we also compared these episodes and discussed which contextual conditions were relevant for each case to produce particular effects on the policy process, including agenda-inclusion and politically related tensions.

This book is an explorative endeavour that aims to better understand the contours of policy change and policy continuity in the linguistic policy domains. It concentrates on examining Spain as a specific case of linguistic complexity within Europe, as well as the diverse multilingual configurations present in different parts of the country. As Sue Wright indicates in her book *Language Policy and Language Planning*, 'Spain provides (…) extremely illuminating case studies which reveal much of the enactment of language rights is problematic' (2004: 216). Consequently, analysing the Spanish case can be of relevance not only to understand the debates and needs of different actors and communities at the national level, but also to think of potential linguistic policies for an increasingly mobile European Union (EU) population.

We plan to formulate more general, European-wide suggestions from this analysis, in particular for those cases where there is not a clear territorial separation related to the use of different languages. The book includes a chapter on EU language policy that supports this discussion and which allows readers to grasp the capabilities of EU policy language instruments for complex cases such as the Spanish one, while also providing an interpretative framework for other cases.

We first present an analytic approach to the study of political linguistic conflicts, in Chapter 2, based on the identification of linguistic claims as the basic component that triggers the appearance of such potential conflicts. We assume that contacts between different language groups create turbulence in the processes of communication within societies and political communities that might develop into political conflicts, although not necessarily in all cases. The existence of linguistic claims is a necessary component for the emergence of such conflicts, and we want to understand how these claims are formed, strengthened and introduced into the political arena. No doubt, understanding the determinants of political linguistic conflicts fully would require much more comparative and analytical work, which is beyond the purpose of this book. Overall, exploring and assessing linguistic conflicts today requires considering the multiple levels – sub-national, national and supranational – at which these can be challenged, devised and enacted by a variety of state and non-state actors.

As we perform the analysis of political linguistic conflicts in recent decades in this Spanish case study, we need to include some contextual information about the current linguistic diversity in Spain and about the linguistic policies implemented in the country by different levels of government since Spain's return to democracy in the 1970s. Chapter 3 is devoted to this purpose: to assess whether and how current Spanish politics has managed to accommodate the various linguistic communities, which in some cases overlap with the formal limits of the sub-national units – i.e. the autonomous communities (regional governments) – whereas in others they do not overlap at all. More specifically, we identify some of the main political dilemmas regarding linguistic policies in Spain, this being a rather complex and subtle policy area in which multiple layers of national identity, social conflict and value formation converge.

This chapter provides a brief overview of language policies in Spain, which is basically in its post-democratisation phase. We show how, after the repressive policies implemented during Franco's dictatorship (1939–1975), when Castilian was enforced as the only national language, the use of regional languages expanded beyond home and

family circles, and regional governments in bilingual regions introduced linguistic policies to protect and promote those regional languages. Additionally, this chapter sets the formal, institutional context established in the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy. Spain comprises 17 autonomous communities. Six of these communities currently have two official languages: their own regional language – Basque, Catalan or Galician – and Castilian. These include the Basque Country and Navarre, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and the Valencian Community, and, finally, Galicia. Taken as a whole, about 40% of the Spanish population lives in territories with their own language and law-making competencies in this policy area. Thus, we describe the Spanish multilingual context as a hierarchical structure made up of a monolingual centre and a bilingual periphery of regions with their 'own language' that co-exists with Castilian, while also highlighting that linguistic policies as formulated by the regions remain a highly contested subject.

The fourth chapter first introduces the research methodology used for the study and then discusses how it has guided our data collection and analysis. To capture Spain's linguistic diversity, while at the same time keeping our research within manageable boundaries, our book focuses on four autonomous communities, which include Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country and Galicia. We explore three areas that have traditionally constituted the main targets of linguistic normalisation policies: education, the media and public spaces. Within these areas, we then identified situations or episodes of rising claims concerning linguistic policies over the last decade. The conflicts included in the cases refer to proposed and attempted changes to the existing linguistic model, which involve, among other features, a redefinition of the status of co-official languages in the institutional domain. Based on our collection and analysis of current literature, newspapers, periodicals and other media, we examine the following dimensions in each of the cases under study: the scope, the actors involved in the conflicts, the addressees (i.e. the people the claimants want to reach) and the channel and political levels involved.

Thus, we find that the field of education involves a complex array of demands and claims and an intense degree of legal proceedings and social mobilisation. Education can be depicted as a major area of conflict, and a particularly sensitive subject in the Spanish periphery, where competing positions in favour of or against the promotion of Castilian and the co-official language as languages of instruction are articulated by a wide range of actors, arguments and channels. Next, we present and discuss conflicts generated by attempts to promote

changes in the linguistic model of audio-visual media and public space signalisation, either by regional governments or by societal actors.

The fifth chapter introduces a comparative analysis that assesses similarities and differences between the cases examined. It also discusses which conditions are relevant for triggering political conflicts and, in some particular cases, escalating them. We find that even if non-education claims have high social visibility – in terms of language use in public audio-visual media, public spaces (stores, traffic and street signalisation) and in media (television) – in practice, when compared to the challenges in the field of education, claims are less capable of producing linguistic political conflicts. Our comparative analysis provides a discussion of the complex dynamics caused by the multi-layered structure of citizenship, considering the political and social differences across territories as well.

In the sixth chapter, we focus mainly on the development of a new framework of citizen rights at the European level and at the European scale. We show that the European institutions hold, or have held, a dual role in relation to linguistic minorities, and how social and political actors exploit the European level to claim linguistic rights. We include this chapter to clarify the roles of both the EU and the Council of Europe (CoE) in framing the political opportunity structure of Spanish claimants on linguistic issues. In the absence of a well-defined national policy framework on linguistic rights in Spain, the European-level policy introduces a significant reference for the linguistic conflicts emerging in Spanish bilingual territories. We undertake this analysis from a quasi-longitudinal perspective, by comparing the normative role of the EU in 2002/2004 with that in 2015/2016, and include a reflection on the extent to which the EU contributes, or has contributed, as a referee for linguistic conflicts, or as a policy-maker on linguistic issues in its own right.

The concluding chapter lays out a synthesis and re-examination of the main argument and presents an assessment of how democratic Spain has managed to deal with this range of linguistic conflicts across policy areas and across sub-national units, although not without significant political conflict. Regulation of the diversity of languages spoken in Spain beyond their native territories is still pending for the whole country. Based both on the empirical insights gained from the Spanish case studies explored in this book and on the chapter on the EU, we also discuss what can be learned from the Spanish experience when the EU aims to frame its recommendations for linguistic policy to member states.

The book concludes with two main reflections. On a theoretical basis, it identifies the strengths and limitations of our analytic approach. The limitations are discussed as avenues for further research that might lead to refinements of the approaches and frameworks aimed at understanding the dynamics of linguistic conflicts in multinational settings. From an empirical perspective, a final discussion is introduced on the increasing multilingual diversity in the age of globalisation and the dynamics of continuity and change that most linguistic policies experience.

Overall, the book provides an empirical, comparative assessment of the linguistic claims and the potential resulting conflicts in regulating languages in the political sphere. In fact, one of the main outcomes of the book is that linguistic policies, which have been tried in Spain for managing linguistic diversity since democratisation, are exposed to political conflicts because they occur at the crossroads of different expectations on individual and collective rights, but also of different projections about the future of each linguistic community. For this reason, while conflicts are very difficult to avoid, what is more important is how they are processed.

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2 A conceptual framework

On linguistic conflicts and multilingualism

Linguistic conflicts are not easy to disentangle. The academic literature has carefully analysed and discussed many cases in detail, while multiple typologies have been proposed to make sense of the diversity and the variety of these conflicts in the world. Different theoretical frameworks have been suggested to explain the linguistic conflicts emerging from diverse multilingual configurations, as well as from those cases where linguistic tensions are not particularly intense, even if they remain latent (e.g. Calvet 1998). In many circumstances, language conflicts may also be associated with other causes of conflict of a socioeconomic, religious or political nature, what makes the analysis even more challenging (Nelde 1998).

From a political science perspective, scholarly work on linguistic politics has focused on the linkages between political regimes and linguistic policy models. In doing this, most studies have looked at the ways in which governments have attempted to manage linguistic conflicts, pursuing either assimilation or pluralistic strategies (Pool 1990; Esman 1992; Ager 1996), particularly in those cases of contact between two large and different language groups. Another strand of literature has delved into linguistic politics as a sub-theory of nation-building theory, and has thus bridged two relevant issues that often raise intricate linguistic conflicts: the formulation of linguistic policy as part of nation-state-building, and the issue of national minorities' rights in multinational contexts (Beer and Jacob 1985; Kraus 2000, 2018). Finally, classical theories on nationalism have addressed the role of linguistic differences in the emergence of nationalism (Gellner 1983) and the relevant role of language in generating national awareness (Anderson 1991), while also providing an appropriate framework to observe the emergence of such conflicts.

From a normative political theory perspective, scholars have proposed some theoretical perspectives on language policy and linguistic rights that might contribute to clarifying fundamental tensions emerging from linguistic conflicts (Requejo 1999; Patten 2001; Branchadell 2003). For example, statements made about how to regulate the use of languages, based on the idea of 'linguistic justice', have provided a new angle on the normative assessment of linguistic conflicts (Van Parijs 2011). Within this perspective, Kymlicka and Patten (2003) and Riera Gil (2016) have certainly contributed to the debate between linguistic policy and political theory with further discussions on collective rights. Moreover, debates on the tensions between individual and collective cultural rights (Taylor 1992) and the right of cultural groups to defend their own language (Kymlicka 1995; Fletcher 1997) are also relevant contributions to a better understanding of the arguments behind some political linguistic conflicts.

On the side of public policy analysis, different approaches have explored how linguistic policies are managed in multilingual contexts, which instruments are employed and to what extent they are effective or generate unexpected results or side effects (Grin and Vaillancourt 1997, Lo Bianco 2010, Wright 2016). In this book, we adopt an approach to linguistic conflicts based on examining the regulatory governance of multilingual settings, focused on identifying the different political and social actors involved, the strategies they introduce to alter linguistic rules – either formal or informal – and the relevance of making linguistic rights' claims, individual or collective, to pursue a regulatory change in their domain. We expect most of the language-related political conflicts to be generated by citizenship rights' claims, and that these conflicts may evidence a potential for policy change. To uncover these connections, we deconstruct the formation of linguistic policy disputes and examine how they escalate to the extent that they create sound political conflicts with wider implications.

In plurilingual societies, the distribution of linguistic rights, as a part of citizens' rights, has to do with how different linguistic communities, out of those coexisting in the private sphere, find recognition in the public domain. Historical paths, political decisions and societal adjustments, among other reasons, may account for how linguistic rights are recognised publicly, and to what extent there is, or not, an equal recognition of rights in multilingual contexts, particularly in the presence of minority languages.[1] However, this is not the focus of this book. Actually, we are interested in understanding how current linguistic configurations in multilingual communities remain stable or eventually change

over time, by focusing on linguistic claims as potential drivers of regulatory change in this policy area. We do not discuss the drivers of change beyond structural dynamics, as, for example, those drivers that are derived from migration, demographic changes or large political and economic transformations. Beyond all these encompassing factors, this book concentrates on examining the conflicts and tensions associated with situations in which different vehicular languages – defined as the languages used for communication among people who may have a different, or more than one, mother tongue – are part of a common or standardised communication framework. We suggest that overcoming such tensions depends upon how linguistic rights and policies are defined and implemented in a particular territory, which largely relates to how linguistic claims are formulated and managed politically.

Language has both an instrumental and an expressive dimension. Whereas, from an instrumental perspective, language is primarily understood as a medium that denominates things and facts, thus allowing people to communicate, the expressive aspects are crucial to how members of a community conceive of themselves and frame their way of life (Taylor 1985). Similar distinctions have been created according to the communication and identity dimensions of established languages, either majoritarian or minority languages, with particular nuances and emphases (for a review of equivalent divisions made by numerous experts, see Riera 2016: 123). Both dimensions are important for multiple reasons that go beyond the conventional 'rationalistic' views of promoting identity and efficiency, as both involve individual and collective concerns about self-perception and transformative social capabilities. This attribute has also been characterised as the communicative and identity properties of languages, making some of them very useful as the foremost property, given its broad use and diffusion, while other languages remain very important for individuals and institutions because they link to a particular identity. As Peter Kraus has suggested, respecting both properties is particularly relevant in a democratic setting:

> Language policy is not only a tool for establishing an extensive frame of communication but it is also directed towards protecting the status or the "honour" of the members of the linguistic community and overcoming collective resentment in institutional contexts marked by cultural heterogeneity.
>
> (2008, 77)

Clearly, we can observe how the instrumental and expressive dimensions inspire language policy in one or other proportion for a

particular case. However, for our analytical purposes, when we examine linguistic conflicts in multilingual societies, the two dimensions cannot be separated easily; nor can one be reduced to the other. We argue that the two dimensions are entrenched, because a significant part of the conflict is about how to manage the relationship between these two dimensions of language, and this appears to be a constant subject of dispute. In fact, we suggest that attempts to separate these two dimensions analytically can be useful for policy-making or for normative purposes, but not necessarily important as a way of examining the formation of linguistic conflicts and their demands. For example, demands may be observed based on improving communication that implicitly involves an expectation of identity recognition, or vice versa, and it might be very difficult to ascertain exactly how the two dimensions are combined.

Building on these insights, we develop a perspective on linguistic conflicts based on the notion of political claims, and we consider linguistic rights as a particular category within citizens' rights that may trigger claims. Political claims are formulated inside societies by actors of all kinds, either organised or unorganised, and addressed to those with the capacity of producing change with the expectation of influencing policies and polities (Lindekilde 2013). Claims do not necessarily come from conventional public policy actors, and they can be expressed as protest events from civil society and social movements (Koopmans and Statham 1999). These political claims are a part of democratic practice and derive from a variety of causes that range from new social needs to environmental crises, political problems and social injustices. Among them, rights claims are very relevant as they tend to be associated with valued principles such as equality, justice and freedom. However, claiming rights, including linguistic rights, can also produce dilemmas, undermine social compromises or even hamper democratic advances (Zivi 2011).

Regulating citizens' rights is a very sensitive area of policymaking, involving multiple considerations and participants. Within this domain, political claims may emerge quite often, having a significant effect on the regulatory governance of rights. Among other effects, claims trigger policy debates, force actors' positioning or eventually provoke confrontation. In addition, rights claims tend to have a particular syntax: they include a subjective perception of a missing right, a belief about the drivers of the perceived problem and a 'complete' solution to the problem as the activation of that particular right. Rights claims do not necessarily involve sophisticated reasoning, interdependent policy logic or strategic ways of action to pursue the expected goal; they

are social constructs, easy to share with social movements and easily understood by large societal groups. Rights claims, however, can also be devices to activate democratic participation in our societies, to promote deliberation and cross-examination about the existing political consensus and social compromises, and to create particular channels for political engagement and inclusiveness (Zivi 2011).

Claims on linguistic rights are a particular type of rights claims that operate, according to this logic, as a political practice that pretends to make effective, specific regulations and policy configurations for language exchanges that would satisfy whoever is considered as the individual or collective rights holder. These claims are not necessarily related to any ethnic or linguistic identity (as, for example, claims about the use of English in the EU), but often they blend instrumental and identity motivations, and it is not easy to disentangle which one predominates. Most linguistic claims do not reveal promoters' goals, but just their views about including or modifying some specific linguistic rights into citizens' rights. Any language claim, however, can either complicate or improve democratic quality; as Zivi indicates (2011): there is no clear expectation about the resulting democratic quality. Linguistic political conflicts, in this sense, might eventually be perceived as being negative, but they might also trigger better or more manageable policy configurations in democratic societies.

In this book, we identify and interpret linguistic claims – mainly linguistic rights claims – made by a multiplicity of social and political actors across several cases. The purpose is to understand the emergence of political conflicts related to linguistics policies in complex sociopolitical environments, and to examine how they ended up. One of several aspects that requires careful scrutiny in order to make sense of political conflicts related to the regulation and promotion of language usage in particular territories is how linguistic rights claims emerge within multilingual societies. Another aspect is the extent to which the claims are related to significant levels of collective and sustained population mobilisation over time. And finally, do these rights claims represent an enhancement of democratic practice involving broader political participation, or do they create questionable democratic gridlocks? We need to understand who is making linguistic claims in the public domain, whether they are 'conventional' or 'unconventional' political or social actors, of an individual or a collective nature, and we also need to understand the interactions and conflict lines these actors establish regarding the definition and expression of their claims (Koopmans and Statham 1999).

Language, related to its instrumental and expressive dimensions, is a key component of political rights in a double sense. First, linguistic rights largely enable the exercise of other citizenship rights due to the ubiquity of language in all dimensions of collective life. Second, these rights strongly facilitate the configuration of a shared sense of community, since social cohesion is not possible in a community that cannot speak fluently. However, as already said, claims on linguistic rights cannot be easily disentangled. This is because claims based on purely instrumental reasoning, and based only on the argument of efficient communication, cannot avoid an implicit consideration about the relevant community to which such claims supposedly apply. Furthermore, claims that may be motivated by identity concerns cannot detract from the facts about the distribution of existing linguistic capacities in the community, if they aim to be convincing enough. In fact, because most claims are aimed at motivating most of the community, they combine both dimensions in a complex way to exploit their potential for mobilising a concerned population and to create a significant effect on linguistic policies.

Thus, we expect claims on linguistic rights to be a mixture of expressive and instrumental perceptions, beliefs and expected solutions, and to be based on demands for activating the rights of individuals on language practice in the public sphere. Rather than examining such claims and specifying their fundamental constituents, we develop an analytical strategy aimed at understanding how and under what conditions existing claims can create, sustain or exacerbate political conflicts about linguistic regulations, and under what conditions such claims can foster democratic participation and facilitate wider deliberations on the applicable policy. In this book, we plan to explore, among other possible factors, the channels of claims diffusion – i.e. the precise substance of the linguistic rights claims – and the contextual configuration of societies in which such claims emerge. We also plan to determine the extent to which such factors provoke lesser or greater political conflict, and how they contribute to the articulation of the policy process related to linguistic policy-making. To this purpose, we explore and compare several cases of political linguistic conflict in those Spanish regions with bilingual populations, particularly regions where multiple linguistic claims were formulated in previous years.

Most often, linguistic diversity is acknowledged as a sign of cultural mixing, as a challenge for identity-building processes and as a source of tension between individual and collective cultural rights. However, it has been argued that public multilingualism, including languages of linguistic minorities, can also facilitate wider social inclusion, because

multilingualism provides a greater capacity for intercultural dialogue and a better connection to the global context (May 2014; Kraus 2012). These contested arguments define the context in which most linguistic rights claims are formulated and asserted, making the regulatory governance of multilingualism a particularly complex process. Such claims represent a very sensitive category of political claims as they can evolve into political conflicts of great intensity and strong polarisation to such an extent that, on occasions, they may be difficult to resolve through conventional democratic procedures. In this sense, this is an issue of particular policy relevance, and one which requires interdisciplinary approaches and accurate academic debates.

Note

1 On the politics of linguistic recognition and the problem of unequal recognition, see Kraus (2018).

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3 Empirical contextualisation

Overlapping linguistic diversity in Spain

This book examines the Spanish case, as it presents a broad variety of language combinations that allow us to observe the emergence of multiple linguistic rights claims over the years, many of which show significant potential for nurturing linguistic conflicts with complex and uncertain resolutions. The language particularities of Spain and how linguistic policies have been developed in recent democratic times make Spain a very special case to study. Aspects of this study include: the conditions that may generate relevant difficulties for managing multilingual communities; policy disputes about linguistic planning that could emerge around, and even for, state-building and the territorial articulation of the country's political institutions.

There are not many more languages in Spain compared to other European countries. Yet, what makes the case special is the large number of speakers of these languages – when compared to other minority languages in Europe – and the absence of other countries where these languages are dominant (Ramallo 2018). The bilingual territories in Spain include Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and Valencia (with different Catalan varieties), the Basque Country and Navarra (Basque) and Galicia (Galician). Although there are four official languages in Spain, only Castilian is official throughout the country. In addition, there is also the case of the Asturian language (Bable), which is recognised and supported by the regional government, but is not considered a co-official language in the Asturias region. In addition, these languages are also spoken in some other small parts of the country that are largely monolingual, in many cases without enjoying significant protection (Lois-González et al. 2020). Ramallo (2018) assesses the sociolinguistic status for each case, including also some other small minority languages communities, finding many deficient or negligible cases.

As such, the configuration of Spanish linguistic communities, territories and politics conforms closely with a natural experiment. Given the significant number of cases in Spain, this configuration enables the discussion of variations in the emergence of political linguistic conflicts, each one displaying its particular characteristics within the same institutional and policy frameworks, i.e. the Spanish state and the EU. The Spanish multilingual context can be characterised by a monolingual centre and a bilingual periphery of regions, each with their 'own language' that coexists with Castilian. If we consider only citizens with a mother tongue other than Castilian, the various linguistic communities in Spain account for more than 20% of its population, if we take into account only co-official languages (Lois-González et al. 2020). When we ponder those Spanish citizens who speak any co-official language, however, including those whose mother tongue is Castilian, they account for more than 30% of the entire Spanish population.

We describe this situation as a 'linguistic labyrinth' in the sense that language configurations are not homogeneous across territories. Additionally, local situations vary largely within each multilingual community. This complicates linguistic policy initiatives in the different bilingual territories and opens up many opportunities for the emergence of linguistic rights claims. As we will see later in more detail (see Table 3.3), there are different percentages of non-Castilian mother tongue individuals across the Spanish bilingual territories, and there are also significant variations in the percentage of bilingual population within each of these territories (Burgueño 1997). There are also small linguistic minorities in largely dominant, monolingual (Castilian) regions that enjoy dissimilar levels of protection and public recognition. In some cases, these minorities use languages that are co-official in adjacent regions, for instance, Catalan in the Aragon territories adjacent to Catalonia, or Galician in Castilla-León and in Asturian territories close to Galicia.

Furthermore, during the 2000s, Spain received several million migrants from different countries of the world, thus enriching the linguistic diversity of the country. This increased diversity represented a challenge for existing linguistic policies and legal frameworks in bilingual territories because it complicated most of the strategies established in the previous years. Finally, it is important to remember that in recent decades, the push for globalisation and the surge of English as a global lingua franca added pressure on citizens all over Spain to acquire a second language (in the monolingual regions) and a third language (in the bilingual regions), making it even more difficult to keep the fragile equilibriums in place within and across regions, and thus opening the door to new linguistic claims.

Though recognised in the Spanish Constitution (1978), the management of linguistic diversity in the different regions where a significant part of the population is bilingual, and where many do not have Castilian as their mother tongue, has not been exempt from controversy. The formulation of linguistic policies has remained a contested topic since the democratic restoration in Spain. Linguistic policy initiatives in support of local languages often created tensions in the country, not only at the national and regional levels, but also within the regional arena itself. Despite these circumstances, the nature of linguistic conflicts and their political underpinnings have not created continuous controversies. For quite extended periods, the sensitivity to conflict and the incidence of linguistic rights claims were relatively low in most regions. Linguistic policies established since democratisation for managing the diversity of languages at multiple levels triggered rights claims, although these did not always result in major linguistic conflicts. This raises one of the main questions that this book addresses: Under what conditions do linguistic rights claims emerge, and when, consequently, do significant linguistic political conflicts arise?

Most of the linguistic conflicts in Spain occur where different linguistic communities overlap, and most of the time they happen within the same territories. This is a key factor not only for understanding the nature of the tensions occurring in the country, but also for making sense of the reasons why relatively peaceful periods of equilibrium are quite common, despite the potential for conflict still being present. Before detailing the main sociolinguistic characteristics of the bilingual territories in Spain, and focusing on the diversity of situations they comprise, we will summarise the current linguistic communities in Spain.

First, we look at the overall presence of Castilian in Spain, which also shows a powerful international outreach, as evidenced by its predominance in Latin America and being the second most spoken language of the United States. Castilian has a powerful but undefined status in Spain: a lingua franca for some of the population, a linguistic community for most and a 'nation-state' language in many respects. Overall, there is no consensus on the role of Castilian that all linguistic communities in Spain would accept without hesitation. In fact, whereas the national government's policies favour the status quo – where Castilian remains the dominant language – or if the national government develops policies to expand Castilian across the world (Del Valle 2007), there is no explicit policy on linguistic issues regarding the use of Castilian in a multilingual context such as Spain. Similarly, there is no explicit policy for regulating how the four official languages should be employed for any purposes beyond the territories where bilingual

populations are based (Vilarrubias 2019). In this sense, the linguistic rights of the Spanish bilingual population remain highly asymmetrical, with no safeguards for their mother tongue when they move to other territories within Spain.

Second, as we pointed out before, there are several sub-national 'linguistic communities' which are not always a majority in their own regions, and, even as a combined group, they are a minority in respect of Castilian. In almost all these cases, such linguistic communities call for recognition, linguistic rights and guarantees, including affirmative action. Affirmative linguistic policies have been established by regional governments – called 'autonomous communities' – to reinforce their practice and to strengthen their own identities, as well as a way to deal with historical grievances on language practice in the public sphere. In so doing, they have relied on asymmetric policy instruments in many areas to support their co-official languages and thus assure and expand their use vis-à-vis Castilian. The linguistic preferences of the population in each territory, as expressed in regular democratic contests, usually have a strong influence on the intensity in which these policies are implemented, thus shaping how policy capabilities would be activated in the short term. This reveals how several sub-national governments in Spain face the challenge of addressing various linguistic communities and their claims.

Finally, a third layer in the complex structure of Spanish linguistic communities is that of migrant communities, which include 'internal migrants', EU migrants and third-country nationals. The number of migrants all over Spain has expanded enormously during the last decades, and migrants have thus come to share spaces with most of the existing linguistic communities, while to some extent also reshaping Spain's sociolinguistic context. This third type of community requires a different set of policies, whose implementation often lies in the hands of national and sub-national or even local governments, and which needs to be sensitive to multiculturalism and ethnic diversity, including, but also going beyond, linguistic issues.

Our empirical analysis of linguistic rights claims delves into the four Spanish regions of this study – Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country and Galicia – each of which displays very different characteristics regarding its sociolinguistic situation. For this reason, we first detail the main characteristics in terms of overlapping linguistic communities in each of the regions. Whereas regional languages have always been present in Spain – some linguistic policies to promote them had already emerged in the 1930s, and even before – these policies were repressed during Franco's dictatorship (1939–1975).

This severe proscription fundamentally affected the public sphere, where Castilian was contemplated as the only Spanish language. Regional languages were thus mainly used at home and in family circles. Generally, this single-language policy backfired, as it 'triggered great linguistic and cultural awareness and a popular desire to recoup these languages and their cultures' and many cultural, political and social manifestations resulted (Lasagabaster 2011, 111), although its impact varied across regions. Unfortunately, our empirical analysis does not include the cases of Navarra and Valencia. These are two interesting cases, as part of their territories have a monolingual population (Castilian), while another part is bilingual. This situation, parallel in both cases, has created particular regulatory situations within the regions, prone to trigger linguistic conflicts that would require closer scrutiny. Yet, we opted to exclude them from our research design to have more similar cases to compare.

Thus, regarding the language used in schools – for many centuries schooling was in Castilian and restricted to a minority – the Galician population, for example, was almost completely monolingual, which triggered a hierarchical relationship between the two languages (Williamson and Williamson 1984). In the case of Catalonia, Catalan was already standardised at the beginning of the 20th century, and during the dictatorship, Catalan was the vehicular language at the *Escola Catalana*, which comprised a network of cooperative schools. In a similar vein, in the 1960s, Basque was used in schools in the so-called *ikastolak* – schools for students whose mother tongue was Basque.

With the restoration of democracy, and through the enactment of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, the regional languages of Basque, Catalan and Galician became formally and legally recognised, and were thus subject to a major revitalisation and normalisation process. The 1978 Constitution acknowledged Castilian as the official language, and the three regional languages became co-official languages, in accordance with their respective Statute of Autonomy.[1] Additionally, the Spanish Constitution established the framework for a decentralised territorial model which relied on the devolution of particular administrative and legislative competencies in several domains, including responsibilities for linguistic policy, to those regions with their own language. Spain comprises 17 autonomous communities. Six of these currently have two official languages: their own language – Basque, Catalan or Galician – and Castilian. These communities include the Basque Country and Navarre for Basque, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and the Valencian Community for Catalan (also named 'Valencià'), and, finally, Galicia. Taken as a whole, about 40% of the

Spanish population lives in territories with their own language and their own law-making competencies in this policy area.

Although the Constitution of 1978 includes some provisions related to language (Article 3; 20.3; 148.1.17, and the final provision), there is neither any specific mention of which languages should be recognised nor of the linguistic model that should be enhanced in the public sphere at the sub-national level nor under what criteria (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2.). This is an important issue because such a lack of definition allows a lot of room for language rights claims, as we will see in the next chapter. Actually, the definition of linguistic rights is indirectly articulated through the recognition of a regime of *official* and *co-official* status of Castilian and the autonomous communities' own languages, respectively (Article 3). This recognition is combined with the recognition of fundamental rights which have a strong linguistic content, such as the right to education (Article 27) (Milian i Massana 1984, 1994). This implies that the incorporation of both languages within the sub-national institutional sphere (education, administration and media) through specific linguistic policy strategies should be guaranteed under conditions of non-discrimination (Article 14). Although the EU

Table 3.1 Legal framework for linguistic policies: EU and Spanish levels

EU level		
Lisbon Treaty (2007)	Art. 165	Respect of linguistic diversity and promotion of languages of Member States
Secondary European legislation	Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 17 July 2000 on the 'European Year of Languages 2001' Council of the European Union Resolution of 21 November 2008 on a 'European strategy for multilingualism' European Parliament Resolution of 24 March 2009 on 'Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment'	
Spanish level		
Spanish Constitution (1978)		
	Preamble	Protection of all Spanish languages
	Art. 3	Castilian is the official language of Spain Co-official status of other Spanish languages Respect and protection of Spanish linguistic diversity

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 3.2 Legal framework for linguistic policies: Sub-national levels

Catalonia		
Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (1979, 2006)	Art. 6	Preferential use of Catalan (*declared unconstitutional by the sentence of the Constitutional Court 31/2010 of 28 June*) Co-official status
	Cap. III: Linguistic rights and obligations	Principle of non-discrimination on grounds of language (art.32) Right to linguistic option in the public space (art. 33 and 34) Catalan as vehicular language in education (art.35)
	Art. 143: Own language	Competency on Catalan
Linguistic Normalization Law of Catalonia (1983)		
Balearic Islands		
Statute of Autonomy of the Balearic Islands (1983, 2007)	Preamble	Catalan language as component of the national identity
	Art. 4 'The own language' ('*La lengua propia*')	Co-official status Linguistic right as the right to know and use Catalan
Linguistic Normalization Law of the Balearic Islands (1986)		
Basque Country		
Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country (1979)	Art. 6	Linguistic right as the right to know and use both Euskara and Castilian Co-official status: The use and knowledge of both languages shall be guaranteed Principle of non-discrimination
Linguistic Normalization Law on the use of the Euskara (1982)		
Galicia		
Statute of Autonomy of Galicia (1981, 2002)	Art. 5	Galician is defined as the own language of Galicia Co-official status of Galician Linguistic right as the right to know and use both Castilian and Galician Galician shall be promoted in the public space Principle of non-discrimination on grounds of language
	Cap. II	Galician knowledge is counted as merit in civil service examinations
Linguistic Normalization Law of Galicia (1983)		

Source: Own elaboration.

framework provides some legal protection for language diversity in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 165), the existing secondary legislation is not of enough clarity to cope with complex cases of overlapping linguistic communities, as is the case of many territories in Spain.

In any case, based on both the national and EU frameworks, it appears that in practice the 'how' question is not very well defined and is thus left open to interpretation. This is a gap that has the potential of becoming a core component of the linguistic political conflicts addressed here. We will discuss the question regarding the EU further in the sixth chapter, when we analyse the European institutions and their roles in language policy processes and consequent political conflicts in Spain during recent decades. Putting aside the European level for the time being, it seems, however, that the lack of a consensual normative approach in the linguistic model at the Spanish level has led to an alternation of legal considerations regarding language policy practices. This situation is contingent on the position of the ruling party and is interpreted according to the legal framework and the sociolinguistic context of each bilingual territory.

Both the statutes of autonomy and the linguistic normalisation laws passed by regional governments make up the sub-national framework that regulates the linguistic question in the regions under study in this book. In this respect, the statutes of autonomy of Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country and Galicia share four key characteristics. First, the statutes have been approved by the Spanish parliament and are recognised as national laws. Second, they recognise their own language as being distinct from, and co-official with, Castilian. Third, linguistic rights are defined in terms of the right 'to know and use' both languages. Finally, all the statutes introduce the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of language. After the regional statutes of autonomy were ratified, parliaments in the bilingual regions approved their own linguistic normalisation laws. They also framed the management of language within the institutional space and regulated their respective linguistic policies at the regional level based on the Spanish Constitution and their respective statutes of autonomy. These legal texts addressed the use of Castilian and the regions' own languages in public education, administration and media, involving, in practice, different degrees of bilingualism depending on the type of linguistic model and the sociolinguistic situation in each region.

Moving from the legal framework to the actual use of language in each territory, some figures on sociolinguistic uses might help to unravel the complexity in the four regions under study in this book. First, it is worth mentioning the lack of homogeneous data in relation to the sociolinguistic uses of the different co-official languages in Spain. Data are mainly collected and analysed, without overall coordination, at the regional

level. Hence, there are important differences in terms of the dimensions and categories used within each region. The absence of a general framework for managing language policy is also visible at this practical level.

Available data, however, indicate that in Catalonia, and also in the Balearic Islands, language skills for the local language have remained quite stable over the last decades, reaching a large proportion of the population (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). Such stability in the use of the language probably relates to linguistic policies implemented since the transition to democracy, but is also facilitated due to the fact that Catalan was already standardised in this region in the early years of the 20th century. The situation is different in Galicia, however, where these numbers have been going down (Table 3.5). Whereas this can certainly be related to the language education model in the Catalan bilingual regions after the restoration of democracy (though with more disparity in Valencia), when it comes to the use of Catalan, figures show that the presence of Catalan is much more frequent in public areas, precisely where language use is more closely regulated and is therefore more guaranteed.

Second, it is important to consider that many Spanish cases of bilingualism are among the most ‘wide-ranging’, at least in Western democracies, in terms of the number of people able to speak the two languages that predominate in their multilingual society. Elvira Riera has examined these language distributions in her book *Why Languages Matter to People* (2016), and found that of 96 societies (nation-states or

Table 3.3 Sociolinguistic context in Catalonia

Language capabilities		*Understand Catalan*	*Speak Catalan*	*Read Catalan*	*Write Catalan*
	2003	96.5%	81.6%	89.0%	58.8%
	2008	94.6%	78.3%	81.7%	61.1%
	2013	94.3%	80.4%	82.4%	60.4%
	2018	94.4%	81.2%	85.5%	65.3%
Language usage		*Catalan*	*Catalan and Castilian*	*Castilian*	*Other languages and other combinations*
	2003	46.0%	4.7%	47.2%	0.6%
	2008	35.6%	12.0%	45.9%	6.5%
	2013	36.3%	6.8%	50.7%	5.9%
	2018	36.1%	7.4%	48.6%	9.5%

Source: Institut d’Estadistica de Catalunya, Survey on Language Uses of the Population, several years. Data for 15 years old and older population living in Catalonia.

Table 3.4 Sociolinguistic context in the Balearic Islands

Language capabilities		*Understand Catalan*	*Speak Catalan*	*Read Catalan*	*Write Catalan*
	2004	93.1%	74.6%	79.6%	46.9%
	2010	85.0%	63.4%	70.8%	47.9%
	2014	96.8%	80.5%	83.5%	61.9%
Language usage		*Catalan*	*Catalan and Castilian*	*Castilian*	*Other languages and other combinations*
	2004	45.0%	5.3%	46.1%	3.6%
	2010	36.1%	6.2%	45.9%	11.9%
	2014	36.8%	10.3%	49.9%	2.9%

Source: GresIb, 2017, Ibestat 2010; data for 16 years old and older population living in the Balearic Islands. In 2010 language usage refers to the question about which language is considered an own language. Surveys from 2004 and 2014 follow the same methodology, while the 2010 survey follows different criteria.

Table 3.5 Sociolinguistic context in Galicia

Language capabilities (Understand / Speak)		*A lot*	*Pretty much*	*Hardly*	*Not at all*	
	2003	81% / 67%	16% / 22%	3% / 9%	0.2% / 2%	
	2008	66% / 54%	29% / 35%	5% / 8%	1% / 3%	
	2013	70% / 57%	26% / 30%	4% / 10%	1% / 3%	
	2018	72% / 58%	23% / 30%	4% /9%	1% / 3%	
Frequency of use		*Always in Galician*	*More Galician than Castilian*	*More Castilian than Galician*	*Always in Castilian*	*Others*
	2003	43.0%	18.2%	18.7%	19.6%	0.5%
	2008	30.0%	26.4%	22.4%	20.1%	1.1%
	2013	31.8%	20.1%	22.0%	26.0%	1.2%
	2018	30.3%	21.6%	23.1%	24.2%	0.8%

Source: Instituto Galego de Estadistica, Coñocemento e uso do galego, several years; data for 15 years old or older population living in Galicia.

regions in Europe, but also including Canada, the United States and Russia) only 11 had more than 75% of their population as functional bilinguals. Furthermore, she also found that both languages had more than 40% of the population being mother-tongue speakers in 16 of the cases examined. When we cross both distributions, we observe that only five cases are fully bilingual societies that combine extended

bilingualism and a fairly clear dualisation of the population in respect of their mother tongue (Andorra, Aosta Valley, Luxemburg, Balearic Islands and Catalonia). Moreover, cases like Valencia or Galicia remain close to this extreme configuration. The Basque Country, however, presents a different configuration, which is quite similar to the Quebec region in Canada, where less than 50% of the population is bilingual. As in both cases, there is a clear majority of the population with the first mother tongue while the second mother-tongue language remains below 25%. As we will see in later chapters, these configurations are relevant for understanding not only the differences in linguistic policies across regions but also the type of linguistic claims and potential conflicts that may emerge in each case.

In the case of Catalonia, Table 3.3 shows that the distribution of language competencies remained very stable between 2003 and 2018, with an almost total capacity to understand Catalan for the entire population and very high levels of speaking and reading Catalan (over 80%), while writing capacities have improved slightly. The use of the Catalan language, however, does not correspond to the same figures: its regular use remains limited to about 36% of the population, whereas the use of Castilian varies between 45% and 50% for the entire period. Mixed language use is unusual, although about 7% of the population say they usually use both languages, Catalan and Castilian. What emerges from the most recent survey (2018) is an increase to almost 10% of the population using other languages.

Knowledge of Catalan in the Balearic Islands shows percentages slightly below those of Catalonia, although we cannot compare surveys for the same years (see Table 3.4). This translates into the fact that since the late 2000s, about 36% of the population living in the Balearic Islands autonomous community usually speaks Catalan – a very similar percentage to Catalonia – while the percentage of Castilian users in both regions is also very similar, just less than 50%. Likewise, the number of people who can hardly speak Catalan in the Balearic Islands was less than 20% in 2014; very similar to the Catalan figure of about 19% in 2018. With some small differences, the available data illustrate that the patterns are quite similar, and there were no major changes in existing percentages over the last two decades or so, with maybe only parallel increases in the percentage of people capable of reading and writing in Catalan.

At the beginning of the 20th century more than 90% of the population spoke only Galician in this autonomous community (Loredo Gutiérrez et al. 2007). After the restoration of democracy, and despite the implementation of Linguistic Normalisation Laws, the number

of people who could understand, speak, read and write Galician declined until the 1990s. This trend, however, changed in the following decades. Among the population over 15 years old, the percentage of those who can speak little or no Galician has remained quite stable during the last two decades (Table 3.5). Data on the frequency of use have remained quite similar for the last 15 years, while the capability of understanding and speaking Galician appears to have increased slightly during the same period. However, where Galician is more intensely used, and when it comes to its usage, the family remains the main locus for learning the language. While the presence of the language is also guaranteed in the public space, i.e. in public administration, Castilian is more widely used in Galicia as a language for public communication and private business activities (Regueira et al., 2013).

Finally, the sociolinguistic context of the Basque Country shows that the percentage of people who use Euskara more than Castilian has increased in recent years. It should be acknowledged that the sociolinguistic context in the Basque Country is more complex than other bilingual regions, given the difficulties of learning Euskara compared with learning the different romance languages (Fernández-Ulloa 2005). The surge in the number of 'bilingual' people in the Basque Country can certainly be the result of the bilingual education system (Huguet et al. 2008). Progress in bilingualism in the Basque Country has been slow but continuous. During the 1990s, almost 60% of the population did not speak or understand Euskara (Table 3.6). Yet this has changed during the last decades, with the increase in the number of bilingual and passive bilinguals in most recent years, who now stand at more than 50% of the population.

A view on language policies in Spain

Given the complexities triggered by these multilevel and multilingual configurations, it is not surprising that the policy and the politics of language in Spain have been the focus across a wide range of the literature since the mid-1980s (inter alia, Lagarde 2009; Cagiao y Conde and Jiménez-Salcedo 2015; Doppelbauer and Cichon 2018). Yet the literature has fundamentally focused on the regions where Castilian coexists with a co-official language. For decades, no Spanish-wide language policy was formulated, at least not formally. This explains why most scholars attempted to frame and analyse the sub-national cases from different perspectives while also assessing their potential for linguistic conflicts within the wider processes of nation-building, national minorities' cultural claims and the emergence of linguistic

Table 3.6 Sociolinguistic context in the Basque Country

Language capabilities		*Bilingual*	*Passive bilingual*	*Only Castilian*	
	1991	24.1%	8.5%	67.4%	
	1996	25.3%	16.3%	58.5%	
	2001	29.4%	11.4%	59.2%	
	2006	30.1%	18.3%	51.5%	
	2011	32.0%	17.2%	50.8%	
	2016	33.9%	19.1%	47.0%	
Frequency of use		*Always in Castilian/French*	*Less Euskara than Castilian/French*	*Both Euskara and Castilian/French*	*More Euskara than Castilian/French*
	2006	70.4%	11.0%	6.1%	12.5%
	2011	70.8%	8.1%	6.2%	9.9%
	2016	69.0%	9.2%	6.2%	10.3%

Source: Eustat, Encuestas Sociolingüísticas, several years. Data for 16 years old and older living in the Basque Country Passive bilinguals refers to those that understand, but do not speak a language.

nationalism (Beswick 2007). The literature on linguistic planning in Spanish bilingual territories, taken as a set of policy actions (Argelaguet 1998; Hoffmann 2000), its design, implementation and subsequent role in the management of linguistic rights claims, is abundant (Wright 2016). Within this framework, studies have examined the goals and outcomes of the linguistic policies and instruments implemented in recent decades. These studies have always been in the context of the territorial location of these policies and instruments within the country (see, for example, Boyer and Lagarde 2002 or Lagarde 2009).

It is also important, however, to mention the strong asymmetry between the studies in the case of Catalonia and those studies on the Basque Country, Galicia and the Balearic Islands. The number of studies on Catalan linguistic policy is much larger compared with the number of studies on the other bilingual regions, and this limits our assessment of policy implementation and policy change in a more comprehensive manner. Furthermore, to our knowledge, comparative analyses of how different regional governments in Spain deal with linguistic conflicts are not very common (however, see Bastardas and Boix 1994; Keating 1998; Wright 2016). Still, the comparative analysis

of linguistic policies in Spain demands further scrutiny for two reasons. First, due to the relevance of the language issue for Spanish society and politics. Second, because Spain stands as an exceptional case of an advanced society within Europe that deals with a complex, multilevel and multilingual configuration that has implications for both the creation of communitarian identities and the management of communicative instruments. Moreover, the country has been acknowledged as 'one of the oldest economically developed multilingual states in the world' (Hoffmann 2000: 49).

Most of the discussions which focus on the dual character of the Spanish linguistic policy model have provided descriptive and interpretive views of the status of the linguistic communities coexisting in Spain. This dual model reflects a tension between monolingual positions based on liberal, Hispano-centric perspectives on the one hand, and multilingual positions developed at the periphery and based on the protection of linguistic diversity, on the other (see, inter alia, Barrera González 2004; Pla Boix 2010; Cagiao y Conde 2015). This dual monolingual and plurilingual structure of the Spanish language policies, both at its core and its periphery respectively, finds expression in two elements.

The first element is the dominance of a monolingual policy model in the regions of the core, where the language in the private and public spheres is the same, and no explicit language policy actions are articulated and implemented. Whereas the implicit monolingual policy model, which is not often openly formulated, elevates the common national language to a uniquely prominent position, other models attempt to expand or bring in a second language, albeit in different ways. The positions of the Spanish government on language policy have not experienced major developments since the times of democratic transition, more than four decades ago. These government positions have been the continuous support of the status quo of Castilian's undisputed prominence, without considering any element of a language neutrality policy (Cagiao y Conde 2015) and have been largely backed by the most relevant Spanish Courts (Milian i Massana 2016). For example, some positions, mainly from the judiciary, emerged in the 2010s to 'shield' monolingual functionaries in all Spanish territories, and requests by regional governments for these personnel to use a co-official language when working in the corresponding regions were largely refused (Branchadell and Kraus 2919: 426–432). However, some modest, progressive attempts have emerged that recognise and support co-official languages at the central level, although these attempts have been largely uncoordinated (Vilarrubias 2019).

The second element refers to the emergence of different policy models to deal with and to nurture bilingual societies in the peripheral regions. The bilingual models imply that more than one language may be used as the vehicular language by the population, and in the public domain each citizen can choose which language to use. In most cases, however, the language policy implemented at the regional level aims to provide full recognition to the second, 'own' territorial language. As we will discuss later, these models include not only the option of the immersion of the whole population in the co-official language, but also the option to keep the co-official language available as a choice for the whole population (e.g. having Castilian as the de facto, shared language), with many adjustments and conciliatory instruments being implemented in most cases. Variations of the immersion model cater for the speakers of a sub-national language and aim to expand the knowledge of local tongues, thus promoting a private–public sphere language switch for users of the common national language (Vila 1995) as a strategy to compensate for its dominance.

In formal terms, sub-national linguistic policy models are regulated by the region's own legislative framework of linguistic normalisation (see, inter alia, Siguán 1992; Etxebarría Arostegui 1995; Blas Arroyo 1998; Herreras 2006; Turell 2007). Since the late 1990s, an increasing politicisation of language usage – in the context of globalisation and the growing influence of the EU – contributed to raising policy tensions related to the linguistic policy models implemented by different regional governments. These tensions eventually led to adjustments and changes in the already established linguistic policy models.[2] In this sense, the Catalan case is particularly interesting as an example of redefining linguistic policy over the years. Below, we present some of these policy (re)orientations but without fully discussing the associated disputes and confrontations that these policies involved, as this will be examined in the next chapters. Actually, these policy changes are mainly related to citizens' linguistic rights (see Chapter 4), or to nationalist political strategies, from both the Catalan and the Spanish perspectives.[3]

The idea of linguistic normalisation was introduced in Catalonia in the late 1970s, after the democratic transition. The approval of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia marked the beginning of the introduction of a language policy. During the 1980s, this language policy was oriented to increase the public status of Catalan in the public sphere, but also to vigorously expand its learning and its practice in all sectors of Catalan society (Marí 2016). The Linguistic Normalisation Law of Catalonia, enacted in 1983, provided the legal framework.

Education policy focused on the goal of achieving equal capacity in Catalan and Castilian at the end of obligatory schooling, thereby progressively implementing a strategy of Catalan language 'immersion' from the start of schooling. All in all, the primary strategy at that time was to reinvigorate and expand the usage of Catalan, and to prioritise its recognition in the public sector, under a general consensus framed in the context of the 1978 Constitution and the window of opportunities opened to reinvigorate Spanish languages other than Castilian.

However, after nearly 20 years, starting at the end of the 1990s, a policy shift occurred which was consolidated during the 2000s. The main strategy in the new policy shift, considering the growing multiplicity of languages used in Catalonia in the context of globalisation, large migration influxes to Catalonia and strong economic internationalisation, was to take into consideration a multilingual orientation. The aim was to consolidate Catalan as an all-purpose language together with Castilian, but also to develop policies which would make a multilingual context in Catalonia sustainable, with a broad view regarding citizens' linguistic rights. Neither purpose was fully accomplished. On the one hand, no clearer legal protection was achieved to make Catalan an equal rights language equivalent to Castilian in every way, and this created political confrontation. In addition, although public recognition in the political and social realms became quite consolidated, initiatives pursued in the economic and cultural realms (for example, labelling food products or introducing language quotas in cinema) showed mixed results. In fact, as mentioned before, during the 2000s and 2010s, the Catalan language capabilities of the population remained unchanged. Also, there was no major change in the usage of either Catalan or Castilian, especially when compared with the usage in the early 2000s (Table 3.3). On the other hand, attempts to promote multilingual policies during this period suffered from some shortcomings, despite a positive attitude towards newcomers' languages and efforts to improve English abilities at the primary and secondary education levels (Marí 2016; Branchadell and Kraus 2019; Cetrà 2019).

A relevant point that we are missing in this initial discussion about the Spanish linguistic labyrinth refers to the oscillating levels of linguistic political conflicts experienced over the years, even in the absence of explicit agreements about how to manage linguistic diversity in Spain as a whole. This book provides some arguments and ideas to explain this rather paradoxical situation. Even after some linguistic rights claims emerged in the 1980s, when policies boosting local languages were introduced in bilingual regions, they neither raised strong

social protestations nor created a nationalistic divide in these regions. On the contrary, they were supported by most of the population and by the political parties, although with different levels of enthusiasm.

This low-conflict situation could be explained by the hypothesis put forward by David Laitin and Carlota Solé (1986) when accounting for the acceptance of pro-Catalan linguistic policies among monolingual Spanish migrants living in Catalonia. They argue that immigrants suffered an internal dilemma: although their first preference was to keep using only Castilian, bilingual migrants (or their children) could obtain competitive advantages by being bilingual, and for this reason had an incentive to free-ride within the monolingual community. This option was reinforced by the political orientation of leftist parties and unions dominant at that time in favour of the Catalan identity, thus, for example, preventing any attempt at collective action against introducing obligatory Catalan in the school (for a more ethnographically based analysis, see Woolard 1989). With different intensities and nuances, this argument could also be applied to other bilingual regions in Spain, where linguistic policies were introduced to favour their own languages, and so making sense of the relatively low level of conflict that followed the implementation of such policies.

Their argument relies on an instrumental view of language acceptance; that is, as long as the incentives are clear, and competitive advantages in the labour market and in the social fabric are discernible enough, there is no need to adopt a new identity to agree to learn the local language. This does not prevent identity change, but we should not expect this as a main driver for such language acceptance. This was probably the case before the introduction of the broad pro-Catalan linguistic policies from the mid-1980s, when, as Woolard refers to, the acquisition of Catalan was considered 'an implicit signal of a desire to be accepted eventually as a member of the Catalan group' (Woolard 1989, 133). Moreover, it is important to remember that policies aimed at promoting Catalan in the school and the public spheres in Catalonia faced some opposition during the 1980s (Garvía and Miley 2013). This was not, however, a mass movement capable of articulating strong social protest against the newly introduced linguistic policy. It was, rather, a linguistic claim that emerged among some sectors of the cultural and economic elites who supported, and benefited from, the linguistic status quo where Castilian was the common language in Catalonia, and where Catalan was a minority language.

Despite these developments and the relatively low incidence of linguistic rights claims – and the even lower incidence of political conflicts during the 1980s related to such claims – linguistic claims appear

to be more salient in the later decades, especially from the 2000s. Linguistic claims increased, thus boosting their potential to result in serious political conflicts and strong social mobilisation. This opened a different period than the initial one we referred to before: already in the late 1990s, most linguistic policies at the regional level were already in place and had been running for some time. Therefore, the goals initially set, which included stopping the decline of native (local) languages, had been achieved in most cases, or even reversed. The new linguistic strategies that started to be framed in the late 1990s emerged from a different political and sociolinguistic context: a fairly decentralised, but also stronger, central state. This was a situation that probably polarised identity-making policies from both sides, increasing the language capacities among the young population in the bilingual regions. This in turn transformed the competitive advantage of speaking the local language almost into a public good, thus reducing its utilitarian benefit. Furthermore, the effects of globalisation were more visible at this time, and concerns about learning English throughout the entire education system became stronger among the population.

Not surprisingly under these new circumstances, linguistic rights claims raised during this period eventually created some relevant political conflicts involving large social mobilisations. Our objective is to understand how these claims emerged, how they developed and why they activated their potential for encouraging and articulating linguistic political conflicts. To this purpose, the empirical chapters of this book (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) focus on the identification of claims, made in the public sphere by representatives of the linguistic communities, that coexist at the sub-national level regarding linguistic rights of citizens (i.e. increasing rights, and protecting existing rights and claims against discrimination). More specifically, our analysis delves into the policy and social dynamics that have emerged since 2005, just after the first decades of linguistic policies had triggered an expansion of the knowledge and the use of native languages in the bilingual regions of Spain.

Thus, we look closely into the linguistic claims made in the period 2005–2015 by different actors involved in linguistic conflicts. Our focus is on the areas of public education, media and the public space. Examining information in the media, we document the claims and the disputes involving the different actors regarding these claims. Such information constitutes the empirical basis upon which we then provide an assessment of the selected cases in Chapter 4. We expect to find variations across these cases regarding the extent to which different political and social actors were involved, the contents of the rights

claims and the conditions under which the claims either escalated or resulted in accommodation or claim reduction. The comparative analysis in Chapter 5 discusses the circumstances of each case, while the extent to which these responses can be transferred to the EU level is assessed in Chapter 6.

Notes

1 The statutes of autonomy are the so-called 'territorial constitutions' of the autonomous communities of Spain (García Morales 2013). Whereas the first statutes of autonomy were adopted between 1979 and 1983, between 2006 and 2011 a second generation of statutes was approved in out of the 17 autonomous communities either to adopt a new statute or to partially reform the existing one. These included Catalonia (2006), Valencian Community (2006), Balearic Islands (2007), Andalusia (2007), Aragon (2007), Castilla y León (2007), Navarra (2010) and Extremadura (2011). For further details, see https://www.mptfp.gob.es/portal/politica-territorial/autonomica/Estatutos_Autonomia.html, last accessed 13 April 2020.
2 For example, see Regueira (2009) for the Galicia case.
3 For a review of such tensions over the decades, and their study from different angles, see Strubell (1999), Cetrà (2019) and Garvía and Miley (2013).

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4 Linguistic claims in Spain

Education, public space signalisation and audio-visual media

Spain comprises 17 autonomous communities, six of which have two official languages: their own language and Castilian. These communities include Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and the Valencian Community (Catalan); the Basque Country and Navarra (Basque) and Galicia (Galician). As previously said, the Spanish multilingual context is marked by a dual structure made up of a monolingual centre and a bilingual periphery of regions. Such coexistence of their 'own language' with Castilian has traditionally been a hotly contested issue in all cases. Within the 'supervised freedom' established by the Spanish Constitution (Pradilla Cardona 2007, 92), the distinct sub-national models for the linguistic policy management of the diverse communication ecosystems have been fraught with tensions articulated in very divergent ways by actors who claimed the redefinition of the relative weights of each of the co-official languages. As argued before, these tensions and conflicts became especially visible after the start of the 21st century.

Methodological framework and case selection

While the political and regulatory spheres have formed a key instrumental framework that articulates the tensions between conflicting positions, the two spheres differ in terms of the stances of ruling governments: the sociolinguistic and political realities of each region, and the specificity of legal frameworks at sub-national level. Altogether, this makes Spain a relevant context to study language conflicts in relation to distinct policy models and sociological configurations. To capture this richness and variety, while at the same time keeping this study within convenient limits, our analysis focuses on four autonomous communities (see Chapter 3). Within each of the four selected regions, we have identified two situations or episodes of conflict around

linguistic policy models that have been implemented in the public sphere. On investigating the current literature, as well as newspapers, periodicals and other media in search of empirical data, we found relevant claims concerning linguistic policies during the period under study: 2005–2015. Demands concerning linguistic policies in these four regions have been on the rise over the last decades, prompted by different social and political actors, many of whom have proposed challenges to currently existing linguistic policy models.

Such claims and demands appear to be especially acute in three areas that have traditionally constituted the main targets of linguistic normalisation policies: the use of language in educational institutions, in the public media (radio and TV) and in the public space (commercial and street signalisation). These were some of the most contested areas for the articulation of linguistic policy in most of Spanish bilingual territories. Based on this premise, we then proceeded to select specific cases (presented in Table 4.1) that would show variation in terms of the actors involved and the claims put forward.

These cases allowed us to explore linguistic claims not only from the individual perspective but also those related to the struggles between distinct actors either to modify or to preserve linguistic policy models. Actually, we consider these cases and their claims because they are relevant in terms either of their complexity, length, diversity of actors or the variety of the political implications. However, the key criteria used in our selection of cases are complexity (the number of actors involved), visibility (in the media) and variety (in the scope of the claims).

To clarify the political dilemmas emerging from these policy language fields within the selected communities, we focused on situations of persistent conflict around the coexistence of Castilian with the co-official languages, and around the struggles to preserve or gain hegemonic positions. The analyses concentrate on the identification of actors, claims, and arguments, as well as the channels of the articulation of the conflicts. We aimed to identify claims that were made in the public sphere by actors representing any of the linguistic communities at the sub-national level. These claims were formulated in terms of the linguistic rights of citizens which refer to any of the following dimensions: the increase of rights, the protection of existing rights and claims against discrimination. The linguistic rights conflicts included in the selected cases thus refer to proposed and attempted changes to the existing linguistic regulations, either by governments or by societal actors. The selected cases involve, among other features, a redefinition of the status of each of the co-official languages and the relevant institutional domain.

Table 4.1 Selected cases

	Catalonia	*The Balearic Islands*	*The Basque Country*	*Galicia*
Education	(1) Introduction of Castilian as language of instruction in the Catalan model of immersion (2006–2014)	(2) Decree of Integral Language Treatment: implementation of a trilingual model (2011–2015)	(3) Reform for an immersion model in Basque (2005–2009)	(4) Decree of Plurilingualism: implementation of a trilingual model (2010–2015)
Media and public space	(5) Catalan and Castilian in commercial and traffic signs (2010–2015)	(6) Radio-Television Mallorca (RTVM) and the retransmission of channels of the Catalan TV (2011–2015)	(7) Basque and Castilian in traffic and street signs (2007–2014)	(8) Introduction of programming in English in Galician Radio and Television Corporation (CRTVG) (2009–2011)

Source: Own elaboration.

The cases in the study relate to the disagreements of language policy in the public sphere generated by regional governments or by societal actors about the linguistic models for public education, audio-visual media and public space signalisation. The cases emerged from the 2005–2015 period and were concerned with the coexistence and relative weight of the official languages – Castilian, Catalan, Basque and Galician – but also non-official languages – i.e. English – in the school curricula, in public television and radio and in commercial and traffic signs. They occurred during legislatures VIII (2004–2008), IX (2008–2011) and X (2011–2016), under the governments of José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)) until 2011, and of Mariano Rajoy, leader of the People's Party (PP), the main conservative party at the national level. These governments represent two markedly divergent programmatic stances with respect to the decentralisation of competencies and the recognition of the plurinational character of Spain. The PP also governed the Balearic Islands and Galicia for extended periods after the restoration of democracy (i.e. after Franco). It shows low sensitivity to the question of national minorities and promotes a strong Hispano-centric discourse (Barrera González 2004), according to which linguistic diversity should be

subject to the maintenance of the dominant character of Castilian. On the other hand, regional conservative parties, namely the federation of Convergència i Unió (CiU) and the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV), have ruled Catalonia and the Basque Country respectively during most of the democratic period, and the defence of language, particularly in the Catalan case, has become a central element in their public policies.

In each of the cases, to assure richness, relevance and comparability, we considered the following analytical dimensions: the scope of the claim and the resulting conflict; the diversity of the stances and the actors (both claimants and addressees); the formal and informal channels that articulate the claim; the range of repertoires; the strategies and instruments employed across distinct geographical regions, and the political levels of the conflict.

The analysis of the internal structure of each case allows us to identify the contextual conditions and the actor-based drivers of the linguistic claims and the potential political conflict. On this basis, we then assess the similarities and differences between the various cases and across the analytical dimensions in Chapter 5. Both the internal analyses (within cases) and the external analyses (across cases) are intended to increase comprehensive scrutiny about how and to what extent linguistic claims in Spain have triggered escalating political conflicts, or, to the contrary, how and to what extent they have facilitated the accommodation of its various linguistic communities into commensurate policy frameworks. Empirically, the study will build in-depth knowledge of the complex dynamics that are brought about by the multi-layered structure of citizenship.

The salience of the cases we describe has been approximated by their representation in the written press at both the national and subnational levels. The newspapers we examined have large readerships at the national level or in their respective autonomous community, but differ in their ideological lines.[1] Stories have been identified by means of the search tools of the respective online archives and by employing a set of keywords from the existing literature. This thorough case selection was to assure enough empirical material to build the narrative and the comparative analyses between policies and across communities. The outcome of the selection process was eight cases, which together illustrate the complexity and heterogeneity of these instances within the Spanish context in terms of linguistic claims, language models and relevant policy actors.

We do not provide an analytical assessment of the policy solutions that were implemented to respond to the demands and the claims put

forward; that is to say the actual linguistic policy practices. That task is beyond our purpose, as we have limited ourselves to study the configuration of the identified rights claims and their potential for linguistic political conflict in particular contexts. Still, these rights claims and political conflicts must be understood within the specific social and legal frameworks at various levels – national, sub-national and regional (European level) – which offer a backdrop against which claims and conflicts are enacted. Additionally, from our perspective, these levels also determine the limits or boundaries of political confrontations and the policy responses provided, which, as we will show, vary across communities and between policy areas.

Claims for and against specific linguistic policy models are based strongly on perceptions about the sociolinguistic situation of co-existing linguistic communities in each region. As we have illustrated before, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country and Galicia show relevant similarities and differences in terms of the integration of Castilian and their own languages into the public and private spheres. The revitalisation of their languages in the public space has been remarkable since the 1970s, particularly in Catalonia, but also, to a lesser extent, in the other three regions. In the last two decades, however, levels of bilingualism have remained almost constant and quite similar for Catalonia, Balearic Islands and, to some extent, Galicia. The level of bilingualism in the Basque Country remains below that of the other regions, although this region has increased its bilingual population percentage in recent years. Differences in the proportions of Castilian and the own language as languages of customary use are mainly related to the variation in Castilian-speaking migration flows across these regions (see Turell 2007). Moreover, respective political contexts also constitute an element of variance, with wide implications for the type of linguistic policy models promoted, thus also affecting the linguistic claims that are formulated.

Linguistic claims in the field of education

This section examines four cases where language claims have emerged and produced episodes of conflict – some of them very intense – around the linguistic policy model implemented in the area of education. We find that the field of education involves a complex array of language rights claims that are related to an intense degree of legal proceedings and social mobilisation. Thus, education policy can be depicted as a major area of political struggles and a particularly sensitive area of the Spanish periphery. At the periphery, competing positions in favour

of, or against, the strategies implemented by regional governments to promote the co-official language as a language of instruction in schools are articulated by a wide range of actors and through different arguments and channels.

Catalan and Castilian as languages of instruction in the Catalan education system

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the question of whether Castilian should also be considered a vehicular language in the Catalan education system has become a major cause of conflict. The linguistic model established in the early 1980s for public and publicly supported schools was that all curricular subjects should be taught in Catalan, except Castilian Language and Spanish Literature. This model has been referred as a 'conjunction model' and implies the use of Catalan as the vehicular language for the whole education system (Cetrà 2019). It is also known as the 'linguistic immersion model', because all non-Catalan-mother-tongue children learn Catalan language by 'immersion' at school, while Castilian is introduced later.[2] This system has been established progressively since the 1980s with the aim of making Catalan equivalent to Castilian in Catalan society, and thus expanding bilingualism at all levels.

The introduction of this system was broadly backed by almost all political forces in Catalonia when it was established in the 1980s. For many years, it relied on the broad support of political and social forces in the region. Also, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, for a long period it did not create a critical mass of opponents. However, some voices started complaining about this model already in the early 1980s, arguing that it violated a constitutional right: that is, to be educated in one's own language. It was also viewed as unfair to Castilian native-speakers compared with Catalan native-speakers. Similar claims emerged occasionally during the 1980s and 1990s, articulated by small civil associations, although not by major political parties, all of which had a significant resonance in the Spanish-wide media. These claims against the Catalan language model for education were mainly based on the defence of citizens' individual rights, while also criticising the Catalan nationalist doctrine for inspiring such a specific linguistic model.[3] In general, and despite some tense public debates, until the mid-2000s such claims had quite a limited public impact, and no significant effect on voter behaviour.

In the late 2000s, a new political party was formed in Catalonia: Ciudadanos. This party embraced these claims against the 'immersion'

of non-native-Catalan students, and raised the issue that such a model also negatively affected their academic performance. In the following years, the party rapidly found its electoral space in Catalan politics, arguing for the greater use of Castilian in Catalan public life, considering Castilian to be more neutral than Catalan (Woolard 2016). Ironically, this occurred two decades after introducing the 'immersion' model, maybe because the competitive advantage of learning Catalan for the descendants of the 1950s–1970s immigrants lost its relevance, as they were already able to speak Catalan (Laitin and Solé 1986).

Here we limit the analysis of linguistic claims relating to this issue to a relatively short period of time – from the mid-2000s to mid-2010s – when tensions rose over the continuation of the Catalan linguistic model involving nationwide political parties and several upper-level courts. Actually, a major standpoint for this conflict was when, in 2010, the Constitutional Court ruled as unconstitutional the 'preferential' status of Catalan in primary and secondary public education.[4] As stated in the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, approved a few years before, in 2006, the role of the Catalan language was defined as being in a prominent position (Article 6, Section 1):

> Catalonia's own language is Catalan. As such, Catalan is the language of normal and preferential use in public administration bodies and in the public media of Catalonia and is also the language of normal use for teaching and learning in the education system.

However, the statement, which represented a full recognition claim for the Catalan language, was not accepted by the Constitutional Court rule 31/2010 where the word 'preferential' was supressed. This amendment created special tensions as it could be interpreted as departure point for many claims to alter the existing status quo in the Catalan linguistic policy at that time. Nevertheless, both Catalan and Castilian linguistic rights in the field of education were already addressed in the 2006 Catalan statute of autonomy to support the continuity and formally protect the existing linguistic model in education, as can been seen in Article 35, Section 2 of the Statute:

> Pupils have the right to receive an education in Catalan at non-university level. They also have the right and obligation to have enough oral and written knowledge of Catalan and Castilian upon completing compulsory education, whatever their habitual language of use when starting their education. The Catalan and Castilian languages shall be sufficiently represented in the curricula.

As said, after its approval, the Statute was subject to seven petitions of unconstitutionality, one of them interposed by the conservative PP that contested more than 100 articles, including those relating to language and linguistic rights. The main argument of the appeal was the asymmetry between Catalonia and the other regions. According to the PP, such asymmetry was reflected in the preferential status assigned to Catalan, the establishment of distinct rights and duties in the definition of a Catalan citizenship, including the use of the term 'nation', and the redistribution of competencies in favour of the sub-national (regional) level. As put by the then-president of the PP:

> [The Catalan statute] has unilaterally wiped out the state model, moving it away from the current state of the autonomies to an asymmetric confederation that favours Catalonia.
>
> (Mariano Rajoy, president of the PP. *El País*, 31/07/2006)[5]

In June 2010, the ruling of the Constitutional Court declared 14 articles as unconstitutional. More specifically, Article 6.1 on the Catalan language was considered partially unconstitutional because of the above mentioned 'preferential' word as to the status of Catalan in the public administration, media and educational system. Furthermore, the ruling argued that this violated the principle of equality between Catalan and Castilian, and thus affected the co-official status of the languages, while it discriminated in favour of the use of Catalan, since the adjective 'preferential' implied the primacy of Catalan over Castilian.[6] In all, up to five dispositions relating to language were subject to interpretation, including:

> The duty of learning Catalan cannot be understood as a legally enforceable obligation with widespread nature.
>
> (Interpretation of Article 6.2)

> It cannot be legitimately interpreted that education should be provided only and exclusively in one of the two co-official languages. It is constitutionally required that both languages are recognised as vehicular.
>
> (Interpretation of Article 35)

> The duty to use Catalan does not involve a ban on the use of Castilian by public and private entities, and the personnel in their service, in internal and external relations, without that normal use of Castilian being formally conditioned.
>
> (Interpretation of Article 50.5)

Particularly relevant was the interpretation of Article 35 by the Constitutional Court, which referred to linguistic rights in the education system, as this reopened the debate on the linguistic model in the Catalan education system. Whereas the Constitutional Court accepted that Catalan should have a prominent role in the public sphere, its ruling stated that this article should be read in the sense that both languages should be languages of instruction, thus avoiding a situation in which only one of the co-official languages worked as a vehicular language. This ruling called into question the 'conjunction' model, reacting to the provisions of the Statute to provide better legal foundations to the existing linguistic model in Catalonia. We have detailed this constitutional disagreement because it was the departure point for further confrontations and legal disputes in later years over how to implement such a ruling where relevant linguistic claims were formulated which pitted individual rights versus collective rights. Moreover, it was a very relevant example of how the Spanish Court openly and in a very detailed manner intervened in these linguistic disputes.

As an immediate reaction to the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court, the greatest demonstration in the democratic history of Catalonia took place against this ruling in July 2010 (*El País*, 11/07/2010). Promoted by Òmnium Cultural[7] and supported by all political parties – except for the PP and the new party Ciudadanos – trade unions and civil society organisations (CSOs), the participants protested against the ruling under the motto: 'We are a nation. We decide' (see Table 4.2. for a full description of the dimensions of analysis). This protest can be seen as a claim for a collective linguistic right, mixing instrumental and identity aspects together: the claim for a Catalan language and a Catalan nation as key symbols, and a claim about decision-making with the aim of preventing a social-linguistic divide in the country. The views of the participants in the demonstration, however, probably did not coincide in full: some felt more attached to the first claim (nationalists and conservatives), while others identified themselves with the second claim (unions and leftist parties).

After the Constitutional Court's ruling, several verdicts of the Supreme Court ruled against different aspects of the Catalan immersion model, based on citizens' claims about the impossibility of educating their children in the Castilian language within Catalonia's public education system, thus infringing their individual and constitutional rights. This verdict created a series of institutional and legal tensions between the Catalan authorities and the judiciary, including the Catalan High Court of Justice, which also ruled in favour of reintroducing Castilian as a language of instruction in Catalan schools.

Table 4.2 Education in the Catalan case: dimensions of analysis

(a) Actors		
	For (bilingual model)	*Against (bilingual model)*
Political	PP; Ciudadanos	CiU; Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC); Socialists' Party of Catalonia (PSC–PSOE); Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV); United Left and Alternative (EUiA); Citizens for Change (CpC)
Unions		UGT; CCOO
Educative community		Federation of Associations of Mothers and Parents of Students of Catalonia (FaPac)
Civil society	CCC	Òmnium Cultural; Foundation of Catalan businesspersons (FemCAT); Platform for the language; Catalan Association of Municipalities and Counties (ACMC); Somescola.cat

(b) Arguments		
	For	*Against*
Political	The bilingual model is supported by a significant part of the Catalan society.	The immersion model enjoys a wide social consensus.
Socio-linguistic	Discriminatory effect on Castilian.	Discriminatory effect on Catalan.
Pedagogical	Positive effects for Castilian-speaking pupils since they would receive education in their mother tongue.	Only the immersion model in Catalan guarantees the proficiency in both Catalan and Castilian.
Social	The bilingual model incorporates the value of linguistic pluralism into education. The immersion model is against social cohesion. Discriminatory effects for pupils with migration background in terms of educational attainment.	The immersion model generates social cohesion. The bilingual model discriminates those who have Castilian as mother tongue, since Catalan is the institutional language in Catalonia. It favours the inclusion of migrants.

(*Continued*)

(b) Arguments

Legal	The immersion model in Catalan is against the Spanish Constitution.	The individual right to choose the vehicular language is not possible since the language of instruction must be fixed by the administration.
Cultural		Catalan is a key element of the Catalan national identity and culture.

(c) Channels

Legal	Constitutional Court; SCJC	
Political	Parliamentary debate	
Civil	Public demonstrations	

Source: Own elaboration.

Such tensions turned into open political conflict, with social mobilisations between 2011 and 2014. These mobilisations occurred in parallel with the legal disputes between the Catalan government and the regional High Court judges over the interpretation of the constitutional rulings.

Such tensions mounted under the new Spanish education law passed by the then–Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy (PP), in 2013,[8] in which several legal processes demanding the inclusion of Castilian as the vehicular language in the Catalan education system were introduced. In March 2013, the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia (SCJC) confirmed that the Catalan administration should introduce a bilingual model in some education centres upon request of the families. In several schools in Barcelona, Tarragona and Girona, bilingual education was demanded, although the Catalan government was reluctant to introduce a new system while litigation continued in the courts. Finally, in January 2014, the SCJC ruled that 25% of the curriculum should be taught in Castilian in schools where parents were claiming this right, although it agreed to consider the Catalan language as the centre of gravity of the education system in Catalonia.

The reasoning used by the SCJC against the immersion model was that Castilian should be a language of instruction too, and in a specific proportion, since the right to education does not guarantee the right to

choose to receive education in just one of the official languages. It also argued that, given that Catalan occupied a central space in the Catalan education system, it was required to establish a minimum number of curricular hours in Castilian to guarantee the right to receive education in that language in a reasonable proportion. The Catalan government claimed that there was no pedagogic argument supporting the establishment of a proportion of 25%, and that the ruling was motivated purely by ideological reasons, against the majority vote of the Catalan parliament. Also, Catalan trade union representatives, together with the organisation 'We are School' (Som Escola), expressed their rejection of the SCJC's ruling on the basis that the immersion model in Catalan had proved its efficacy in the promotion of social cohesion, and it represented an adequate tool for complying with the legal requirement of achieving full linguistic competencies in both co-official languages, given that Catalan was less extensive compared with Castilian.

Following this controversy, several families claimed their rights for financial compensation for not being able to receive education in Castilian in the Catalan public system. Consequently, they took their children to private schools, where, according to the 2013 Spanish education law, Castilian was the language of instruction. After a short time, the Spanish government legislated full compensation by Royal Decree 591/2014, approved in July 2014, to be paid to the families by the Catalan government. The Catalan government complained about this measure and mobilised broad political and social support because it interpreted this measure as a direct attack on its established conjunction model.

After a few years, however, it was apparent that there was no clear demand for Castilian-only education in Catalonia. Up to April 2016, 39 families out of the 113 cases submitted – representing the equivalent of 0.007% of the total number of students in Catalonia – received a grant to pay for a school where Castilian was the vehicular language (*El País*, 01/09/2016 and 06/04/2016). In addition to this, in February 2018, the Constitutional Court declared as invalid the ruling of the 2013 Spanish education law that introduced financial support for those families opting out of the Catalan education system. The rationale for this ruling was that, according to the constitution and its later amendments, most of the responsibility for education policy lay with the regional governments and not with the Spanish government (*La Vanguardia*, 20/02/2018). Finally, the resulting situation turned out to be very close to the initial one, before policy initiatives were launched, multiple rulings were passed and all types of claims surged.

The Decree of Trilingualism in the Balearic Islands

With the Law of Linguistic Normalisation in 1986, the knowledge of Catalan expanded in the Balearic Islands. This expansion placed the growth of Catalan at a similar rate to population growth (Observatory of the Catalan Language 2013). As we saw in the previous chapter, 30 years later, in the mid-2010s, a large proportion of the population was able to speak both Catalan and Castilian, although only about one-third used Catalan as their preferred language.

Between 2011 and 2012, the Govern Balear, headed by the PP and with Rafael Bosch as Education Counsellor, implemented a campaign to find out the preferences of families regarding the language of instruction: Catalan, Castilian or the language chosen by the educational centre. Most families chose Catalan as their preferred language. Despite the results of this consultation, the PP government aimed to introduce a policy change in the languages of education, modifying their distribution for teaching purposes. Basically, the claim they were addressing was related to the impact of globalisation and the importance of English for the services economy of the region.

Thus, in April 2013 they introduced the Decree of Trilingualism, or the Integral Treatment of Language (TIL).[9] The TIL thus became the legal framework regulating the curricular language in primary and secondary education in the Balearic Islands. This reform of the linguistic model, promoted by the PP regional government, encountered wide opposition. The new decree replaced the previous model introduced in the 1990s, which had enjoyed a notable social and political consensus. The new model aimed at implementing a rule of proportionality of one-third Catalan, one-third Castilian and one-third English in the curriculum. The previous linguistic model for education in the Balearic Islands was not actually a linguistic conjunction model as the one implemented in Catalonia, but rather a bilingual model based on a rule that guaranteed a minimum of 50% of the curriculum being taught in Catalan, while the remaining 50% was to be defined by the school and the government.

In June 2013, two months after the introduction of the Decree of Trilingualism, the main trade unions – the Workers' Commissions (CCOO), the Union of Workers of Teaching-Intersindical of the Balearic Islands (STEI-i) and the Federation of Workers of Education–General Union of Workers (FETE–UGT) – lodged a litigious appeal against this decree, claiming that not enough resources were provided to implement such a change, and that the pedagogic reasoning behind was not at all clear. In September 2013, a very large

social mobilisation against the TIL took place in the main cities of the Balearic Islands bringing together the unions, the educational community, citizens, opposition parties and CSOs. In addition, the Assembly of Teachers of the Balearic Islands promoted an open-ended strike to stop the reform. During that period, the linguistic conflict escalated, and in early 2014, several school principals and leadership teams tendered their resignation because of their disagreement with the new linguistic policy.

The PP did not get much social support for implementing these measures, and even some sections of the party disagreed with the new policy. However, and despite the significant number of educational centres that also disagreed with the TIL, and the general protest that followed the strike, in May 2014, the Balearic regional government approved a new decree legislating the implementation of the linguistic project in primary and secondary schools for the following academic year 2014–15. This led to open protests again. In September 2014, the Superior Court of Justice of the Balearic Islands overturned the decree on the basis that it was in breach of Article 35 of the region's statute of autonomy, and that the regional government had mismanaged other legal procedures. Article 35 established that the regional government should have consulted the University of the Balearic Islands as an advisory institution in matters of language. The legal battle continued. In January 2015, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal that the Govern Balear had lodged against the ruling of the Balearic Superior Court of Justice that suspended the TIL. However, an election later in the year brought a leftist coalition to the regional government, which then decided not to continue the legal battle but to reinstall the former model instead.

The implementation of the TIL by the Balearic government at the hands of the PP triggered a large mobilisation of actors which employed a variety of actions in their claim to keep the previously existing linguistic model. Trade unions, the whole educational community (teachers, families and students), as well as the main opposition political parties, cultural organisations and CSOs, were involved (see Table 4.3. for a full description of the analysis of the dimensions). Furthermore, those involved were able to articulate a linguistic political conflict of great impact. Their collective action lasted for more than two years, with multiple mobilisations, all of which had strong repercussions throughout Spain, and even internationally. The main complaints made by these groups were based on a mix of legal, pedagogic, economic and political arguments. Yet, a common claim was that the new model was destabilising a complex linguistic configuration

Table 4.3 Education in the Balearic case: dimensions of analysis

(a) Actors		
	For (TIL)	*Against (TIL)*
Political	PP	PSIB-PSOE
Unions		CCOO; STEI-i; FETE-UGT
Educative community	Estudiants Lliures de les Illes Balears	Federation of Associations of Students' Mothers and Fathers (FAPA); Assembly of Teachers of the Balearic Islands
Civil society		More for Mallorca (MÉS per Mallorca); El Pi-Proposal for the Balearic Island; OCB
(b) Arguments		
	For	*Against*
Political	EU recommendations on multilingualism.	Lack of support of the Balearic society.
Socio-linguistic		Discriminatory effect on Catalan.
Economic	Promotion of competitiveness.	Lack of resources.
Pedagogical	Reduction of school failure.	Lack of pedagogical orientation.
Social		Negative impact on families with scarce resources. Against integration of immigrants.
Cultural		Catalan as key element of Balearic identity.
(c) Channels		
Legal	Superior Court of Justice	
Political	Parliamentary debate	
Civil	Public demonstrations; strikes	

Source: Own elaboration.

which had been in place for about 30 years without triggering major conflicts.

First, many claims against the TIL by those actors who supported the regional language were focused on denouncing this new model both as a political strategy to consolidate the dominance of Castilian in everyday interactions and as a step to undermine the weight of the Catalan language at the institutional level:

> The objective is to eliminate Catalan. The Catalan language is a source of national pride.
>
> (Francina Armengol, Federation of Spanish Socialist Workers Party in the Balearic Islands (PSIB-PSOE), regional parliamentary debate)

> Teaching at school is equal, but outside school there is no equality. Castilian is present everywhere, but Catalan and English are not; thus it will be difficult for the school to provide experience to the children if they lack other experiences outside.
>
> (Ricard Vila, School Rafal Vell, 324.notícies)

Second, some actors claimed that the policy change should also be rejected because of a lack of pedagogic orientation and resources. The new model was perceived as an ideological construct without a clear technical definition of how it should be organised for adequate implementation. This was expressed by the leaders of teachers' unions and parents' organisations alike:

> It is complicated because teachers lack the necessary pedagogic orientation to apply the TIL. The educational community and the teachers, in particular, consider that this is a pedagogic aberration, and they have always asked for its gradual implementation based on pedagogic and psychological criteria within the teaching of these languages.
>
> (Maria Alarcón, General Secretary of FETE-UGT, *'El Matins'* TV3)

> This is an attack on the language, on the labour rights of the teachers, and evidently students are the victims.
>
> (Oscar Prats, Secondary Education Institute 'sa Blanca Dona', 324.notícies)

> A well-established trilingual system may be very good, but it is necessary to provide centres with resources; with native teachers.

(Pablo de la Fuente, Association of Students' Father and Mothers (APIMA) at school Sant Jordi, 324.notícies)

The counterarguments used by members of the Govern Balear were based on claims about the advantages of the trilingual model in terms of promoting competitiveness and the fight against school failure, which was considered to be a side effect of the dominance of Catalan in the public advisory institute in matters of language:

> This government will go ahead with all the reforms deemed necessary, and one of the reforms that is necessary is educational reform. This is because of one simple reason: because I do not want to lead the worst results in educational failure and early dropout in Spain and Europe.
>
> (José Ramón Bauzá, president of the Govern Balear, 324.notícies, 28-5-2013)

This argument suggests a connection between the dominance of Catalan in public schools and the poor academic performance of students. A few years later, however, in an interview, the then-head of the regional government, José Ramón Bauzá (PP), admitted major mistakes in how the new model had been implemented. Interestingly, he then made a different claim based on an individual rights claim and, on the right, and freedom of families to decide the language of education for their children:

> I have always defended freedom, and I believe that there is no one better than parents to choose the education of their children. We have the great wealth of having two co-official languages and the more languages our children know, the better. Yes to freedom. No to imposition.
>
> (José Ramón Bauzá, *ABC*, 4-3-2017)

Linguistic reform for a conjunction model in Euskara in the Basque Country

Under the Francoist dictatorship, the Basque language, or Euskara, experienced a severe decline in favour of Castilian due to linguistic repression and population changes, among other reasons. However, with the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country (1979) and the Law for the Normalisation of the Use of Euskara (1982), the 'reversing

language shift' that affirms the basic principle of a community's right to use its language (Fishman 1991) became a core goal of Basque linguistic policy. As Euskara was introduced in the public sphere, including into the administration, the education system and the media, its social function was strongly endorsed, thus enabling its intergenerational transmission after 40 years of dictatorship (Fernández-Ulloa 2005). Although Euskara remains a minority language today, with a percentage of people who understand or speak the language more greatly reduced than any other region examined here, data show that the number of Basque-speaking people has notably increased over the last decades (see Chapter 3, also Cenoz and Perales 2007).

After democratisation, several decrees and laws regulated the incorporation of Euskara into the education system.[10] In contrast to the immersion model in Catalonia and the bilingual model in the Balearic Islands and in Galicia, the Basque Country implemented a comprehensive model. This model combined both the immersion and the bilingual models, thus establishing three options: Model A, Castilian as the vehicular language, except in English classes and for Basque language and literature; Model B, mixed vehicular use of both official languages, and Model D, Euskara as the vehicular language, except for English and Spanish language and literature; thus, classes are given exclusively in Basque, with Castilian language as a subject.[11] Since its implementation, the immersion model in Euskara (Model D) has gained relevance and has become increasingly widespread in primary education and, to a lesser extent, in secondary education.

In 2005, the Basque government started to discuss the reform of the linguistic policy in the education system of the Basque Country to establish a single model and thus improve the degree of bilingualism achieved by the end of secondary education. Supported by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna-EA), the United Left-Green Party (Ezker Batua-Berdeak-EB), the Communist Party of the Basque Homelands (PCTV-EHAK), Aralar and the Socialist Party of Euskadi (PSE-EE), this reform process represented the most important linguistic policy reform proposed since the 1980s.

Two years later, the government presented the detailed contents of the reform, which was followed by the publication of Decree 175/2007 in October of that year. This decree established the new curriculum, setting a new status for Euskara as the main language of instruction in compulsory education (with a minimum of 60% Euskara in the curricular programme). The reform was intended to shift the linguistic model towards a strategy of immersion in Euskara and further promote and expand the use of Euskara. The rationale was that the previous

linguistic model had turned out to be ineffective in achieving the goals set by the Basque administration for students' linguistic competencies in Euskara. It is worth saying that less than 10% of students following Model A (the Castilian model) at that time was in compulsory education, while in the 1980s it was over 50%. This made the demand for effective bilingualism much stronger. Thus, it was clear that there was a demand for a reform of the various models offered, though consensus on the contents of the reform remained elusive (see Table 4.4. for a full description of the dimensions of analysis).

Under these circumstances, there were controversies over the goals of the new linguistic model for schools. It became clear that

Table 4.4 Education in the Basque case: dimensions of analysis

(a) Actors

	For (immersion model in Euskara)	*Against (immersion model in Euskara)*
Political	EB; EA	PNV; PP; PSE-EE
Unions	Solidarity of the Basque Workers (Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna-ELA); Comissions of Abertzale Workers (Langile Abertzaleen Batzordeak-LAB); Union of Teaching Workers of the Basque Country (STEE-EILAS)	CCOO
Civil society		Platform for the Freedom of Linguistic Choice (Plataforma por la Libertad de Elección Lingüística)
Institutions		Consultative Council on Euskara

(b) Arguments

	For	*Against*
Political	High degree of political and social consensus.	The new model represents a strategy of imposition of Euskara.
Legal	The three-option model does not guarantee the main principles of the Law 1/1993 on the Basque Public School.	

Pedagogical	The model of options does not guarantee proficiency in both languages.	
Sociolinguistic		Discriminatory against Castilian. Linguistic policy must be coherent with the diversity of sociolinguistic situations in the Basque Country.
(c) Channels		
Political	Parliamentary debate	

Source: Own elaboration.

there was no consensus, even among the members of the governing coalition (PNV-EB-EA). The opposition political parties (PSE-EE and PP) and trade unions (CCOO) were very critical of its implementation. Also, a movement against this project was started: the so-called Platform for the Defence of Linguistic Freedom of Choice in Teaching (Plataforma por la defensa de la libre elección de la lengua vehicular en educación). This platform claimed for the right to continue with Castilian-dominant teaching in schools, as formulated in Model A. The movement's claims were based on individual rights. Thus, in July 2008, the PNV publicly expressed its differences with EA, the promoter of the reform – and its partner in the coalition – for new linguistic standards and demanded more flexibility in the reform's design, as well as a more inclusive approach towards the reform.

EA's main argument in pursuing the reform was that the three-option model did not guarantee knowledge of both Castilian and Basque at the end of compulsory education, and the Catalan model, based on the idea of a single immersion strategy, could work much better for this purpose:

> It is clear and indisputable that the system of models does not bring in bilingualism. It is therefore essential to promote a reform to guarantee the command of Euskara and Castilian by the end of ESO [compulsory secondary education].
>
> (Onintza Lasa, Education Commission of the Basque Parliament, EA. *www.euskoalkartasuna.eus*)

However, a representative of the PSE-EE, then in opposition, expressed great concern about the social effects of the new model, claiming that sociolinguistic conditions of Euskadi were very different from those in Catalonia.

> Implementing the Catalan system is foolish because the sociolinguistic reality is not the same, nor the laws, nor the political consensus, on which the school is based in Catalonia. Coexistence would be broken.
>
> (Isabel Celaá, Member of the Parliament, PSE-EE, *El Correo*, 9-7-2008)

Altogether, the public debate prompted a revision of the new model and the requirements it introduced. Multiple claims emerged from public opinion, including media and social organisations, about the need for a more consensual approach to the reform. For example, the leader of the trade union CCOO in Euskadi claimed that:

> The agreement should be based on the consideration of the two official languages as instrumental languages in the school environment and the conjunction of respect for the mother tongue of the students with the establishment of a bilingual objective at the end of basic education.
>
> (Javier Nogales, *El Diario Vasco*, 25-9-2008)

Trade unions (CCOO), and the opposition political parties (PP and PSE-EE) strongly criticised the bill, given that in practice most of the curriculum would be instructed in Euskara to achieve the proficiency goals, thus affecting the equilibrium between the languages and discriminating against Castilian. They claimed that ignoring the diverse sociolinguistic context in the Basque Country would trigger linguistic conflicts between Castilian and Euskara and would stimulate exclusionary mechanisms from the institutional sphere. This in turn would affect those with poor competencies in Euskara.

As a consequence of all these complaints, in November 2008, EA, the party in charge of education policy in the Basque government, agreed to revise the proposal to include the views of different actors, and to present a new draft of the reform to the educational community. However, EA still recognised the importance of having 60% of teaching in Euskara in all cases. A few months later, regional elections were held, and a different distribution of seats brought in a new coalition, this time between the conservative nationalists (PNV) and the socialists (PSE-EE). Thus, this electoral result led to the abandonment of

the former proposal to introduce a single linguistic model in Euskadi based on the immersion principle and to the continuity of the existing trilingual model, which is still in place in 2020.

The Decree of Plurilingualism in Galicia

Galician society shows a high competency in Galician, although the percentage of people who use it as a first language, or as the language of normal use, is lower compared with the other cases, especially among young people and the middle-upper, highly educated social levels. Still, Castilian is normally used in the public space and in formal situations, such as in the educational sphere, in professional contexts and in public administration (Hermida 2007), because of the low social prestige of Galician, even today. In addition, contrary to other regions, defenders of the language have not acted homogeneously in Galicia. While the most radical were in favour of getting the language close to Portuguese (the *reintegracionistas*), another group was in favour of the normalisation of an independent language (the *isolacionistas*). With Galicia's Linguistic Normalisation Law of 1983 and the creation of the Direction of Linguistic Policy, the Galician language (Galego) was introduced into the institutional image of this autonomous community. However, a battle started between these two factions, because the new norm was very distant from Portuguese. In 2003, a new linguistic norm was approved by the Royal Galician Academy (Real Academia Galega (RAG))[12] with strong support from the biggest organisation in defence of Galician, A Mesa pola Normalización Lingüística, which encouraged the alignment of Galician's orthography and morphology with Portuguese. There was wide social agreement with this new norm. It was, however, opposed by the most radical sector of the *reintegracionistas* and by the most radical sector of Galician nationalists.

Within this context, in 2004, a new Normalisation Law (Plan Xeral de Normalización da Lingua Galega – PXNL) was unanimously approved by the Galician Parliament (with the PP in government). In practice, however, the plan was never put into practice, to the extent that in 2012, the PP voted against a motion proposed by the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) to force compliance with the PXNL. Partly because of these struggles, Galician has been further stigmatised, either for being used by the less educated and those in the rural areas, or for being used by the radical nationalists. This has impeded both the integration of the language into the schools and its spread in the public sphere. In fact, 59.57% of students in Galicia received the same proportion of classes in Galician as in Castilian. However, if we distinguish according to age and level of education, this percentage changes

to 72.72% for students between 5 and 16 years old, and 36.03% for students aged 17 and over. This older group received 46.48% of its classes in Castilian or mostly in Castilian (IGE 2019).

Between 2005 and 2009, the coalition government of the Xunta – which brought together the Party of the Socialists of Galicia (PSdeG-PSOE) and the BNG – introduced a new decree without the support of the main party in the opposition, the conservative PP. The Xunta decreed that at least 50% of the curriculum should be in Galician. After the elections in 2009, the new administration, under the PP, changed the linguistic policy model to promote a trilingual model, with one-third of the curriculum to be taught in English. It also balanced the number of hours of instruction in Castilian and Galician (Decree 79/2010).[13] The PP argued that the reform responded to concerns expressed by families and was in line with the EU recommendations on multilingualism.

Political opposition parties – i.e. PSdeG-PSOE and BNG – together with CSOs, trade unions and RAG rejected the reform of the linguistic model on cultural, pedagogic and sociolinguistic grounds. Galician was claimed to be a key element of the Galician culture and identity, and as such it needed to be promoted by the public administration to compensate for the regression it had experienced in the institutional space. Moreover, decisions on the preferential use of language in the education system could not be taken privately by families. It was claimed that such decisions should be taken by the institutional framework according to the specific situation of the sociolinguistic context and the concomitant social and cultural needs of Galician society (see Table 4.5. for a full description of the dimensions of analysis).

In 2012, the Superior Court of Justice of Galicia (TSXG) annulled two main changes introduced by Decree 79/2010: the possibility of asking families which language should be used in specific subjects (Article 5.2), and the possibility of allowing pupils to use Galician or Castilian by choice (Article 12.3). The TSXG argued that language programmes were the responsibility of the administration, and therefore it should not be left to families to decide. The TSXG also highlighted that Galician should be treated differently from Castilian in order to guarantee equality between the two languages.

Three years later, conflict and rights claims lingered. In February 2015, a massive demonstration that brought together between 20,000 and 25,000 people in Santiago de Compostela, protested for changes to the linguistic policy of the regional government, the Xunta. The main arguments against the decree, as expressed by civil society representatives, political leaders, and RAG, contended that Galician was a key element of social cohesion and that the decree was a political strategy to force the decline of Galician. The demonstration was led by the organisation 'We

Table 4.5 Education in the Galician case: dimensions of analysis

(a) Actors

	For (trilingual model)	*Against (trilingual model)*
Political	PP-Galicia	PSdeG-PSOE; BNG
Unions		FETE-UGT
Civil society	Bilingual Galicia (Galicia Bilingüe)	We want Galician (Queremos Galego!); The Bureau for Linguistic Standardization (A Mesa pola Normalización Lingüística); Galician Intersindical Confederation-Teaching (Confederació Intersindical Gallega-CIG-Ensino)
Official institutions		RAG

(b) Arguments

	For	*Against*
Political	EU recommendations on multilingualism.	The preferential language must be fixed by the administration since it is a collective right.
Cultural		Galician is a key element of the Galician culture and a medium of social cohesion.
Pedagogical	The promotion of Galician must be an active and wilful process. It promotes the equality of both co-official languages. To receive education in the mother tongue is fundamental for educational attainment.	
Sociolinguistic	The decree addresses concerns expressed by families.	The number of people who speak Galician has decreased. Discriminatory effect against Galician.
Legal		Against dispositions on linguistic rights expressed in the European, national and sub-national legal frameworks.

(*Continued*)

(c) Channels

Legal	TSXG
Political	Parliamentary debate
Civil	Public demonstrations

Source: Own elaboration.

want Galician' (Plataforma Queremos Galego!) which underscored the relevance of the demonstration as this 'showed unity around language as a common and social cohesion element, essential to our existence as peoples' (Marcos Maceira, spokesperson, www.queremosgalego.org). In a similar vein, representatives from the BNG contended that:

> The different judgements rendered by the TSXG prove right those who questioned the decree and declare as illegal the instruments passed by the Xunta to carry out a policy of eradication of Galician.
>
> (Ana Pontón, BNG. Bng.gal/blog)

Finally, the Royal Galician Academy claimed that:

> Decree 79/2010 of the Xunta de Galicia, which is said to develop the Law of Linguistic Normalization, is in fact in open contradiction to this law by omitting the concept of normalization and announcing a legal change in its preamble… The most serious aspect is that it perpetuates the position of weakness of Galician, thus deepening prejudices against it by strictly excluding its use in subjects of scientific content.
>
> (RAG, *Faro de Vigo*, 28-4-2015)

Overall, most of the claim-makers showed that the low degree of usage of the Galician language was the result of years of inactivity of the Galician administration, which had led to the language's sharp decline over the democratic period. CSOs, together with PSdeG-PSOE, BNG and the left-wing electoral coalition Galician Alternative of the Left (AGE), all collaborated in claiming the use of Galician as the official language of Galicia. Although the claims for the use of Galician in education have persisted (in 2019, for example, the BNG tried to change the Law of Linguistic Normalization to ensure the use of Galician in schools), the majority of the PP in the regional government managed to silence most of these claims.

Linguistic claims in public space signalisation and audio-visual media

This section turns to the presentation and discussion of rights claims related to attempts to promote changes in the linguistic policies that regulate public space signalisation – e.g. stores, traffic and street signalisation – and audio-visual media, either by regional governments or by societal actors. The cases presented here deal with rights claims regarding language usage in these two domains, and are relevant in terms of the complexity of the claims, the duration in time, the diversity of actors and the variance of the political implications. We find that claims in the field of education relating to proposals intended to modify rules for child–class allocation often show rights claims at the individual level. Most claims around language usage in public radio and television, and in stores and in traffic and street signalisation, however, are directed towards the reformulation of the structure and composition of the linguistic terrain shared by Castilian and the co-official languages.

The direction of actors' claims about the proportion in which each of the two languages should be used, and in what situations each language is distinctly relevant, aims to evaluate the significance of the impact on the public space domain in the sub-national context. We look into claims and subsequent conflicts about language usage on commercial, traffic and street signs in Catalonia and in the Basque Country. We also look at claims about the promotion of TV channels and programming in local and regional audio-visual media in the Balearic Islands and Galicia that use the co-official language as a vehicular language. Whereas in the first two cases – Catalonia and the Basque Country – demands involved claims on different modes about how to implement a bilingual model, in the latter cases the observed claims were strongly against the reduction of the linguistic terrain of the co-official languages, Catalan and Galician, respectively.

The usage of Catalan and Castilian on commercial and traffic signs in Catalonia

Since the mid-1980s, the Catalan administration has promoted the use of Catalan in commercial and economic activities through a number of public campaigns.[14] Additionally, the Law of Language Policy 1/1998 regulated the use of the official languages in Catalonia – Catalan and Castilian – concerning multiple commercial and economic activities. The law regulates language usage in practices regarding consumer attention, commercial and informative signs, labelling of products with

designation of origin in Catalonia and the advertising of companies with a concession agreement with the Catalan government, with the general aim of making the role of Catalan in the public space more visible.

Both the Law of Language Policy (1998) and the Consumer Statute (1993) established a simple rule: commercial signs in the public space must be at least in Catalan. This simple rule, as a minimum requirement, implied that commercial signs must either be in Catalan only, or in Catalan and Castilian (and/or other languages). During the period examined, the Office of Language Guarantees sanctioned several stores in Catalonia for having their commercial signs only in Castilian. Consequently, some political and civil actors claimed their right to use the language of their choice, with the need to introduce legal changes to make this possible.[15] The main arguments introduced were built upon the idea that the 'imposition' of Catalan by the administration implies a violation of consumers' linguistic rights. Interestingly, the Catalan Consumer Agency provided the same argument regarding commercial signs written exclusively in Castilian, arguing that this implied a violation of linguistic rights of Catalan consumers and clients (*El Confidencial*, 02/04/2010).

The parties affected by such administrative sanctions claimed that this rule created a conflict with Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution, and that the Law of Language Policy of 1998 had a prohibitive and coercive character against Castilian. Nevertheless, a few court resolutions resulting from administrative appeals stated that, according to Article 3.2 of the Spanish Constitution, the regulation of languages used in Spain, contrary to the case of Castilian, remains the competence of regional governments, i.e. the autonomous communities. Therefore, in these cases, regional (sub-national) legislation prevails. Additionally, the courts argued that the rule could not be interpreted as a prohibition of Castilian, but rather as a rule of minimum usage, since it does not prevent the use of Castilian or any other language. Whereas the cases concerning commercial signs written only in Castilian involve a conflict that goes from the administration to citizens, and which may entail the application of sanctions, rights claims concerning traffic signs involve demands against signs written only in Catalan. Thus, these claims entail a conflict triggered by affected citizens who complained to the administration, and which also involved formal complaints to the Síndic de Greuges*,* the Catalan Ombudsman (see Table 4.6. for a full description of the dimensions of analysis).

As a follow-up to this controversy, in 2015, a CSO called Catalan Civic Coexistence (CCC)[16] launched a campaign to promote the bilingual signalisation of traffic signs in Catalan and Castilian on the basis that most traffic signs in Catalonia were written only in Catalan, thus

Table 4.6 Catalan and Castilian in commercial and traffic signs: dimensions of analysis

(a) Actors		
	For (signalization in Castilian / against rule of minimum in Catalan)	*Against (signalization in Castilian / for rule of minimum in Catalan)*
Political	PP; Ciudadanos	CiU; ERC; PSC; ICV; EUiA
Unions		UGT; CCOO
Civil society	Citizen Impulse (Impuls ciutadà); Association for Tolerance (Associació per la Tolerància); Coordinator for a Catalunya in Freedom (Coordinadora per una Catalunya en Llibertat); CCC	Catalonia Action (Catalunya Acció); Platform for the Language (Plataforma per la Llengua)
(b) Arguments		
	For	*Against*
Sociolinguistic	Discriminatory effects on Castilian-speaking citizens. The sociolinguistic reality in Catalonia is of bilingualism.	
Social		Catalan is a tool for social cohesion and integration.
Legal	Violation of linguistic rights of Castilian-speaking consumers and drivers. Against the Spanish Constitution and language legislation in traffic space.	Violation of linguistic rights. Language policy of 1989 provides a rule of minimum in Catalan in commercial signs; this rule does not prevent the use of Castilian
(c) Channels		
Legal	Legal proceedings	
Political	Parliamentary debates	
Civil	Public protests and demonstrations	
Administrative	Ombudsman, sanctions	

Source: Own elaboration.

implying a violation of the legislation that regulates language in traffic signalisation: the Law on Traffic, Circulation of Motor Vehicles and Road Safety (1990) and the General Regulation of Circulation (2003).

CCC also argued that monolingual traffic signalisation was against the linguistic rights of the Castilian-speaking population and represented a threat to traffic security:

> The exclusion of the Castilian from road signs and signals not only contravenes legal norms and undermines linguistic rights of behalf of the citizens of Catalonia and of other regions of Spain that visit us, but it also constitutes an obstacle to the correct understanding of road messages for drivers who do not speak Catalan.
>
> (*El Singular*, 3-4-2015)

The rationale behind these claims was that in a bilingual region, traffic signs should likewise be bilingual, since monolingualism in Catalan implies the exclusion of Castilian, thus violating not only the linguistic rights of Castilian-speaking Catalan citizens but also the linguistic rights of citizens from other regions of Spain. CCC's campaign also encouraged citizens to appeal against traffic sanctions relating to non-bilingual traffic signs based on two laws: Article 56 of the Law on Traffic, Circulation of Motor Vehicles and Road Safety, which states that traffic signs must be expressed at least in the official language of the Spanish state (i.e. Castilian), and based on Article 138 of the General Regulation of Circulation, which provides that:

> The written information included in or accompanying signage panels on public roads, and the inscriptions, will be in Castilian and also in the official language of the autonomous community recognised in the corresponding autonomy statute, when the sign is situated within the territorial area of this community.

Complaints from the affected parties were directed to the Catalan Ombudsman. Moreover, the PP of Catalonia supported the incorporation of Castilian in traffic signs, arguing that signalisation in the public space should mirror the sociolinguistic situation of bilingualism in Catalonia. Thus, they demanded that:

> What is usual in the street in relation to the indistinct use of Catalan or Castilian should now be transferred to a basic element: that of city signalling… The idea that Catalan can be easily understood by a Castilian-speaking person is no longer a justification… There are words in both languages that have nothing in common.
>
> (*Crónica Global*, 18-7-2014)

Overall, between 2007 and 2017, the ombudsman received about ten complaints about traffic signs that were not in Castilian. Defenders of Catalan-only traffic information argued that this is complementary information, while the traffic symbols are based on images of universal recognition (Fernández 2018). The issue, however, still lingers, and changes, when introduced, were mainly promoted at the municipal level.

The usage of Basque and Castilian on traffic and street signs in the Basque Country

During the last decade, several claims for a bilingual model for the signalisation of the public space have been put forward in the Basque Country. Main Basque cities, such as San Sebastián and Bilbao, have introduced Euskara in many street signs that until then had been only in Castilian. While this issue triggered some conflicts in the political arena that involved political parties who supported street signs only in Basque (the coalition of the EH-Bildu, PSE-EE and PNV parties), and in both Basque and Castilian (PP and the Union, Progress and Democracy party (UPyD)), it did not raise visible claims stemming from civil society actors (see Table 4.7. for a full description of the dimensions of analysis).

Table 4.7 Basque and Castilian in traffic signs: dimensions of analysis

(a) Actors		
	Against (only Euskara in signalization)	*For (only Euskara in signalization)*
Political	PP	EH-Bildu; PNV
(b) Arguments		
	Against	*For*
Political		Public space is a local and regional competence.
Socio-linguistic	Linguistic rights of non-Euskara-speaking citizens.	Euskara is a language of customary use in many cities in the Basque country.
Legal	Legal framework supports a bilingual model.	
(c) Channels		
Legal	Legal proceedings (appeal)	
Political	Parliamentary debates	
Administrative	Basque Ombudsman	

Source: Own elaboration.

Additionally, claims for a bilingual model for traffic signalisation constituted a significant source of conflict between political parties supporting the promotion of Basque in the public space and parties supporting the co-representation of both official languages. According to the legislative framework, which regulates language usage in the public space – i.e. Law of Normalisation of the Use of Euskara, Law on Traffic, Circulation of Motor Vehicles and Road Safety (Article 56) and General Regulation of Circulation (Article 138) – the content of traffic signalisation on public roads must be both in Castilian and in the official language of the corresponding autonomous community.

In 2007, following demands of independent and left-wing Basque parties, like EH-Bildu, the Basque Ombudsman (Ararteko) agreed with the claim made by a citizen that all traffic signs in the municipality of Oñate (Guipuzkoa) were written only in Basque. The main argument supporting the ombudsman's decision referred to existing legislation, i.e. that traffic signs must be bilingual. The city council counterargued saying that given that most signs also included pictograms and that 85% of the population in Oñate used Euskara in everyday situations, then the inclusion of Castilian was not justified. The ombudsman stated that pictograms were insufficient and that Castilian should be introduced in the signalisation, as in the case of information about dates and types of vehicles in parking areas.

In the same way, a few years later, the Delegate of the Spanish Government in the Basque Country lodged an administrative appeal against the Provincial Council of Gipuzkoa (Diputación de Gipuzkoa) calling for traffic signs to be bilingual. The main argument of the appeal was that, according to Article 10 of the Law of Normalisation of the Use of Euskara, indications and signs in the public space should be in both Basque and Castilian (*Noticias de Gipuzkoa*, 27/11/2014). According to the Provincial Council of Gipuzkoa – the regional administration controlled by EH-Bildu – road space is the competency of the regional government and therefore decisions on the language used for road signalisation concern only the provincial council. The delegate argued that the political position of EH-Bildu on the introduction of Castilian in these signs had a discriminatory effect on Castilian:

> The intention is not to stop using Euskara, neither to make Castilian invisible, much less violating the law.
>
> (Carlos Urquijo, Delegate of the Spanish Government in the Basque Country; *El País,* 19-12-2007)

This was a claim referring to a possible intention by those nationalist proponents to make Castilian less visible in the public space in Euskadi, even to the point of introducing English if necessary. On the other hand, claims for Euskara-only traffic signs appeared among Basque independentists on the left, although the claims failed to trigger significant mobilisations.

RTVM and the reception of Catalan TV channels in the Balearic Islands

Between 2010 and 2015, in the context of the 2007–2008 economic and financial crisis and when the PP controlled the Balearic government, the management of local and regional audio-visual media in the Balearic Islands experienced several cutbacks. Opposition parties and social organisations, as for example the organisation Balearic Cultural Work (Obra Cultural Balear (OCB)),[17] strongly criticised this decision and protested against the limitation of their linguistic rights. Over this period, we identified two highly contested cases in which some relevant linguistic claims were formulated. First, claims against the closure of RTVM station in 2011, which consisted of local radio and TV with programming exclusively in Catalan; and second, claims regarding the cutting of reception of two specialised channels of the public Catalan broadcast TV3 (channels 3/24 and Super 3/33) in 2015. Political and civil society actors depicted both cases as a political strategy to constrain the linguistic space of Catalan in the islands' public sphere, although the Balearic government did not refer to the cultural and linguistic aspects of the cases when defending the measures that affected RTVM and channels 3/24 and Super 3/33. In the case of RTVM, the Govern Balear resorted to economic arguments; the case of the reception cuts of channels 3/24 and Super 3/33 was presented as just a technical issue (see Table 4.8. for a full description of the dimensions of analysis).

RTVM was closed in 2011 after five years in operation, at a moment when the economic crisis in Spain was at its peak. The regional government justified its decision based on economic arguments – the lack of financial and economic sustainability of the station and the lack of resources by the local administration (Maria Salom, Consell de Mallorca, *Diari Ara*, 11/12/2011) – and implemented the closure. A few years later, in 2014, the Superior Court of Justice of the Balearic Islands, when accounting for the closure of the station in 2011, dismissed the appeal made by trade unions and television station workers, based

Table 4.8 Audio-visual media in the Balearic Islands: dimensions of analysis

(a) Actors		
	For (limitation of channels in Catalan)	*Against (limitation of channels in Catalan)*
Political	PP	ERC; Socialist Party of Mallorca (PSM); United Left (Esquerra Unida-EU); The Greens Initiative (Iniciativa Verds-IV); PSIB-PSOE, Podem; MÉS
Unions		CCOO; STEI-i
Civil society		OCB; Sovereign Assembly of Mallorca (Assamblea Sobiranista de Mallorca); Young People of Mallorca for the Language (Joves de Mallorca per la Llengua); FAPA Mallorca; Understanding Mallorca (Entesa per Mallorca); Memory of Mallorca (Memòria de Mallorca)
(b) Arguments		
	For	*Against*
Economic	Insufficiency of resources.	
Technical	Redefinition of the broadcasting space.	
Political		It is a political duty to promote the Catalan language in public media.
Socio-linguistic		Limitation of the use, knowledge and prestige of the Catalan language.
Social and cultural		Cultural and informative function of public television Vehicle for social cohesion and integration of immigration.
Legal		Against freedom of expression and linguistic rights Against Law of Linguistic Normalization and the Statute of Autonomy of the Balearic Islands.
(c) Channels		
Political	Parliamentary debate	
Civil	Public protest actions; demonstrations	

Source: Own elaboration.

on the same economic arguments raised by the Balearic government (*El País*, 27/10/2014).

Already in 2011, from the perspective of civil society and as a reaction to the decision of José Ramón Bauzá's (PP) regional government, various organisations in Mallorca formed an alliance under the name of Platform RTVM to coordinate civil protests and demonstrations against the closure of RTVM. Among the arguments put forward, linguistic and cultural issues played an important role in the alliance's position contesting RTVM's closure. Claims about RTVM's importance for the protection of the Catalan language in the Balearic Islands were at the forefront of the alliance's arguments. Platform RTVM framed the regional government's decision to close RTVM as an attack against both freedom of expression and freedom of information and against the creative sector, as well as against the recovery of the historic memory of Mallorca and the Catalan language (Plataforma RTVM, *Diari Ara*, 11/12/11. Platform RTVM pointed out that RTVM played a fundamental role in Balearic society since it was a vehicle for linguistic normalisation and for the integration of migrant groups. Furthermore, RTVM reflected the cultural and social reality of the people of Mallorca, thus generating social cohesion.

The cutting of the retransmission of channels 3/24 and Super 3/33 of Catalan TV in 2015 also gained strong media visibility. This case was not an isolated episode. In fact, since 1985, the reception of TV channels of the Catalan Corporation of Audio-visual Media (CCMA) had been a major source of conflict in the Balearic Islands. These TV channels had been subject to continuous political and social struggles for the inclusion of Catalan in the Balearic audio-visual sphere. In 1989, after the signal repeater that retransmitted the signal of Catalan TV in the Balearic Islands was violently attacked, a campaign under the motto 'Stop barbarism, we are decent people' was launched. In 2004, the administration of Jaume Matas (PP) started introducing restrictions on the retransmission of sport events, mainly concerning football matches. In 2007, OCB organised a protest action under the motto 'We want to watch TV3. Football festival in Catalan'.

Finally, in early 2015, the retransmission of channels 3/24 and Super 3/33 was ended by the PP government in the Balearic Islands arguing the reorganisation of the broadcasting space in their territory. In April that year, OCB promoted a new protest, this time under the claim: 'For a free choice of language, we want to watch 3/24 and Super 3/33'. The decision was mainly depicted as an attack against freedom of expression and against linguistic rights and a clear regression of

the Catalan communications space, as claimed by the President of the OCB at that time:

> I am very concerned about having a government that creates obstacles to the use, knowledge and prestige of our own language. This should be denounced; it cannot be tolerated. A government that should ensure all this, acts against this perfectly explicit mandate. Why? I do not accept the argument that it is not technically feasible. Because there is a technical solution, and if they do not apply it, I understand that it is because they do not want these channels to be available. They are breaking the normalisation law and the statute.
>
> (Jaume Mateu, president of OCB. Vilaweb)

OCB also argued that the elimination of these two channels affected half of the TV offerings in Catalan, whereas audio-visual content in Castilian remained unaffected by the reorganisation of the broadcasting space. They also introduced a legal claim arguing that this closure contradicted the guidelines set in the Law of Linguistic Normalisation of the Balearic Islands (Law 3/1986) by which the public administration has an obligation to promote the Catalan language in the audio-visual space (*Diari Ara Balears*, April 2015). In any case, the disconnection ended soon as regional elections held the same year led to the coming to office of a different government. Actually, after the elections of 24 May 2015, a coalition between PSIB-PSOE and the left-oriented Podem i Més per Mallorca (MÉS) agreed to reinstate the digital terrestrial TV of channels 3/24 and Super 3/33.

The introduction of English programming in the Galician Radio and Television Corporation (CRTVG)

A law in 1984 created the Galician Radio and Television Corporation (CRTVG), which for the first time gave public visibility to the language. According to this law, one of the main functions of the CRTVG is the promotion and diffusion of the Galician language (Article 16, Law 9/1984). In fact, although Galician TV retains high levels of audience numbers (it is the second most-watched TV channel of any of the autonomous regions, Barlovento Comunicación 2019), most of its viewers are over 64 years old, which again stigmatises the use of Galician for a sector of the population.

In 2011, the PSdG-PSOE proposed broadcasting movies on TV Galicia in their original versions, mainly in English. The main goal was to support the improvement of the Galician population's English-language

skills, especially among young audiences. However, this proposal found opposition not only from concerned groups such as the association of professionals of dubbing (Apradoga), but also from nationalist parties such as the BNG. Arguments against the introduction of movies and serials in English considered that this might limit the social and cultural function of Galicia TV, whose main objective, according to the Statute of Autonomy of Galicia, the Law of Language Normalisation, and the 1984 law (see above), was to promote and protect the Galician language (*La Opinion*, A Coruña, 6/10/2011). It was claimed that, as stated in the Galician language regulatory framework, Galician is the language of normal use on Galician public radio and TV, and the government of Galicia had the obligation to promote production materials in Galician, dubbing, subtitling and exhibiting audio-visual media to this purpose (see Table 4.9. for a full description of the dimensions of analysis).

CRTVG defended the transmission of programmes in English with Galician subtitles, arguing that it would not only improve English skills, but it would also promote the use of Galician in children and

Table 4.9 Programming in English in CRTVG Galicia: dimensions of analysis

(a) Actors		
	For (programming in English)	*Against (programming in English)*
Political	PP	BNG
Professional corporations		Apradoga
(b) Arguments		
	For	*Against*
Political		Limitation of the normalization role of public TV.
Pedagogical	Promotion of language skills in English.	
Cultural		Cultural and informative function of public television. Vehicle for social cohesion and integration.
(c) Channels		
Political	Parliamentary debates	

Source: Own elaboration.

young audiences. The BNG expressed its opposition to the proposal on the basis that children's TV programmes in English would undermine their Galician oral capabilities since it would cut down the hours of children's programmes in Galician aimed at an early-age audience who had no reading competency in Galician (*La voz de Galicia*, 30/12/2009). The BNG also argued that the Xunta's promotion of the trilingual model of Galician–Castilian–English was in fact a political strategy to restrict the linguistic coverage of Galician in the public sphere.

Conclusion

In this chapter we illustrated the relations of conflict existing in the governance of language at the national and regional levels, as well as within the regional level. The case-based analysis has illustrated how distinct linguistic regulatory models have been implemented in Spanish regions in the last decades, and the concomitant claims they have raised. Through these detailed cases, we have brought to light some relevant aspects in terms of how the regions attempted to deal with the linguistic diversity in their territories and tried to redress a situation of a reduction in the use of local languages, introducing asymmetric regulation in some policy areas. Our cases have also illustrated the main rights claims and linguistic conflicts around such policies, providing in-depth knowledge of the complex dynamics that are the result of the multi-layered structure of citizenship in the Spanish context.

We have described conflicts generated by the proposed changes of linguistic models (the immersion, bilingual and trilingual models) which have been prompted mainly by political and societal actors aiming to alter the language usage of the four regions in the education systems, in audio-visual media and in the signalisation in public spaces. Some claims have a citizens' rights logic, while others respond to a more collective rationale which is hard to reduce to the individual level. Building upon the extensive collection and qualitative analysis of newspapers, periodicals and other media, this information constitutes the empirical basis upon which we rely, to provide, in the following chapter, a comparative assessment of Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country and Galicia across different analytical dimensions. Over the 2005–2015 period, we found variation across cases regarding the extent to which linguistic conflicts have increased, a variation of the claims on which they were based, and which confrontations have resulted in regulatory accommodation and which in claim reduction.

Under which circumstances each of the cases falls is a matter for discussion. This comparative analysis is developed in Chapter 5, while the extent to which these responses are shaped by the European level of governance is assessed in Chapter 6.

Notes

1 The newspapers examined include, at the national level: *El País, El Mundo, ABC, El Diario.es*, and *Publico.es*. And at the sub-national level: *LaVanguardia, El Periódico de Cataluña, El Punt* (Catalonia); *Diario de Mallorca, Ara Balears* (The Balearic Islands); *El Correo, El Diario Vasco* (Basque Country); *La Voz de Galicia*, and *Faro de Vigo* (Galicia).
2 The system has exceptions for all type of situations, as well as additional support for those students experiencing difficulties and for newcomers.
3 For a detailed analysis about these complaints and the actors involved, see Cetrà (2019) and Garvía and Miley (2013).
4 For further details, see Ruling of the Constitutional Court 31/2010 of 28 June.
5 All translations are by the authors.
6 See page 33 of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court 31/2010 of 28 June.
7 Òmnium Cultural is probably the main civil association for the promotion of Catalan language and culture. It was established by private sponsors during the Franco dictatorship.
8 See Spanish Organic Law on the Improvement of the Quality of Education (LOMCE) 8/2013.
9 See Decree 15/2013, 19 April.
10 These include the Decree of Bilingualism (1979); Linguistic Normalisation Law (1982); Decree for the Curricular Development of the Basque (1992), and the Law on the Basque Public Schools (1993).
11 These are the models as they appear in Decree 138/1983, which regulates the use of official languages in non-university education in the Basque Country. The decree does not mention Model C.
12 RAG is an institution founded in 1906 and dedicated to the study of Galician culture and languages.
13 According to this regulation, maths, physics and chemistry must be taught in Castilian.
14 The campaigns included: ‘Do you notice enough that we are in Catalonia?’ (‘Es nota prou que som a Catalunya?’, 1986); ‘Catalan on wheels’ (‘El català sobre rodes’, 1990); ‘Catalan is good for you’ (‘El català et serveix’, 1992); and ‘In Catalan, you win’ (‘En català, tu hi guanyes’, 2003). For further details, see Gencat.cat, last accessed 15 March 2020.
15 See, for instance, the campaign promoted by the Coordinator for a Catalonia in Freedom (Coordinadora per una Catalunya en Llibertat).
16 CCC is a civil society organisation focused on the defence of bilingualism. It promotes the campaign ‘Promoting bilingual signalling in Catalonia’.
17 Created in 1962, OBC is a civic and cultural institution of the Balearic Islands aimed at promoting its own language and culture and defending the right of the Balearic Islands to full self-government.

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Decree 79/2010 of 20 May for plurilingualism in no-university education (DOG 92, 18.05.2010)

Decree 175/2007, of 16 October, which establishes the Basic Education curriculum and is implemented in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country

Decree 15/2013, 19 April, of integrated treatment of languages in no-university educational centres (BOCAIB, 20.04.2013)

Law 10/1982, of 24 November, of Normalisation of the use of Euskara in the Basque Country (BOPV 16.12.1982)

Law 3/1983, of 15 June, of Linguistic Normalisation in Galicia (DOG 14.07.1983)

Law 3/1986 of Linguistic Normalisation of the Balearic Islands (BOCAIB 15, 20.05.1986)

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Royal Decree 1049/1979, of 20 April which regulates the incorporation of the Basque language in the educational system of the Basque Country (BOE 112, 10.05.1979)

Royal Legislative Decree 339/1990, 2 March, which approves the text of the Law on Traffic, Circulation of Motor Vehicles, and Driving Safety (BOE 63, 14.03.1990)

Royal Decree 1428/2003, of 21 November, which approves the General Traffic Regulations for the application and development of the articulated text of the Law on traffic, circulation of motor vehicles and road safety, approved by Royal Legislative Decree 339/1990 of 2 March (BOE 306, 23.12.2003)

Ruling 31/2010 of 28 June, of the Constitutional Court 31/2010 (RI 8045-2006) about the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (BOE 172, 16.07.2010)

5 Comparative analysis across issues and territories

Language policy in Spain has traditionally been a highly politicised and unstable issue subject to continuous pressures both from political actors with different orientations and from CSOs both well established and emerging (see inter alia, Argelaguet 1998). To some extent, the eight cases we have examined confirm this idea as linguistic political conflicts have been common in most of them.

However, it is during the last two decades that the linguistic question has arisen as a major source of political and social dispute in the bilingual Spanish territories. This has involved, though, different degrees of political, legal and social conflict originating from multiple linguistic claims formulated by individuals and by collective actors. While some of the claims we have identified were formulated against the existing linguistic policy, as framed in each particular case during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, other claims were formulated against policy initiatives to deviate from the status quo. A first observation to highlight is the strong resilience of existing policy frameworks. In general, claims against linguistic policies did not succeed in modifying those policies, whereas claims aimed at defending policies were quite successful. However, this did not prevent tense political conflicts in several policy processes, as we identify in our case studies.

The eight cases we examine in the four selected regions illustrate that political conflicts related to language policy comprise multiple types of actors, channels and arguments as well as different political and administrative levels. Although the main level for the disputes was regional, Spanish institutions at the central level were involved in different cases: either the executive or the judiciary. Quite often, local public administration entities were also active in triggering or managing some of the linguistic conflicts. In this sense, language planning in the Spanish periphery should be understood as the result of bottom-up and top-down 'deliberative efforts' (Cooper 1989), articulated by

different actors, playing collectively and, to a much lesser extent, individually, within specific sociolinguistic and political contexts.

When looking at the cases, there is a divide between major and minor conflicts. Cases related to the language policy models in the field of education involve greater complexity because the degree of legal proceedings and social mobilisation is more intense compared with the cases involving language usage in audio-visual media and in public space signalisation. In this sense, education can be depicted as an area of major political conflict across the different territories, and a particularly sensitive topic. Competing positions in favour of or against the asymmetric regulation of the co-official language and/or Castilian as languages of instruction, and their relative weight in different education models, are articulated by a wide range of actors, and through varying arguments and channels.

Our analytical framework in this chapter builds on two preliminary premises. The first premise is that variations among language policy models can be characterised as differences in the management of the relationship between the co-existing linguistic communities in the private sphere and their representation in the public or institutional domain. Each sociolinguistic configuration in a particular territory has followed a different model, based on a previously established broad agreement, after the transition to democracy in Spain. These configurations crystallised a language policy in each case, which in time created significant path-dependent effects, but they also produced some unexpected consequences. The second premise is that claims related to changes in language policy models, either proactive or reactive, are articulated according to developments or interpretations of both the legal framework that regulates language and the linguistic rights from an individual point of view. In this sense, the political conflicts described in Chapter 4 have been characterised by the exploration of how political, social and legal actors discuss the institutional and legal status of Castilian and the co-official languages as vehicular languages in the areas of education, audio-visual media and public space signalisation.

Through our analysis, we identify elements of similarity and dissimilarity regarding the four main dimensions considered in the description of the cases. These elements include: the nature of the claims (including or excluding references to individual rights); the characteristics of the actors involved in the formulation of claims, and how those claims were addressed through specific collective action strategies; how claims' arguments were publicly articulated and the channels used for their formulation and diffusion (see the comparative

summaries in Table 5.2). A final element refers to the intensity and extension over time of the political conflicts that the linguistic claims provoked.

Even if all cases show actors' claims about the distribution of the weight of Castilian and the co-official languages in the public sphere, we can identify a general pattern in their claims that reflects the characteristic political divisions of Spanish linguistic politics between pro-monolingual and pro-multilingual positions. In this sense, and considering the main advocates of change in linguistic policies and the specific type of model being promoted, the cases display relevant symmetries. These symmetries in turn refer to the dominant tension between Castilian-centric positions articulated at the national level and the defence of linguistic minorities at the periphery. In other words, some actors claim the individual right to use Castilian without limitations in any territory, whereas others claim the collective right to introduce some restrictions on the use of Castilian to protect or promote the local language. However, how policy proposals are defined, and in some way also how the associated claims are articulated, varies according to the sociolinguistic conditions present in each case (see the comparative summaries in Table 5.1).

Education claims and linguistic conflicts

In the area of education, policy changes proposed during the period of this study involved two strategies: the diversification of the number of languages of instruction, articulated as a process that goes from a bilingual to a trilingual model (i.e. the Balearic and Galician cases), and the intensification of support for a particular language (i.e. the universalisation of Euskara in the Basque Country, and opening the door to Castilian as a language option in Catalan schools). Whereas the change in the education language model in the Galician, Balearic and Catalan cases seeks the diversification of the number and proportion of languages of instruction, in the Basque case, the most relevant goal was to strengthen the role of their own language. Additionally, in Galicia and the Balearic Islands, the proposed change turned the bilingual models – based on a rule of 50% local language and 50% Castilian – into a trilingual model promoting equal proportions of local language, Castilian and English. In Catalonia, claims were about the transformation from an immersion model in Catalan to a bilingual Catalan–Castilian model. The linguistic policy reform in the Basque Country, however, aimed at implementing a soft version of the Catalan

Table 5.1 Claims for the redistribution of the weight of Castilian and the co-official language in the public sphere

	Field	*Linguistic model in force before the claims*	*Promoters*	*New model to be implemented*	*Promoters*
Catalonia	Education	Immersion in Catalan	Leftist parties; nationalist parties; trade unions; Òmnium Cultural; Plataforma per la Llengua; parents' schools association	Individual choice of Catalan or Castilian	Foro Babel; PPC; Ciudadanos; Spanish Ministry of Education
	Public space	At least in Catalan	Leftist parties; nationalist parties; municipalities	Bilingual Catalan–Castilian	PPC; Ciudadanos; CCC; Associació per la tolerància
The Balearic Islands	Education	Bilingual Catalan–Castilian (minimum of 50% in Catalan)	OCB; FETE-UGT; MÉS; FAPA; PSIB-PSOE	Trilingual Catalan–Castilian–English (1/3 each)	PP-Balearic Islands
	Audio-visual media	TV offer in Catalan	OCB; Entesa; PSIB; EU; Podem; MÉS	Reduction of TV offerings in Catalan	PPB-Balearic Islands

(*Continued*)

	Field	*Linguistic model in force before the claims*	*Promoters*	*New model to be implemented*	*Promoters*
The Basque Country	Education	Free choice model: (A) Immersion in Castilian; (B) Bilingual; (D) Immersion in Basque	PNV; PSE-EE; PP; Plataforma Libertad de elección lingüística	Immersion in Basque for all (60%)	EA; EB; ELA; LAB
	Public space	Basque/ Castilian	PNV; PSE-EE	Basque at least, other languages	BILDU
Galicia	Education	Bilingual Galician–Castilian (50%)	BNG; PSdeG-PSOE; FETE-UGT; Queremos Galego	Trilingual Catalan–Castilian–English	PP-Galicia; Galicia Bilingüe
	Audio-visual media	Promotion of Galician	BNG	Introduction of programming in English	PP-Galicia; PSdeG-PSOE

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 5.2 Comparison of the dimensions of analysis: Claims, actors, arguments and channels. Synthesis

Nature of the claims				
	Catalonia	**The Balearic Islands**	**The Basque Country**	**Galicia**
Education	Immersion in Catalan vs. bilingual Catalan–Castilian	Bilingual Catalan–Castilian vs. trilingual Catalan–Castilian–English	Three-options model vs. immersion model in Basque	Bilingual Galician–Castilian vs. trilingual Galician–Castilian–English
Media and public space	Immersion in Catalan vs. bilingual Catalan–Castilian	Inclusion vs. non-inclusion of Catalan TV	Immersion in Basque vs. bilingual Castilian–Basque	Bilingual Galician–Castilian vs. trilingual Galician–Castilian–English

Actors and collective action				
	Catalonia	**The Balearic Islands**	**The Basque Country**	**Galicia**
Education	Political parties, unions, CSOs	Political parties, unions, CSOs	Political parties, unions, CSOs, institutions	Political parties, unions, CSOs, institutions
Media and public space	Political parties, unions, CSOs	Political parties, unions, CSOs	Political parties	Political parties

(*Continued*)

Articulation of arguments

	Catalonia	**The Balearic Islands**	**The Basque Country**	**Galicia**
Education	Political, sociolinguistic, social, pedagogic, legal, cultural	Political, sociolinguistic, social, pedagogic, economic, cultural	Political, sociolinguistic, pedagogic, legal	Political, sociolinguistic, pedagogic, cultural
Media and public space	Sociolinguistic, social, legal	Political, sociolinguistic, social, economic, technical, legal, cultural	Political, sociolinguistic, legal	Political, pedagogic, cultural

Channels of diffusion

	Catalonia	**The Balearic Islands**	**The Basque Country**	**Galicia**
Education	Political, legal, civil	Political, legal, civil	Political	Political, legal, civil, administrative
Media and public space	Political, legal, civil, administrative	Political, civil	Political, administrative	Political

Source: Own elaboration

immersion model – introducing a compulsory 60% in Euskara – thus replacing the previous three-option model.

In this respect, the Basque case illustrates the regional government's attempt to change the established policy models despite the opposition of various political and social actors. Furthermore, there were even disagreements within the government proposing the reform. The main reason for those advocating and supporting the policy change was their perception that the universalisation of Euskara was not succeeding. Hence, they believed that a new strategy based on the introduction of a single-language model would be the full solution to the problem. Against this claim, two different types of reaction became discernible. First, those who could share the perception of the problem (such as the coalition party PNV) but did not support the envisaged strategy because of the unintended consequences they perceived. Second, those who completely disagreed with the initial perception and considered that the reform threatened the individual right they were enjoying – the right to select the main language for their children's schooling. Consequently, the protests against the single-language proposal were divided between the two groups of actors; groups which also showed relevant differences in terms of the resources they activated, for example, regarding the extension of mobilisations, the articulation of claims and the diffusion channels used. Yet both groups contributed to a democratic deliberation on the desirability of reform between the overlapping linguistic communities in the territory. Finally, due to regional elections and the new party coalition, the reform did not progress. Yet, no major linguistic conflict escalated thereafter, and the existing model continued for years afterwards.

The policy process in Catalonia was quite different. The Catalan government faced external pressures to change the existing linguistic model, moving towards the Basque model that included several language options in the schools. In Catalonia, concerned civil society groups had made claims against the educational linguistic policy which had been in place since the 1980s. These claims relied on the subjective perception that some individual rights were not respected in the Catalan education system. They claimed the right to educate their children in Castilian in the public schooling system, at least for a significant proportion of the school time, and referred to the Spanish legal framework to support such arguments. They complained about the Catalan language policy and considered that the government's nationalist ideology was the main driver of the problem, thus framing the situation as an anti-nationalism struggle. Also, the complete solution they proposed was a move towards a different system with different

models (such as the Basque Country's), or the possibility of establishing opt-out procedures.

The collective action strategies deployed by those supporting these claims in Catalonia were very different from those in the Basque Country. First, there was the broad coalition of political parties and social actors that sustained the original model implemented in the 1980s and which remained quite cohesive regarding this topic during the time this linguistic conflict occurred. Second, there was a growing group of concerned individuals who progressively organised themselves to articulate their claims and were able to be involved in a new political party (Ciudadanos) that embraced their views on the linguistic issue. Their position was also supported and amplified by different actors from the Spanish political centre, such as some political parties and the media who sympathised with their claims about the need to guarantee the right of students to be educated in Castilian for the entire primary and secondary school.

As for Galicia and the Balearic Islands, in both cases their regional governments, at that time in the hands of regional branches of the conservative PP, promoted policy changes to reduce the weight of their native language in the education linguistic model. They planned to introduce a multilingual challenge in their discourses based on globalisation pressures and Europeanisation trends. Thus, they framed their claims as a modernisation discourse to justify the reduction of the weight of the local language in the new linguistic model they intended to introduce. In both cases, strong resistance to the proposed changes emerged from opposition parties and from civil society, with both groups of actors able to initiate significant social mobilisations. Claims against these proposals were based on strong perceptions that the new models would threaten the consolidation of the local languages, which were still in a very fragile situation compared with the strength of Castilian in their regions. Their views on the drivers of the perceived problem were quite varied, though. Some opponents claimed against what they perceived as the expansion of Spanish-wide nationalism and its language dominance, whereas others referred to the technical difficulties of implementing the new models in a context of shortage of resources, which, in the end, would lead to a deterioration of education quality. Again, coalitions against the proposed reforms were quite common, particularly in the case of the Balearic Islands. Governments, on the contrary, failed to build up coalitions to support their policy proposals.

Claims on language in the public media and in public spaces

Regarding the cases relating to public media, we identified claims against the dismantling of TV channels – or the change in criteria – in terms of language use in public media in the regions. The major goals for establishing and supporting public entities during the 1980s were to promote and reinforce the public use of local languages and to consolidate the institutional authority of the co-official language. However, three decades later, some regional governments having different policy orientations did not consider these as fundamental instruments to promote language usage and attempted to change how their public media operated.

In the Balearic case, claims contested the attempts to dismantle the TV station due to the 2007–2008 economic and financial crisis, which had led to profound cutbacks in several policy areas at both the regional and national levels in Spain. This added to the interest in limiting the presence and use of Catalan in local and regional audio-visual media. In Galicia, in contrast, claims were articulated against the introduction of another language distinct from Galician in regular TV programming. In both cases, the claims aimed at defending the public media as a tool for promoting linguistic immersion and for expressing national identity and culture.

We also examined claims in the cases of the Basque Country and Catalonia which related to the regulation of language usage in the signalisation of commercial, traffic and street signs. In these claims, regional governments intended to strengthen the presence of the local language, and in some cases and under certain circumstances, this would even entail assuring the presence of the native language alone. The controversies were related to the use of Castilian, with no reference to the local language – particularly for commercial signs – and the limited use of Castilian for traffic and street signs. Some political and social actors argued for the diversification of the number of languages used in the public space, articulating strategies to promote a Basque–Castilian model in the Basque case, and to promote a Catalan–Castilian model in the Catalan case. In the Catalan case, following the 1998 Law of Language Policy, claims were expressed against the rule of 'at least in Catalan' for commercial signs. In the Basque Country, however, where some roads showed Euskara-only information, claimants asked for bilingual traffic signs, as stated in the Spanish General Traffic Rules and Traffic Law (1990 and 2003).

Levels of collective action and mobilisation in the cases of public spaces signage were relatively limited, but the cases of the public media, in particular the conflict relating to the closure of the public Catalan TV station in the Balearic Islands, attracted a larger number of actors. For the public signage cases, most of the debates attracted only those involved directly in the issue, for example, the individuals and firms affected by the commercial signs policy. Also, highly motivated activists on both sides of the linguistic conflict became important actors. They promoted actions with high visibility and launched litigations in the courts, claiming their right to address the situation according to their preferred choice. Mobilisation in the case of the public media was broader and involved political parties and CSOs. The latter were the actors who sustained and promoted the defence and use of the local language over the years for the collective good.

Linguistic claims, channels and collective action

Based on a more in-depth comparison of the 'who' (the actors), the 'why' (the arguments) and the 'how' (the channels) questions involved in the linguistic claims, as examined in the previous chapter, some common general features become evident across the selected regions – Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country and Galicia – and across the public sphere dimensions of education, audio-visual media and public spaces.

As already mentioned, competing positions in the political and social arena are mainly articulated along the divide between two types of claims. First, claims that defend the Castilian language through individual rights complaints, as well as policy strategies of voluntary bilingualism or trilingualism. Second, claims that defend the co-official language as effective bilingualism to assure its presence in the public sphere. Diverse political and social actors represent both positions. In some of the studied cases, claims were initiated by political parties promoting a new model based on their positions in the government. This is clear in the Balearic and Galician cases on education when the PP, then in the regional executive in both communities at the same time, and also when EA, a member of the government coalition, promoted a single-language model for Euskadi. In other cases, claims derive from pressures of the opposition parties or emerging social movements that articulated around linguistic demands. In most cases, trade unions and CSOs, professional corporations and cultural associations (e.g., Òmnium Cultural; Obra Cultural Balear; Galicia Bilingüe), and, to a lesser extent, official institutions (e.g., RAG), became involved in

the disputes. These actors often reactivated old, supporting coalitions that then tried to play a relevant role in all cases. This was not the case, however, in conflicts that showed lower degrees of political and societal relevance, as in the issue of audio-visual media in Galicia, or the Basque case about the use of Euskara in public spaces, both of which were new and tended to create greater polarisation between the contenders.

When looking at the channels through which claims are articulated, we find that the actors involved in the claims resort to political mechanisms and legal and administrative proceedings to deploy the strategies they intend to use to modify language policy practices. Legal and political proceedings, as well as civil protest actions such as demonstrations and mobilisations, are particularly significant either to destabilise the proposed changes or to assure the status quo. Cases involving a higher degree of legal and political conflict are those related to the education field – this conflict being especially strong in the Balearic case – where discussion on the use of public resources was much higher and social mobilisation was much more intense. All these factors led to a solid alliance between the different actors of the educational community. Moreover, whereas most of the Catalan, Galician and Balearic cases involved court proceedings, the Basque case developed exclusively in the political and administrative arenas. Finally, another interesting difference between the cases is the degree of social confrontation they ushered in, with the level of social mobilisation much more intense in the Balearic Islands than in the other regions.

Whereas the type of actors involved and the different channels used for the articulation of the claims imply elements of greater similarity than divergence, some interesting differences emerge when we analyse the type of arguments used in the eight cases. We identify seven types of arguments:

1 Legal arguments: refer to the legal framework of reference at European, national and sub-national levels.
2 Social arguments: relate to issues of equal opportunities, social cohesion and social inclusion when there is effective bilingualism in a region.
3 Pedagogic arguments: relate to offering better language skills and higher language proficiency through available resources.
4 Economic arguments: refer to questions of competitiveness and employment in the labour market (expanding the use of English, but also universalising the local language).

5 Sociolinguistic arguments: refer to the discriminatory effects of a particular language model due to the extra effort needed to use a non-mother-tongue language.
6 Cultural and identity-related arguments: refer to the identity function of language for a political community.
7 Political arguments: refer to the degree of political consensus and democratic legitimacy of a particular language policy.

Legal, cultural, social and sociolinguistic arguments are dominant across all cases, but not all actors used the same type of arguments. Pedagogic-related arguments are especially significant in the educational cases given their legitimate arguments, frequently based on scientific findings. Interestingly, economic-based arguments were present only in the Balearic cases. While the cultural and identity arguments were important in most of the cases, they did not play a significant role in the Basque cases when compared to the intensity of identity in other territories.

In relation to the arguments based on the legal framework, references to EU institutions and policies are mostly present in the Balearic and Galician cases on education. This is because the aim of those governments – to implement a trilingual model – was defended based on the EU guidelines and recommendations on multilingualism. In 2002, the European Council recommended that at least two foreign languages should be learnt from a very early age. 'Mother tongue plus two foreign languages' was formulated as a goal to promote social cohesion, employability and economic competitiveness in a knowledge-based society, as well as to create mutual understanding and a shared sense of community.[1] However, the EU guidelines do not establish what should be done in those territories in which the 'mother tongue' is not homogeneous, this being true in all the cases analysed here (see Chapter 6 for further discussions). In fact, all contending parties involved were in favour of multilingualism, but they differed over the best way to achieve such a goal. The main question underlying these cases is how to protect citizens' mother tongue and at the same time promote other languages. To this end, social cohesion criteria, as well as different pedagogic arguments, are often introduced to maintain these different perspectives.

Similar claims are absent in the Catalan and Basque cases, where demands for bilingualism rely on the legal principle of non-discrimination on grounds of language and the official status of Castilian. Arguments in favour of the immersion model in Catalonia and the Basque Country, and the bilingual model in Galicia and the

Balearic Islands, are expressed in terms of compensating the discriminatory effects of the hegemonic position of Castilian in the media and other public spaces. It is argued that a loss of institutional terrain of the co-official language would lead to its marginalisation and to the reinforcement of Castilian. A basic assumption by those defending this policy is the expectation that knowledge of co-official language by all parts of the society would positively affect social cohesion and social mobility, thus avoiding a serious social divide based on language differences.

A key dimension shared by all these conflicts is whether linguistic rights should be articulated as individual rights or collective rights. Liberal positions, defended by the PP and some CSOs in favour of a bilingual model (Galicia Bilingüe; Estudiants Lliures de les Illes Balears; CCC), contend that language should not be imposed by the administration, and that citizens should have the right to freely choose the language. Based on the principle of non-discrimination of language, their positions argue that the linguistic model implemented should guarantee individual language rights through a diversified offer. Nevertheless, defenders of linguistic rights as collective rights frame their proposals to better articulate society and its identity. In this sense, we find that court rulings have been diverse. Some rulings stand for a liberal position on exercising linguistic rights promoted by the PP, and others acknowledge the capability of regional governments to make policy choices about the language policies they implement.

Finally, interesting elements of divergence emerge regarding the political levels involved in the conflicts. In the field of education, the cases of the Basque Country, Galicia and the Balearic Islands manifest and develop as domestic conflicts entirely at the sub-national level, whereas the Catalonian case manifests more strongly as a conflict between the national and the sub-national levels. In this sense, the peculiarity of the Catalan case is that it involves the interaction between diverse legal institutions (the Constitutional Court of Spain and the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia) and legal frameworks (the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006, LOMCE 2013). The cases related to claims in audio-visual media are articulated at the sub-national level, whereas those concerning public space signalisation are developed at the intersection between the local, regional and national levels, since traffic signalisation is a matter subject to both local (regional) and national regulations. Overall, we observe some common patterns in a much-diversified situation, involving in each case equivalent actors, comparable divisions and similar levels of government being active in each case. However, it is important to note that some linguistic conflicts

show very complex combinations of claims, whereas others appear to be very simple, involving just a single dimension.

In this chapter, we have compared the cases across the four different dimensions of analysis and identified a significant number of similarities and differences that reveal interesting patterns, although these patterns are not easy to observe when the analysis concentrates on a single case or dimension. For example, it appears that claim-making was quite similar in all cases, but the political support, as well as the social mobilisations aimed at pushing claims forward, or even creating political conflict, were not as intense in all cases. The Catalonia and Balearic Islands cases suggest a more intense capacity for action and broader coalitions in defending the native language when compared with other cases, despite the emergence of the linguistic political conflicts during the 2000s.

In the concluding chapter, we discuss these differences in more detail, as well as the broader implications of the intensity of linguistic political conflicts and the relevance of litigation for their resolution. However, it is important to note that linguistic policies were not fundamentally altered during the period examined in spite of the claims expressed and the intense political conflicts involved in some of the cases. Although a change of linguistic policy direction started to emerge from most of the territories in the late 1990s – as a response to multilingualism and the demands and challenges of globalisation – this did not transform existing policy frameworks. However, such changes created a new policy space in which multiple claims emerged which focused on different aspects, and as a result linguistic policy conflicts arose. Before the final assessment and the detailed discussion, the next chapter introduces the European dimension in our analysis of linguistic claims in Spain. The European dimension was the second largest transformation to occur during the period examined, emerging as a constraint, but also as an opportunity, for linguistic policy change in Spain – something that claim-makers soon started to recognise.

Note

1 European regulations include Council Resolution of 14 February 2002 on the promotion of linguistic diversity and language learning in the framework of the implementation of the objectives of the European Year of Languages 2001 and COM(2003) 449 final: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions. Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004 – 2006.

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6 European institutions

Framing linguistic conflicts in Spain?

From its very foundation, the EU has championed multiculturalism and diversity. Linguistic diversity within the EU is probably the best example of this commitment as 24 languages are officially recognised and can be used by citizens to communicate with any EU institution. The protection of minority languages is also among the objectives of the EU, as specified in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Such benevolent policy intentions are, however, hampered by two major obstacles that limit the EU's linguistic policy. The first obstacle is that language issues, unless specifically related to an individual right legislated by the EU, are the exclusive competence of the member states. Consequently, it is not possible for the EU to take on the protection of languages directly. As for the second obstacle, the EU has to face the burden of having 24 official working languages, which hinders freedom of movement and market integration at the EU level. As a matter of fact, English is gradually becoming the lingua franca for communicating within the EU, to the detriment of the other languages used by member states. The EU has therefore a dual and contradictory role in relation to languages: preaching linguistic diversity on the one hand, while having to face linguistic communication needs on the other.[1]

There is a trend in the European public space towards reducing the costs of EU linguistic diversity, such as becoming more competitive as a single market. As an example, the EU has introduced the notion of 'easily understood languages' (Council Directive 79/112/EEC).

> The Member States shall, however, ensure that the sale of foodstuffs within their own territories is prohibited if the particulars provided for in Article 3 and Article 4(2) do not appear in a language easily understood by purchasers, unless other measures have been taken to ensure that the purchaser is informed. This

> provision shall not prevent such particulars from being indicated in various languages.
>
> (Article 14, Council Directive 79/112/EEC)[2]

Therefore, only the EU's official languages are given voice in some public spheres, and eventually it is English that takes the lead as the main language of communication in most EU spheres.[3]

But how does the EU really act in defence of the languages? And how is the EU used by local, regional and national actors who claim linguistic rights at the country level? In this chapter, we explore the relationship between the EU and the Spanish actors in linguistic matters, to understand when and how the EU level is applied or used in the defence of Castilian language claims, or in support of any regional language. Indeed, Chapters 4 and 5 have shown that none of the conflicts presented here have implied the direct participation of the EU in any of the channels, not even the legal channel. The conflicts have remained mostly regional (with actors from the regional level), and only exceptionally at the national level (meaning that both regional and national actors participated). This non-participation at the EU level does not, however, imply that this level of contention has not been present during this period, even if not specifically in relation to the conflicts described in the previous chapters. Quite the contrary, the EU level is implicitly present most of the time, as we will see in this chapter, either as a guardian of linguistic protection, in a space in which different actors can address official claims for the protection of linguistic rights, or in a space where CSOs can network in defence of their language preferences to broader audiences. We will see these aspects in detail in the following sections. Before going into that detail, we start with a brief description of Europe's legal framework for the protection of language. This is needed to understand the extent to which the European level can be exploited by national and regional actors who claim linguistic recognition and/or protection.

The legal framework for the protection of language in Europe

Article 3.3 of the TEU reads, '[The EU] shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced'. With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) acquired the same legal status as the EU treaties. The CFR specifies that there should be no discrimination based on language (Article 21, CFR), and

that 'The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity' (Article 22, CFR). Linguistic rights and the rights of minorities are therefore at the core of EU primary law. Also, the Council of Europe (CoE) launched the ECRML, a European convention that remains the most comprehensive treaty in terms of language protection in Europe.

The ECRML came into force in 1998 and as late as in 2020 had been ratified by 25 European states, of which 16 are EU member states (although some large countries as France or Italy do not participate).[4] Regional or minority languages are those that are: 'i. traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population', and 'ii. different from the official language(s) of that State; and it does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants' (Article 1, Part I, ECRML). The Charter aims not only for the recognition and respect of regional or minority languages, but also for their active safeguard in public and private life (Article 7, Part II, ECRML). It does this by means of policy interventions in education, justice, administration and public services, media, cultural activities and cultural facilities, economic and social life, and transfrontier exchanges (Articles 8–14, Part III, ECRML). Signatories can choose two levels of language protection under Part II or Part III of the Charter. Signatories that grant the higher level of protection to a qualifying language must agree to undertake at least 35 actions in Part III of the Charter. The application of the Charter is monitored every five years by a Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages who make recommendations to the signatories on the applicability and accomplishments of the Charter.

Linguistic protection in Europe is therefore embedded in different mechanisms that involve different actors and different countries. The TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU proclaim the principles of non-discrimination and respect for linguistic diversity with which all member states must abide. Moreover, despite being entrusted with the protection of the treaties, the EC has no real competences on linguistic issues. It is only the member states that have real power on linguistic issues unless language protection applies to an area of EU competence such as workers' rights. A coherent framework at the EU level, as well as a coherent linguistic policy, is thus missing. Therefore, there is a lack of policy instruments for guaranteeing the protection of languages at the EU level. It is the Council of Europe, that is in charge of monitoring the ECRML, which supervises the levels of protection for languages across Europe. However, even the ECRML does not provide for any enforcement mechanisms

in the case of non-compliance by the member states. In this sense, it is worth to note that the European Parliament has raised awareness of this problem by calling on all member states who have not yet done so to ratify and implement the ECRML. It has also raised awareness by demanding that the Commission propose concrete policy measures for language protection (EP Resolution, 11 September 2013).

The distinction between the official languages of the EU spoken by the 'majority' and the non-official languages of the EU spoken by the 'minorities' entails different levels of protection for different languages. The status of the official EU languages is recognised in Article 55 of the TEU; only the official EU languages are granted legal status within the EU and therefore have 'active' protection under EU law. All official languages are equal with regard to the authenticity of linguistic versions of EU sources of law and to the rights of EU citizens to choose the language for written and oral communication with EU institutions (Ioriatti, Pulice, and De Vries 2017). Regional and minority languages that are official languages of the EU (e.g. German in Italy or EU immigrants' minority languages) are granted the right to be used in written and oral communication within the EU. In contrast, regional and minority languages across the EU (e.g. Catalan, Euskara, Galician, Valenciano) are granted protection under EU primary law but have no legal status (Carrera et al. 2017).

In Spain, the situation of languages is therefore even more complex when adding the EU level. Indeed, Catalan, Galician and Euskara are co-official languages in their respective regions and therefore have a protected status within Spain. But this protection is not guaranteed at the EU level, as only Castilian is recognised as an official language in the EU, even though the ECRML should protect Catalan, Euskara and Galician. This distinction drives the main interactions between the Spanish level and the EU level on linguistic issues.

The EU as guardian of the languages in Spain: 2005–2014

The CoE, through the ECRML, acts as the guardian of linguistic protection in the countries that have signed the treaty. In Spain, the treaty came into force in 2001, and, at the time, the Spanish government under the PP chose different levels of protection for the different languages within its territory (Table 6.1). All co-official languages enjoy the highest level of protection through the treaty, although only in the autonomous communities where they are co-official languages (for example, Galician in León enjoys protection only on the basis of Part II

Table 6.1 Levels of protection of Basque, Catalan, and Galician under the ECRML

Language	*Level of protection*
Basque in Basque Country	Part II and Part III
Basque in Navarra	Part II and Part III
Catalan in Catalonia	Part II and Part III
Catalan in Baleares	Part II and Part III
Catalan in Aragon	Part II
Galician in Galicia	Part II and Part III
Galician in Castile and Leon and Extremadura	Part II

Source: Own elaboration.

of the treaty). A few languages are excluded from protection, such as Darija Arabic in Ceuta or immigrants' languages, even when they are spoken by a big community.

Countries abiding by the ECRML are monitored periodically, which means that they have to issue a report on the state of the languages protected by the Charter. Most importantly, a delegation of the Committee of Experts performs an 'on-the-spot' visit to some of the Spanish regions after each report is officially delivered by the Spanish authorities. During this visit, the delegation meets several representatives of the local speakers of the regional and minority language, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), politicians, journalists and educationalists. In addition, the committee receives comments and information from the representatives of the local-language speakers, NGOs and independent experts who then help them in evaluating compliance to the Charter. These are the actors who can convey the linguistic claims to the CoE, claims which are at the basis of the committee's recommendations. Although the reports do not specify which actors have been consulted by the committee during each of the evaluation periods, the information they contain is of great relevance for understanding which claims can cross the Spanish borders to be heard in Europe. These reports have therefore been analysed with a focus on the case studies presented in previous chapters, such as to identify whether the linguistic claims that are present at the regional level will reach the European level. Table 6.2 presents a summary of our findings for four evaluation periods during which the conflicts related to our case studies developed: 2002–2005, 2006–2009, 2010–2013 and 2014–2017. Each of the case studies analysed in previous chapters has been matched with one or more of the evaluation periods, taking into consideration the length of the conflict. For example, the case

Table 6.2 Claims at the EU level through ECRML monitoring

Monitoring period	*Incumbent party at national government*	*Area*	*Education*	*Claims at EU level*
2002–2005 (2008)*	PP *2002–2004* PSOE *2004–2005*	Education	'Immersion' Basque country (2005–2009)	No
		Public space	'Signs' Basque country (2007–2014)	Yes
2006–2009 (2011)*	PSOE	Education	'Immersion' Basque country (2005–2009)	No
			'Bilingualism' Catalan (2006–2014)	Yes
			'Trilingualism' Galego (2010–2015)	Yes
		Public space	'English TV' Galego (2009–2011)	No
			'Signs' Catalan (2010–2015)	No
			'Signs' Basque country (2007–2014)	No
			'RTVM' Baleares (2011–2015)	Yes
2010–2013 (2015)*	PSOE *2010–2011* PP *2011–2013*	Education	'Bilingualism' Catalan (2006–2014)	No
			'Trilingualism' Galego (2010–2015)	Yes
			'Trilingualism' Baleares (2011–2015)	Yes
		Public space	'Signs' Basque country (2007–2014)	No
			'Signs' Catalan (2010–2015)	No
			'RTVM' Baleares (2011–2015)	Yes
2014–2017 (2019)*	PP	Education	'Bilingualism' Catalan (2006–2014)	Yes
			'Trilingualism' Galego (2010–2015)	Yes
			'Trilingualism' Baleares (2011–2015)	No
		Public space	'Signs' Catalan (2010–2015)	No
			'RTVM' Baleares (2011–2015)	No

Source: Own elaboration.
*In brackets, the year of the report.

'Immersion' in the Basque Country is included in both the 2002–2005 and in the 2006–2009 periods, because the conflict lasted from 2005 to 2008. Column 5 in Table 6.2 indicates whether a specific conflict is reflected in the recommendations of the committee.

As we can see from Table 6.2, all claims relating to education, except those from the Basque Country, reached the European level in more than one of the evaluation periods. As already established in Chapters 4 and 5, linguistic claims in education have led to relatively high levels of conflict in Spain. This is reflected here, as these are the only claims that are systematically included in the committee's agenda. In contrast, claims related to the public space have only been heard at the CoE in relation to the closing of the public TV channel in the Balearic Islands, which we saw was the most conflictive among the case studies related to public space. Overall, Table 6.2 shows that the ECRML offers an additional level of action that is used by the actors to make their linguistic claims visible. This area of contention might therefore be limited only to increasing the visibility of linguistic claims, because the recommendations of the Committee of Experts – later adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the CoE– are not mandatory. As such, the protection of languages is mostly left to the discretion of the national and regional authorities.

In fact, the experts' reports reflect different sensibilities towards the languages depending on who the incumbent party is at the national level. The first report, with the PP as the incumbent party, highlights that:

> there is still a need for awareness-raising in Spain about regional or minority languages. [...] There is also a need to improve mutual understanding, with a view to promoting the virtues of plurilingualism and linguistic diversity and, in both majority and minority language groups, the fundamental idea of peaceful and harmonious co-existence.
>
> (CoE, Report of the Committee of Experts of the Charter, Initial Monitoring Cycle)

Whereas the PP's position in relation to languages matches the monolingual position described in Chapter 4, the PSOE appeared to be more open to the protection of languages in Spain. For example, in 2004 the Zapatero government formally asked the EU to recognise all co-official languages of the Spanish state. During 2005 and 2006, the Spanish government signed several agreements with a number of EU institutions (the Council of Ministers, the Committee of the Regions, the EC, the European Parliament, the European Ombudsman and the Economic

and Social Committee) so that Catalan, Basque and Galician could be used by citizens in relation to any of these institutions. Also, reflecting this openness, in 2007, the Zapatero government created the Council of Official Languages within the Spanish executive (CoE, Report of the Committee of Experts of the Charter, 3rd Monitoring Cycle). In the last period, the PP government again seemed to be one of lack of protection for languages. The report acknowledges that 'the Committee of Experts has become aware of certain regressions at the level of the Autonomous Communities' (CoE, Report of the Committee of Experts of the Charter, 4th Monitoring Cycle). In addition, according to the experts, one of the major laws of the PP government is critical of language protection: 'The Organic Law 8/2013 provides for the strengthening of the teaching of Castilian nationwide. According to the information made available, there is a fear that this strengthening will occur at the expense of regional or minority languages' (CoE, Report of the Committee of Experts of the Charter, 4th Monitoring Cycle).

At the regional level, the experts' reports reflect that there is a large difference in the protection of languages depending on the particular autonomous community and also on who governs at the regional level. According to the experts, there is a high level of commitment to ensure that Catalan and Euskara are protected by the regional authorities, even to the extent of providing language protection when the central government fails to do so, such as in the judiciary. In contrast, the use of Galician is defined as 'under risk', and more action is required from the regional government. For example, in one of the last reports, the experts acknowledge that:

> The language is widely present in public life including regional and local administration. In the field of education, the Committee of Experts is concerned about a gradual reduction of Galician-medium education. With the introduction of the trilingual model, the proportion of Galician has been reduced at primary and secondary level. Problems persist in legal proceedings and there is an insufficient offer of programmes in Galician on private television.
>
> (CoE, Report of the Committee of Experts of the Charter, 4th Monitoring Cycle)

This situation continues still today: as the last report of the Committee of Experts of the Charter acknowledges the condition of Galician has deteriorated over the last years.

Claims for linguistic rights in the EU institutions

In this section, we observe how the EU level is used by regional and national actors to address claims for the protection of regional languages. We do so by analysing the European parliamentary work on linguistic issues. In particular, we analyse the written questions addressed by representatives of the Spanish government or representatives of the autonomous communities to the European Commission (EC). This allows us not only to observe how the different actors who claim language protection use European institutions but also to understand how the EC reacts to these claims.

Table 6.3 presents the number of written questions addressed to the EC which relate to the protection of one of the official languages in the Spanish territory in four different time periods.[5] The table also shows that the regional governments use the EU institutions differently. Catalan representatives are by far the most active at the European level, whereas the other regions are less present, especially the Balearic Islands. It is to be expected, however, that there would be little reference to Castilian in the European Parliament. Table 6.3 also reflects the different levels of openness of the national government in relation to linguistic issues. The period 2009–2014 – which corresponds closely with the first legislature of Mariano Rajoy, from the PP – is by far the most active among the representatives of all the regions, except Galicia. These data suggest – echoing Chapters 4 and 5 – that the actors involved in the protection of language employ different channels at different points in time, depending on the resources at their disposal and the structure of the opportunities. As for the resources, the Catalan and Basque governments have been more likely than other regional governments to use the EU institutional channels to make their linguistic claims. However, this might reflect the fact that nationalist parties have been in power most of the time in those two regions. Regarding the structure of the opportunities, the data reveal that the number of written questions to the European Parliament increases significantly when the structure of opportunity is closed at the national level (that is, during PP's legislature). Actually, we observe that regional governments therefore turn to the European level when there are few opportunities at the national level.

As for the content of the written questions, two main types can be identified. First, those that claim for the protection of the co-official language against what is perceived as abuse by the Spanish government (e.g. OJ C 231, 17/07/2014, about the closing of a regional TV channel).[6] The second type of written question addresses the EU level

instead and makes claims for the recognition of the co-official language within the EU institutions as well as for direct intervention by the EU to promote the language (e.g. OJ C 138 E, 07/05/2011 about Catalan translators not being replaced in the future). Interestingly, the EC's responses to the representatives are totally driven by the type of question. As for the first type, the EC makes it known that it has no competency on linguistic issues and therefore cannot act in response to questions posed in relation to the use of the language at the national or regional level. In contrast, when the EC is addressed directly about the use of language within the EU institutions, its response, most of the time, contains a commitment to improve the situation of the regional and local languages, and it sometimes even implements a small change in response to the question.

Our analysis reveals that the regional actors make use of the EU institutional channels to claim their linguistic rights, especially when there is no one willing to hear their claims. In fact, and even if data from Table 6.3 do not allow for an in-depth analysis, there seems to be a correlation between how the different actors get involved at the EU level and who is in power both at the national and at the regional levels. In Galicia, the PP was in government both in Galicia and at the national level for most of the 2009–2014 period, which might be the reason why the number of written questions is not the highest, as it is in all the other regions. Quite the contrary, the period 2004–2009, which coincides with the government of BNG (the nationalist party) and PSOE in Galicia, is when the number of written questions is the highest, even when the PSOE is in government at the national level. Similarly, in Catalonia, the number of written questions increases substantially when the PP enters the national government and a nationalist party is present at the regional level. To some extent, the EU

Table 6.3 Number of written questions in the European Parliament to the European Commission

	Catalan (Catalonia)	**Basque**	**Galician**	**Catalan (Balearic Islands)**	**Castilian**
1999–2004	8	6	3	2	0
2004–2009	9	9	8	0	3
2009–2014	49	17	7	6	1
2014–2019	17	4	6	0	0
Total	**83**	**36**	**24**	**8**	**4**

Source: Own elaboration.

level reflects the internal conflict between Catalonia and the central government in Spain (see Chapters 4 and 5). As such, the European institutions play a role in hearing linguistic claims from representatives of the speakers of the co-official languages. Yet, since linguistic competencies are in the hands of the Spanish government and stay at the national level, the EC indirectly supports all choices made by the national government. This situation notwithstanding, the European space contributes to the visibility of regional linguistic claims in a forum that is less contaminated by national conflicts.

The EU as a space for linguistic claims of civil society

Previous chapters have highlighted the importance of CSOs in language claims. Some CSOs are also very active at the European level, where they have created strong connections. In this section, we report on the opinions of two CSOs related to the protection of the language. Our report is based on findings from CIVGOV, a project financed by the 5th Framework Program of the EC (for the period 1999–2004), and from an interview with an expert in linguistic issues (for the period 2017–2018).

1999–2004

Social movements in favour of Catalan, Basque and Galician had at the time a positive and optimistic view of the EU, which was considered to be friendlier than the member states where different languages coexisted (EC 2007). The EU was particularly relevant for social movements in defence of Catalan and Basque, as these were well structured and well organised at the European level (Gómez-Reino et al. 2005). Social movements in defence of Galician were less structured at the European level due to the difference in understanding how Galician had to be protected. For some of these organisations, Galician had to stand as an official language in Europe with the same status as the other European languages. For others, Galician was seen as being equal to Portuguese, and therefore it already had official status in the EU. This discrepancy in the defence of the Galician language contributed to the de facto weakness of the Galician social movements at the EU level. The European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL), an NGO supported by different European institutions, played an important role in coordinating the activities of social movements in the EU. The Eurocharter was perceived as being positive by those Spanish social movements in defence of the languages, and the EU altogether was seen as a useful framework for

denouncing discrimination suffered by the minority languages. The overall European structure was seen as a favourable framework both for denouncing situations qualified as 'harsh and unashamed linguistic discrimination', such as Euskara in Navarre, and for developing long-term strategies, such as the demand for co-official status of Catalan in the EU (Gómez-Reino et al. 2005).

On the negative side, however, social movements were highly critical of the dominant weight of the member states in linguistic matters and of the insufficiency of the European institutional framework regarding the co-official languages, although the interviewees recognise that the European Parliament is more open about supporting linguistic claims than the EC. In particular, the use of the concept of 'minority' to refer to non-official languages of the EU imposed a strict limit to the extent to which languages could be protected.

2017–2018

There is a more pessimistic view of the role that the EU plays in the protection and promotion of languages in Spain today. As it appears, Spanish regions have more competencies on linguistic matters than the EU has, and therefore they can guarantee a higher level of language protection than the EU. In addition, since the status of the co-official languages in Europe has not improved, the expert was very critical about the extent to which the EU is really involved in linguistic issues, although the European Parliament is again perceived as much more open than the EC. Linguistic protection, the expert claims, is mainly a matter for the regional governments, when they are willing to apply it. The expert also highly criticised the fact that the concept of minority is still in use in relation to the protection of languages:

> It seems that the concept [of minority] wants to hide that these are not the languages that the state has chosen as 'its' language (French in France; Castilian in Spain; Italian in Italy; etc.).

The expert is also highly critical of the CoE due to the lack of compliance to the ECRML of many countries, and of the fact that EBLUL was discontinued in 2010, after 28 years of activity given the lack of financing from the EC:[7]

> The disappearance of EBLUL has left without voice more than 46 million Europeans; this is a metaphor for the lack of interest of Europe in diversity.

After the EC's funding cut, and at the initiative of some of the members of EBLUL, the European Language Equality Network (ELEN) was created in 2011 by a number of CSOs to ensure the presence of the regional and minority languages at the EU level. This umbrella organisation thus acts as a controller of the EU legislative process – ensuring that the rights of regional and minority languages are protected – and as a strong lobby for the protection of regional and minority languages. All major Spanish organisations in defence of the regional and minority languages became part of ELEN, which emerged as the main forum for transferring linguistic claims to the EU. Yet representation in ELEN differs greatly across the languages: only one CSO represents Galego and Balearic Catalan,[8] two represent Basque and five represent Catalan. This unequal representation is related to the capacity of the organisations (in terms of resources and social support) and to their willingness to be present in the EU, as in the period 1999–2004, reported above. These different capacities also relate to the types of claims that are raised by the organisations within the framework of ELEN. In the Galician case, A Mesa Pola Normalización Lingüística contributes only to the annual meetings of ELEN, and supports claims related mostly to the protection of individual's rights. In contrast, Catalan organisations appear to be very active within ELEN, and their claims relate both to the protection of individual's rights and to the defence of Catalan as a collective right. For example, during the last events in Catalonia, CIEMEN introduced political claims to the General Assembly of ELEN, not strictly related to linguistic rights. The Basque organisations are also very active within ELEN, although their claims focus on the expansion of the Basque language and on its protection. For example, they have led the committee for the creation of the Donostia Protocol to Ensure Language Rights that was presented to the Council of Europe in 2016. We can therefore see that the organisations pursue different strategies at the EU level. While Galician, Basque and Balearic organisations stand for the protection and promotion of their regional languages and make use of the European level to increase visibility of their languages, Catalan organisations tend to use their networking to push the national government in relation to the conflicts at the national level.

Conclusions

Although Europe has established a number of legal and institutional tools aimed at protecting all European living languages, its role remains uncertain in relation to the protection of regional and minority

languages. The ECRML is indeed unique in its way, and it plays a major role in reporting potential abuses of linguistic rights in the countries that have committed to it. Yet not all EU member states belong to the Charter, nor are there any sanctions in cases of serious infringement. Even if experts have reported incidents regarding the conditions of some Spanish languages in the last few years, no actions have been taken by the national government to solve the existing conflicts, and there has been no pressure from the European level to improve the situation. In addition, since the EU institutions have no competencies on linguistic issues, its effective support of language protection in Spain and in other EU member states is limited and is kept at a rather symbolic level.

Notes

1 This contradiction becomes even more visible from the perspective of EU citizens' rights: the right to be educated and speak in one's own language vs. the right to move freely within the EU.
2 Reviewed by Directive 97/4/EC, Article 1(9): 'Member States shall ensure that the sale is prohibited within their own territories of foodstuffs for which the particulars provided for in Article 3 and Article 4(2) do not appear in a language easily understood by the consumer, unless the consumer is informed by means of other measures determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 17 as regards one or more labelling particulars'.
3 See, for example, this written question on the use of English as the sole language for open consultation to the EU, 'Your Voice in Europe': http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2013-008003+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
4 Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
5 We are aware that the number of written questions is very dependent on the number of representatives of each regional government in the European Parliament, and especially on the number of those who belong to a nationalist party, yet it is still a good proxy for our purposes.
6 Interestingly the same type of question is used by representatives of central government to claim against the discrimination of Castilian in the regions with a co-official language.
7 Similarly, the EC did not appoint a commissioner for multilingualism in 2014, breaking past tradition.
8 Yet, in practice, since it is the same language, Balearic Catalan receives protection by the Catalan organisations that are present in ELEN.

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7 Conclusions

The aim of this book was not only to examine the Spanish linguistic labyrinth, but also to contribute to the analysis of linguistic claims, to better understand under what conditions they are likely to emerge, and when they might accumulate and build up strength to the extent of becoming significant political conflicts. In this concluding chapter, we have three main objectives. First, to develop a final interpretation of the formulation and consequences of the linguistic claims we observed for the Spanish case, considering the four territories under examination in this book. Second, to discuss in more detail the role of the European institutions in the existing linguistic disputes in Spain. We argue that these institutions constitute a relevant contextual factor, despite their almost non-existent regulatory power in the linguistic policy area. Finally, to examine and reflect on the possible learnings that can be derived from the Spanish linguistic intricacies for other social and territorial configurations, in particular within Europe.

The sub-national and regional levels in Spain

The eight cases of linguistic claims in Spain we analysed in the previous chapters have covered a variety of situations. In most cases, claims have emerged against a regional government's proposal to modify an existing status quo which had been established a few decades before, just after Spain's transition to democracy. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established an intense process of decentralisation during the years that followed its ratification. Consequently, regional governments obtained significant responsibilities in the area of linguistic policies, in particular those territories where a native language co-existed with Castilian. Thus, in the 1980s, these regions introduced new legislation, adapted to their particular linguistic situations, to regulate and promote their languages. These regional linguistic policies relied on broad political and

social support. While they were not without controversy, those parties and movements opposing the linguistic regulations introduced after the transition in different regions did not obtain a significant electoral support. Despite their attempts to convince Spanish monolingual voters in these regions to reject the newly introduced bilingual policies, this was not a relevant political campaign issue in the 1980s.

However, two decades later, in the 2000s, the number of claims against linguistic policies in the different regions escalated, thus making political conflict visible in several cases. The salience and visibility of some of these conflicts, and their capability of mobilising support, created a potentially highly unstable environment. In addition, the policy debates moved beyond focused disputes and became part of the electoral strategies of different parties. These electoral strategies led to competing proposals about how linguistic regulations should be dealt with in each territory, and in particular about their asymmetric nature. So, in the previous chapters we focused on the examination of the conditions under which these transformations in the making of linguistic claims occurred.

The surge of linguistic claims in the 2000s, which continued into the following decade, can be related to many different factors. Two of the factors discussed before are worth highlighting. The first factor describes the intensification of the globalisation processes and the increasing dominance of English as the lingua franca of Europe, which, in turn, boosted linguistic claims as well as increasing proposals for introducing multilingual policies in bilingual territories. The pressure to cope with English as a lingua franca triggered opportunities in domestic politics to reframe the previous consensual approaches that emerged during the first years after the 1978 Constitution. Actually, their ambiguity facilitated the expansion of political initiatives aimed at diminishing the relevance of co-official languages for the sake of modernity and necessity, also reducing asymmetric regulations. The second factor refers to the consequences of the success of regional linguistic policies introduced 20 years before. In most cases, these policies managed to reverse the previous trend towards the marginalisation of local languages, expanding or universalising their use, and providing them with recognition and reputation. After the initial objectives were largely achieved, disputes emerged over the next steps to be taken, which stirred up conflicting options. These two factors – the dominance of English and the success of regional linguistic policies – manifested themselves with different intensities across the different territories and policy sectors (i.e. education, media and the public spaces), yet they were significant in almost all cases.

Despite the tensions created, the overall result we observed from the cases we examined was considerable stability. Claims in favour of maintaining the existing policy configuration were more successful, thus contributing to the policy status quo, whereas those aimed at changing linguistic policy failed. Irrespective of whether the proposals for policy change came directly from the regional government or from social movements, claims in favour of the status quo were more successful than those aimed at a policy change. In Euskadi, for example, government proposals to adopt the Catalan immersion model did not prosper. This contrasts with the effectiveness of those claims aimed at maintaining the three-option model in place. Also, in the Balearic Islands, the government's proposal to change the flexible bilingual model in order to intensify English in the classroom did not work as it was confronted by multiple claims against its implementation. These claims were finally successful in their aim to maintain the existing linguistic status quo.

Within this rather stable context, we observed variations regarding the orientation and formulation of the claims, as well as the political conflicts they initiated. The orientation of the claims was either towards defending the right to use the mother tongue, often Castilian, for educating children, or against the requirement imposed by regional governments to use the local language for informative purposes in the media and in public spaces, although not necessarily banning the use of Castilian. There were also cases where claims concentrated on defending the policies in favour of local languages against regional governmental initiatives to reduce their support for them. Most claims in Galicia and the Balearic Islands took this form. More generally, we identified claims against and in favour of the proposed reform (or the status quo). In some cases, governments did not attempt, or were not able, to activate constituencies to support their proposals.

When it came to formulation, some claims were very simply formulated, and they basically demanded the protection of individual rights. Others, on the contrary, were more complex and involved some consequential reasoning about the collective effects of individual linguistic decisions. We found single claims both from citizens requesting their right to use only Castilian, these being the most frequent, and from citizens demanding priority for their territorial languages. Political parties and social movements usually initiated more sophisticated claims which argued about the indirect effects or the dangers of the policies they intended to change. For example, claims by defenders of the linguistic immersion model in Catalonia often justified the importance of this model for ensuring equality of opportunity and social mobility for

all Catalan citizens. This was due to the creation of an almost universally bilingual society in Catalonia.

Only in two or three out of the eight selected cases did the political conflicts that emerged from the claims escalate to a high level of intensity. The other conflicts reached a medium intensity or even had a low impact on public opinion, as shown by the scarce media attention. Among the more intense conflicts, the Balearic case stands out. Triggered by an attempt to modify the education model, this proposed change to policy triggered a very intense mobilisation process and brought together multiple claims against the government's proposal. The Catalan case was also intense, with claims to dismantle the immersion model leading to a combined political and legal struggle that reached all levels of government in Spain.

This brings us back to the argument presented in the introduction of this book. Given the linguistic configurations we observe in Spain, with multiple overlapping linguistic communities, social hybridisation regarding language attitudes and varied levels of bilingualism in the multilingual regions, the potential for linguistic claims is high. Moreover, there is no doubt that many of these claims stem from a multiplicity of reasons. Thus, when some particular conditions combine with a background of persistent low-intensity tensions and policy debates, the possibility that linguistic conflicts escalate and become major political problems becomes higher. Such a potential for claims cannot be avoided, given the existence of controversial opportunities in accommodating individual and collective rights, as defined by the political systems at both the regional and the national levels. However, when a transformation of the structure of incentives related to language learning and practice appears to happen, as occurred in Spain in early 2000s, this creates the particular configuration to turn linguistic claims into major conflicts. At the same time, English emerged strongly as a lingua franca in the context of rising globalisation, making stronger its demand, while the disappearance of the selective incentive of being bilingual when this becomes universal in a territory reduced a key axis that framed the ambiguous consent of the previous period.

When linguistic claims become political conflicts, and eventually transform into electoral mobilisation and opportunistic political behaviour, they create a window of opportunity for moving away from the linguistic labyrinth and into the heavens of polarised linguistic confrontation. Analysing linguistic claims, their construction, formulation and their articulation allows a better understanding of how political conflicts emerge in this sensitive policy field, as shown in the

previous chapters. Both collective and individual-level claims are to some extent unavoidable and quite possibly effective for keeping debates alive within the language policy domain. Yet it is the responsibility of each political regime to process the claims. Overall, we observed that claims in the linguistic domain are more effective when made against proposed policy changes, rather than when they are intended to trigger significant linguistic reforms in a region. In the latter case at least, claims prompted adjustments and refinements to existing linguistic models and regulations but did not alter them profoundly.

The European Union

When comparing the Spanish and the EU cases, elements of continuity and discontinuity were evident in both. These elements might be considered a framework for assessing the extent to which the Spanish case – with its prevalent territorial linguistic tensions and the monolingual role of the central level of government – can be contrasted with the wider configuration of European linguistic policies and the absence of a common language identity for the whole of Europe.

The Spanish cases illustrate the conditions under which language can become a very sensitive issue, leading to conflict when particular actors perceive and frame it as justification for an electoral struggle. They also suggest when these conflicts can escalate and turn into unmanageable situations. Looking at the frequency and the potential for conflict arising from the claims in Spain, the idea of regulating an 'official', common European language, à la United States, with a bilingual model in the transnational public space, might create many difficulties. Promoting such a bilingual model, in which the 'official' language would coexist with national languages, seems inappropriate, especially because there is a high potential for generating new linguistic conflicts. In addition, if such a policy were related to individual citizens' rights and minority language rights, it could open a very uncertain linguistic controversy.

In the EU, linguistic diversity is depicted as a defining feature of European culture, and even as an element of unity; European cultural identity is framed as a culture of entrenched cultures. The lack of an official, common EU language makes the European arena a neutral space regarding linguistic diversity, and facilitates the instrumental usage of language for communication. As the EU does not have its own language, the role of European institutions can be different from that of member states when dealing with the question of linguistic diversity. Whereas member states have their own national languages, and

they articulate specific policy frameworks, the EU's legal and regulatory framework enshrines language diversity both as an EU value to be promoted and respected, and as a component of a European-wide identity. In practice, however, and given the EU's very limited competencies in the domains of culture and language, these ambitions may be wishful thinking at best. Nevertheless, the EU, as well as the CoE, has developed some soft capacities in this policy area over the years, as we have shown in the previous chapter.

Language diversity clashes with EU economic integration, although there are also internal contradictions within the EU's economic integration itself. On the one hand, in the public space, it is easier to sell products in a monolingual system and in a common market than in a multilingual system. On the other hand, in relation to education, market integration in the EU requires a plurilingual workforce to strengthen the competitiveness of its economy and to promote employment and business opportunities. There is a trend in the European public space towards reducing the cost of EU linguistic diversity, such as becoming more competitive as a single market. As an example, the EU has introduced the notion of an 'easily understood' language to favour the internal EU trade, which significantly impacts the use of minority languages in the EU.

Consequently, only the official EU languages are given voice in some public spheres, but eventually it is English that takes the lead as the main language of communication in most EU spheres. As for education, since the promotion of mobility and intercultural understanding is an important aim of the EU, it attributes a high priority to language learning. Multilingualism is a key factor for Europe's economic competitiveness. These aims led to the 'three-language policy', which implies that European citizens should master, in addition to their mother tongue, two other languages, a policy that was guided through the Bologna process.

These two trends – reducing the cost of EU linguistic diversity and attributing a high priority to language learning – have had an impact on the use of co-official languages in Spain since these introduced more complexity in language policy at the local level. However, they also clarified the rules of the game within Europe. On the one hand, the fact that the co-official languages in Spain are not official in the EU limits their capacity for getting recognition at the EU level. So, turning into their languages into official has become a growing target for Spanish bilingual regions. On the other hand, the drive of the EU to adopt English as the lingua franca has actually helped regional governments' claims for supporting the trilingual system in their

territories, even when these favoured strategies intended to diminish existing protections to the local language as we saw in Balearic Islands and Galicia.

In any case, linguistic tensions in Spain remain because linguistic communities overlap at the national and the regional levels. This adds to the limited and not even credible capacity of discretion of the Spanish main political institutions, given their traditional support of Castilian as a national and global language and its standing with a majority of monolingual citizens (excluding foreign languages). In this sense, the current EU policy on multilingualism has the potential of operating as a sort of 'neutral policy', but this has not been activated. Some insights pointed in this direction already in the 1990s; yet, many difficulties arose to adopt an active role. However, a question still lingers regarding other European institutions" potential role in determining linguistic policy. Does it make sense, for the CoE, for example, to obtain some sanctioning powers in linguistic tensions and claims, considering that national states would also take sides in most of the possible conflicts? Can the CoE become an arbitrator in case of linguistic conflicts, to prevent escalation and entrenchment?

Some final considerations for the linguistic challenges across levels

Certainly, the previous questions are important and worth exploring. So far, unfortunately, we believe it is difficult to arrive at a firm and clear answer. Based on our analysis of the Spanish cases, we suggest that the involvement of European institutions in linguistic tensions and claims may not be an impossible aim given the persistent stability of bilingual policy models over past decades; models which were implemented with broad political consensus and with the capacity of addressing linguistic claims before they led to tense political conflicts. The question, notwithstanding, is whether and how the regulation of linguistic diversity and linguistic rights in Europe can really be promoted through an arbitration policy. The uncertainty is due to the clear divide between the European sociological context of a wide linguistic diversity and a transnational public space where some global languages operate as linguae francae.

There are 24 officially recognised languages in the EU, more than 60 regional and minority languages, and many other languages spoken by migrant minorities. Despite this extraordinary linguistic diversity, the most spoken foreign languages – English, French and German – constitute a parallel, much more homogeneous, linguistic space; one

which operates in the European wider space, but also in EU institutions and in EU policies. There is the need, for this reason, to look forward beyond linguistic regulation and introduce more active language policies in Europe to maintain such linguistic variety, and not only for preserving ethnic or territorial identity.

Language diversity and linguistic communities create what is possibly one of the most important political and cultural barriers EU citizens face when they exercise their right of free movement. This diversity also works as an obstacle to the creation of a common public space to share policy deliberations and judgements. The right to work, study and reside in another member state is strongly constrained by Europe's linguistic diversity. Even if the linguistic rights of EU citizens who move country are not guaranteed in terms of their mother tongue, when they do move to another country, multilingualism can be considered a by-product of their mobility. In this sense, EU mobility programmes can be viewed as promoting the emergence of a multilingual European space, capable of including minority languages, if they include a more active language policy. The promotion of multilingualism by means of such programmes for guaranteeing linguistic diversity suggests that EU cultural policy should promote language learning of the less-spoken European languages as a matter of European identity. The advancement of multilingualism through the promotion of spatial mobility requires affirmative action regarding EU peripheral territories and their languages.

Historically, the common idea of language as a central element of collective identity has been very powerful, inspiring nation-building in multiple cases, as we saw with some of the Spanish governments until current times. In turn, this could work as an example for the EU to avoid, by showing that the promotion of one, or a few, common, official EU languages to enhance European identity can even worsen the existing divisions at the national and the supranational levels. In terms of language and identity, diversity operates as a constitutive principle of European identity. In this sense, the promotion of non-hegemonic EU languages would not only promote diversity as an EU value, but it might also operate as a factor promoting a European identity. In parallel, the English language, in its role as the lingua franca – a language for communication, irrespective of mother tongues and national identities – could become a part of a basic linguistic right to exercise some fundamental communication functions in the entire EU territory at all administrative levels.

Preserving multilingualism is certainly a challenge, especially in a context marked by budgetary constraints at both the domestic and

the EU levels. Overall, the EU relies on the principle of multilingualism as the rationale for its multiple official and working languages. Based on the examination and analysis of Spanish linguistic conflicts, we can conclude that, apart from the EU's efforts to prioritise language learning, procedural elements should also be considered. Thus, the EU could offer a useful procedural strategy or model that might help ease domestic linguistic concerns. Furthermore, we believe that a more flexible approach to linguistic policies, combining measures aimed at facilitating the movement of people and goods across Europe with asymmetric regulations to protect regional and minority languages, would be a commendable principle if their implementation carefully prevented them from developing into political conflicts, and an external arbiter were available when necessary.

Finally, and as a possible objective for an enhanced European citizenship, in those cases in which the potential for linguistic claims to escalate is very high due to the salience of the case, it would be highly recommended to define stabilisation mechanisms as much as possible to avoid the emergence of major political conflicts. Additionally, the CoE could play a relevant role by guaranteeing minimum linguistic rights, independently from, and with no links to, national identities and regional frames. Actually, the linguistic claims that we have analysed in Spain do have the potential of escalating into vivid political conflicts, producing strong motivations for electoral competition. This could happen also in other territories, beyond the Spanish cases, if some conditions apply. However, we should point out that these actors' strategies were not completely successful in many cases, as most of their linguistic claims mixed perceptions of identity in the same argument as instrumental reasoning. Linguistic claims, both in favour of the use of Castilian and in favour of the local language, tended to express a 'soft' notion of community in their demands, eventually expecting to balance the linguistic and political communities, but avoiding any reference to strong national identities. Because claims originated in overlapping communities which share multiple identities, they emphasise those instrumental advantages that can derive from the policy proposal they were defending. These instrumental advantages can range from the growing importance of English in these times of globalisation to the positive externalities for children learning perfect Catalan when living in Catalonia. So, we also find that bilingual or multilingual societies show some self-reduction mechanisms that prevent escalation in many cases of conflict.

Certainly, rather than transforming or profoundly altering existing linguistic models that have been working successfully with broad

social support for decades, what we have observed is that linguistic claims in Spain often encouraged public debate on the interactions between the collective will of a region, European citizenship rights and existing linguistic policies. Not always, however, were these linguistic claims based on the acknowledgement of multilingualism and the need to grant symbolic recognition architectures and linguistic rights to all existing languages. Opportunistic political behaviour and asymmetric power relations favouring the dominant language were also involved in linguistic claims, as we have observed in some of the cases examined. However, this is not the entire history behind linguistic confrontations in Spain. They have created conflicts as far as they tried to benefit from a particular context in which incentives to language learning and practice apparently changed quite quickly. Once this particular context evolved into a more nuanced situation, and perceptions on changing incentives stabilised or even reduced, payoffs of such opportunistic strategies became more and more uncertain.

More broadly, we can conclude by suggesting that, to the extent that linguistic claims can be expressed through political debates and dialogue by means of policy processes – which eventually lead to improved policy analysis or even to policy adjustments – they can contribute to keeping rich and vibrant political communities flourishing and not necessarily provoking major political tensions and disputes despite growing linguistic complexity.

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